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Summary
On the basis of a comparative analysis of the case law in Germany, England and South Africa
dealing with fundamental change of circumstances, it is submitted that the underlying
principle of this problem area is the idea of frustration of the contractual purpose (causa
finalis). The problem of fundamental change of circumstances is directly connected with
basic issues of legal theory such as the dichotomy between legal certainty and substantive
justice, the role and limits of interpretation, the concretisation of principles, the adjudication
of interests and the problem of value-judgements in the law which are of immediate influence
on the understanding of the problem by judges and legal commentators. A broad perspective
on the topic is necessarily indicated hereby.
The thesis therefore starts off with an account of the role of purpose (causa finalis) in the
history of legal philosophy, with a focus on developments in Germany. The continuing
relevance of Aristotelian-Thomistic legal thinking is emphasized. The German and English
case law dealing with fundamental change of circumstances is analyzed in an analogous
manner. An account of the history and development of the doctrines dealing specifically with
fundamental change of circumstances is given: the clausuIa rebus sic stantibus of the ius
commune, the doctrine of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany and the doctrine of
frustration of contract and common mistake in England. The crucial elements of the approach
of the courts are restated. The positions of the two most influential German legal authors
involved on opposite sides of the debate concerning the doctrine of WegJall der
Geschaftsgrundlage are discussed. At the end of the discussion of English case law, the
approach of the English courts is compared with that of their German counterparts, providing
a basis for the development of the author's understanding of the concept causafinalis.
Notwithstanding the fact that South African law does not recognize a doctrine dealing
specifically with fundamental change of circumstances, and in spite of dicta to the effect that
the English doctrine of frustration of contract is not part of South African law, it is submitted
that the doctrine of frustration of contract has nevertheless strongly influenced the South
African law of supervening impossibility and supposition, and has arguably become part and
parcel of it. Likewise, cases of frustration of the contractual purpose due to a fundamental
change of circumstances have been dealt with by means of other doctrinal devices such as
common mistake. It is submitted, finally, that the famous and controversial issue of the role
of causa in South African law should be reconsidered, since it may contribute to the
understanding of the notion of contract, and assist in overcoming the current doctrinal crisis
of the theory of contract.
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2Opsomming
Aan die hand van 'n vergelykende analise van die regspraak in Duitsland, Engeland en Suid-
Afrika betreffende fundamentele verandering van omstandighede, word ter oorweging gegee
dat die beginselonderliggend aan hierdie probleemgebied te vind is in die gedagte van
verydeling van die kontraksoogmerk. Die probleem van fundamentele verandering van
omstandighede staan in onmiddellike verband met basiese vrae van die regsteorie, onder
andere die teenstelling tussen regsekerheid en substantiewe geregtigheid, die rol en perke van
uitleg, die konkretisering van beginsels, die opweging van belange en die probleem van
waarde-oordele in juridiese verband wat almal inspeel op die hantering van die probleem deur
regters en kommentatore. Met die oog hierop is 'n breë invalshoek op die ondersoekveld
gebiedend.
Die ondersoek neem derhalwe as vertrekpunt 'n oorsig oor die rol van oogmerk (causa
finalis) in die geskiedenis van die regsfilosofie met 'n besondere klem op ontwikkelinge in
Duitsland. Die deurlopende belang van Aristoteliaans- Thomistiese denkwyses word
beklemtoon. Die Duitse en Engelse regspraak betreffende fundamentele verandering van
omstandighede word op 'n eenvormige grondslag ontleed. 'n Oorsig van die geskiedenis van
leerstukke wat spesifiek verband hou met fundamentele verandering van omstandighede word
aangepak, te wete die sg clausuia rebus sic stantibus van die ius commune en die leerstuk van
Wegfall der Geschafstgrundlage in Duitsland en die leerstuk van frustration of contract en
common mistake in Engeland. Die kemaspek van die benadering van die howe word
uitgespel. Die botsende standpunte van twee van die mees invloedryke Duitse denkers in die
teoretiese debat bied 'n breë konseptueie raamwerk vir die uiteindelike vergelyking van die
Engelse regspraak met die van die Duitse howe en die ontwikkeling van 'n eie standpunt
aangaande die begrip causafinalis.
Die Suid-Afrikaanse reg erken nie 10 soveel woorde dat veranderende omstandighede as
sodanig die bestaan van 'n kontrak raak nie, en in die besonder word die Engelsregtelike
leerstuk van frustration of contract in vele regterlike dicta verwerp. Die ondersoek na die
Suid-Afrikaanse respraak lei egter tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse reg
aangaande onmoontlikwording van prestasie en die veronderstelling inderdaad in wesenlike
opsigte deur die leerstuk van frustration beïnvloed is. Verydeling van die kontraksoogmerk
ten gevolge van veranderende omstandighede geniet ook juridiese erkenning deur middel van
. ander juridiese meganismes soos die leerstuk van gemeenskaplike dwaling. Die slotsom van
die behandeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg is dat die berugte en omstrede rol van causa in
die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg herwaardering verg.
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8Introduction
As a matter of course, contracts are made to settle the terms of agreements and to keep the parties
bound thereto -pacta sunt servanda. But it is equally a matter of course that agreements and contracts
develop out of certain circumstances and in contrast to the fixation of the agreement in the contract,
those circumstances can naturally never be finally settled. Life goes on and is characterised by
continual change.
Obviously, most of these changes have no bearing upon the contract, for the very reason for the
conclusion of the contract was to protect the agreement from change. But sometimes circumstances
which are vital for the agreement change in such a fundamental manner as to put the contract under
considerable strain. Beyond a certain degree of strain it becomes questionable whether adherence to
the contract still makes sense. After all, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not an end in itself.
The crucial methodological problem in relation to the problem of changed circumstances is how to
justify the intervention into the contract, and where to draw the line in view of the infinite range of
possible factual situations. There are as many potential cases as possible circumstances and there is
no general pattern of fundamental change of circumstances. This is what makes it especially difficult
for the law to deal with the problem of changed circumstances since it is bound to lay down abstract
rules for the sake of legal certainty.
Thus, one of the most important determinants of any response to the problem of fundamental change
of circumstances, which gave rise to the doctrines of clausula rebus sic stantibus of the ius commune, I
the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany' and the doctrine of frustration of
contract in England;' is the classic dichotomy between the goal of legal certainty and the ideal of
substantive justice in the individual case.
There is much dispute on just how far one mayor has to go: Where are the borders required by legal
certainty? What are the limits of interpretation? How does the process of concretisation of general
principles take place? Which are the standards to employ in this concretisation? The position of
jurists in view of the abovementioned doctrines depends to a great extent on the stance taken on these
fundamental issues. Connected with this is the question whether a distinctive legal device is really
IPart II § 1.
2Part II § 2.
Jpart III.
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9necessary for the resolution of this problem, or whether established rules of law and the normal rules
of interpretation are sufficient to cope with problematic cases. Preconceived opinions shape every
author's understanding of the role of the established rules of law, the role of interpretation, the role of
bona fides and the role of purpose (or causa) in the law. This understanding, in turn, shapes the
individual author's opinion on the contours of each doctrine. The opinions oscillate between two
poles: the negative pole denies that doctrines regarding the effect of changed circumstances have any
justification and claims that a solution must and can always be found in other established rules of law,
whereas the positive pole acknowledges the doctrines as evidence of a general principle and a means
of filling gaps in the law, based on judge-made law and the demands of substantive justice. These
poles are personified in a characteristic manner by two of Germany's most influential legal scholars:
Werner Flume and Karl Larenz.'
All three doctrines referred to above have developed out of a specific practical need which had to be
satisfied by the courts. Yet the question remains whether the other established rules of law and the
inherited rules of interpretation can deal with the problem more effectively and reasonably (e.g.
without a resort to fictions). Do they really offer more legal certainty, more foreseeability, and more
precision? Or do they only veil the inevitable process of evaluative judgement (Wertung) more than
they rationalise it? Do the three abovementioned doctrines not, in the end, - understood correctly in
the light of a more fundamental enquiry into the far-reaching methodological and even philosophical
questions entailed by the topic - make the solution of the specific problem of fundamental change of
circumstances more rational, predictable, precise? If so, it would be better to persist with them and to
improve them with reference to the results of a broad historical analysis of the methodological and
philosophical premises of the law. When the decisions of the cases in question are not only based on
purely equitable reasoning but also on intelligible and refined rules derived from a clear principle
firmly rooted in legal history and theory, then the imperative of legal certainty should be satisfied.
The decisive question raised by the problem of fundamental change of circumstances is under what
conditions may the principle of pacta sun! servanda be set aside? Under what circumstances is it
justified to dissolve a contract? Which changes influence the binding character of a contract and
which don't? What is the decisive aspect that may question the validity of a contract? The question for
the abstract principle involved in cases of fundamental change of circumstances can only be answered
with recourse to the nature, the essence of the concept of contract and the nature of law itself.
Therefore, the answer to the problem of fundamental change of circumstances depends directly on the
theory of contract itself.
IPart Il § 3.
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The formulations used in the context of clausuIa, Geschaftsgrundlage, and frustration of contract are
in the final analysis all directed towards the same crucial point: the change of circumstances is held to
touch on the "nature" of the contract, its "foundation" or "basis", it makes the contract "radically
different", it obstructs the "purpose" of the transaction, the "common object" of the parties. I The
formulations employed show that the problem finally can be reduced to the question as to what
determines the nature, what makes up the essence of a contract. What is the "basis", the "foundation"
of a contract? Simply the autonomous will of the parties? Or rather the inherent ethical premises of
the legal system? When does a contract become "radically different" compared to before the change
of circumstances? What is the "purpose" of a contract? Can there be something like "the" purpose of a
contract? How can the purpose or the foundation of the contract be determined? These questions
cannot simply be answered with reference to the facts of the individual case by means of
interpretation since they touch directly on our understanding of contract in general. Recourse to legal
philosophy and methodology is therefore indispensable.
Due to this perception the thesis starts off with a short account of the understanding of law in general
in the history of legal philosophy - which in turn determines the understanding of contract in
particular - in order to supply the necessary background to appreciate the dimension and implications
of the problem in issue here.
The account focuses to a certain extent on the role of purpose in the law because it is submitted in this
thesis that the basic principle governing cases of fundamental change of circumstances and underlying
the doctrines of clausula rebus sic stantibus, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of
contract is that of frustration of the contractual purpose (causa finalis). The role of purpose is an
underestimated but crucial element of our understanding of contract and of law in general. The
essence or nature of a contract - and therefore its" Icundation'' or "basis" - can only be determined by
taking into account the contractual purpose, that is the end for the sake of which the contract was
entered and to which it was designed to constitute the means. If that purpose is frustrated by a
fundamental change of circumstances, the contract fundamentally changes its significance, it becomes
"radically different". In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the contractual purpose - on the abstract
level - is considered to be either commutative justice (in a broad sense) or liberality.
The first part of the thesis therefore describes the impact of the Aristotel ian-Thomistic phi losophy of
essences linked to ends (causa finalis) on the law of contract, its decline in the Age of Enlightenment
(Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant) and the consequences of that decline for the legal theory of the 19th
century (Savigny, Puchta, Windscheid), as well as the development toward a "renaissance" of
1See especially Part II § 2.1, Part III § 1.1.2.
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Aristotelian-Thomistic ideas in the modern German Wertungsjurisprudenz (Larenz) and legal
ontology (Kaufmann) which was made possible through the renewed interest in the role of purpose in
the law beginning with Ihering and the overcoming of the positivistic concept of science by Neo-
Kantianism (Rickert, Stamrnier, Radbruch) and phenomenology (Husserl).
Before the background of the philosophical developments, the second part of the thesis describes the
rise and fall of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, the answer of the ius commune to the problem of
fundamental change of circumstances, and the emergence of its modern German counterpart, the
doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage' The contemporary approach of the German courts
towards the doctrine is analyzed and the discussion concerning the doctrine in German legal science is
reflected by describing the position of the most influential opponents concerning this subject, Werner
Flume and Karl Larenz.2 It is argued that the position of Karl Larenz is convincing since it is based
firmly on a clear understanding and evaluation of the philosophical and methodological implications
of the problem of fundamental change of circumstances. On the basis of the discussion of the
philosophical background, the historical development of the doctrine, its treatment by German courts
and the exposition of the topic by Karl Larenz, it is argued that the cases of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage may well be categorised and evaluated on the basis of the principle of frustration
of the contractual purpose (causa finalisi'
Essentially the same path of investigation is followed in the third part of the thesis, dealing with
fundamental change of circumstances in English law. An account of the development of the doctrine
of frustration of contract is given and the characteristic but crucial confusion concerning the decisive
underlying principle is highlighted." The close relationship between the common law treatment of
frustration of contract and common mistake is emphasized.' The similar treatment of the relevant
cases and the fact that common mistake is considered an instance of tile doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany bears witness that the same underlying principle is concerned. The
analysis of the approach of English courts towards the doctrine of frustration of contract shows that
essentially the same criteria are employed by both English and German courts when applying the
respective doctrines.6 The respective decisive criteria, "radical change of the obligation" and
"Unzumutbarkeit", are different insofar as they reveal a characteristic difference in the approach of
the legal traditions of the two countries (English law focuses on the contract, German law focuses on
'PartlI§ 1.
2Part II §§ 2 and 3.
Jpart II § 4.
"Part III §§ 1.1.1. and r.r.z.
5Part III § 1.2.
6Part III § 2.
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the aggrieved party), but on the other hand not so far from each other concerning the basic underlying
principle. Consequently - and not surprisingly - the English cases of frustration of contract and
common mistake can be categorised and analyzed the same way as it was done with the German
cases. I An assessment of similarities and differences between the English and the German approach
concludes this part of the thesis?
Before coming to the role of fundamental change of circumstances in the South African law of
contract, the results of the foregoing parts of the thesis are concentrated in a restatement and analysis
of causa finalis as the informing underlying principle of the doctrines of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract.'
Finally, the way South African contract law deals with fundamental change of circumstances is
analyzed from the perspective developed in the earlier parts of the thesis. It is argued that the
predominant view among South African courts and legal scholars that South African law does not
accommodate any kind of frustration doctrine and that the notion of causa has no role to play in
contract law - and should accordingly be ousted completely - is incorrect in this rigid generality."
Several aspects of the South African law of contract dealing with cases of fundamental change of
circumstances are analyzed and it is argued that the principle of causa finalis can be regarded as the
decisive aspect of the cases discussed.'
The study of the nature, the history and development of clausuia rebus sic stantibus, Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract may prove to be an illustrative factor in the search for
a coherent theory of contract in order to stop the current doctrinal crisis and continuing disintegration
of Private Law."
'Part III § 3.
2Part III § 4.
Jpart IV.
"Part V §§ 2.5., 3 at the end.
5Part V §§ 2.1. - 2.3., 3.
60n this see Gordley Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, 8,9; in general: Grant Gilmore The Death of
Contract 1974 102. From a German perspective: Wolfgang Zollner "Zivilrechtswissenschaft und Zivilrecht im ausgehenden
20. Jahrhundert" AcP 188 (1988) 92; Arthur Kaufmann "Die 'Ipsa Res Iusta'' I. Festschrift Larenz 1973 (Kaufmann also
expressly refers to Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle); Joachim Hruschka "Vorpositives Recht als Gegenstand und Aufgabe der
Rechtswissenschaft" Juristenzeitung 1992 429sqq.
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Part I: Change of circumstances in legal philosophy: the role of purpose in the law
1. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy
According to Aristotle, the world is made up of individual things, called "substances", e.g. people,
animals, plants and things. He further identifies two major kinds of order in the world: the order of
part to whole and the order of means (causes) to ends (effects), the first being based on the second.
The essence of any substance is determined by its four basic causes: efficient cause (causa efficiens,
which brings a thing into being, e.g. the parents of an animal or human being), substantial form (causa
formalis), matter (causa materialist, and the "final cause" or "end" (causa finalis), which is the
purpose of the thing's existence, e.g. for a flower to grow and blossom. The essence of a thing is
therefore linked (also) to the purpose, or end, of its existence. By understanding the causes of a thing
one can formulate a definition, thus capturing its essence. Matter and form were considered as internal
causes (causae intrinsecae) and efficient and final cause as external causes (causae extrinsecae). The
causa efficiens could be further subdivided into causa factiva, which necessarily brought about a
certain effect, and causa impuls iva, which did not bring about an effect necessarily but gave an
impulse into its direction. The concept of causafinalis proved to be the most fertile for the use of the
lawyers. All events consist of causes and effects. All effects depend on causes. These causes can be
proximate (causa proxima) or remote (causa remota). But the effect can only be established if the
cause is sufficient therefore (causa sufficiens). Man too, has an ultimate end, a causa finalis: he is
designed to live a fully human life by fostering and developing his natural assets accorded him by
creation. The tool to reach that end is the most significant of all the assets given to man: the human
reason. Through it, man is able to understand the ends of his actions and the contribution they make to
his ultimate end. Means (causes) to that end (effect) are above all the human virtues, which form the
main subject of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The specific virtues that became especially
influential on medieval contract doctrine and thus also on the doctrine of causa were the aristotelian
virtues of promise - keeping, liberality and commutative justice.
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) was the first to apply this broad approach to particular - and also legal-
human actions, such as promise-keeping and marriage, by examining the moral lawfulness of human
actions. He went beyond Aristotle's discussion of virtue and described a moral law, a "natural law",
that governs the keeping of promises, thereby christianizing Aristotle. He perceived that because the
essence of a thing is defined by its end, legal actions, like all actions, were also required to have the
final cause in the sense of being the means to a particular end and in serving this end (designed by the
acting individuals) had to, correspond to the underlying virtues that were by definition best suited to
attain the partiesenvisaged end. These were, again, either liberality - giving or doing something for
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purely benevolent reasons to the right people, the right amounts at the right time without expecting
something in return - or commutative justice - that is expecting something of equal value in return.
The corresponding virtues assured that there could be no arbitrary cause, they defined the acceptable
causes on which in turn the enforcement of the obligation depended. A cause not corresponding to
either of the virtues would not have served the end of the obligation which was also not left entirely to
the parties, but had to correspond to the ultimate end ( = final cause) of man.' In that case, the causa
was not sufficiens and could therefore not reach its effect (the ultimate end): "cessante causa cessat
effectus'" - the obligation could not be enforced.
To put it more specifically, the effect of changing circumstances can represent, In Aristotelian-
thomistic terminology, an involuntariness of the 2nd degree: According to Aristotle and later Thomas
Aquinas, man acts through reason and will. Reason is the capacity to understand the ends of one's
actions and the contribution they make to the ultimate end of man.' Will is the capacity to choose for
the sake of this end.4 This is the crucial point of thomistic understanding of contract law. Contracts
had to correspond to the will of the parties, but to the will as it was understood according to Thomas
and Aristotle. First of all, a party had to understand the essentialia of the specific contract, the
elements which made up its "essence" (as opposed to the accidentaliaï? If these essentials were not
understood, the contract would not be binding. One could speak of an unvoluntariness in the 1st
degree. But, according to Thomas, even if the party was clear about all the essentials, circumstances
might arise under which the party would still not be bound. The source for this position is Aristotle's
theory of equity in the Nicomachean Ethics Book V, chapter 10: as a matter of equity, a law should
not be applied if the law-giver had not meant it to be applied under the given circumstances. Since
Thomas saw promises as laws of the parties, he transferred this rule to promises and thereby to
contracts: contracts are not binding under circumstances under which the contracting party did not
intend to be bound." This, of course, is too general and Thomas differentiated further: if
circumstances become onerous but the end of a contracting party is still attainable, that party is kept
bound. If, on the other hand, the envisaged end is unattainable because of the change of
circumstances, then these circumstances are outside the commitment of the party and the contract is
not binding because of, as one could say, involuntariness in the 2nd degree, meaning that there is no
involuntariness in the literal sense but in the sense that the will which led to the formation of the
Ifor a detailed account: Gordley 17sqq. and 49sqq.
2Thomas Aquinas Summa theologica Suppl, Qu. 55 art. 2 n. I.
JNicomachedn Ethics Book I chapter 7 and 9.
4Nicomachean Ethics Book II chapter 2 and 4.
5Summa theologica Supp!. q. 51, a. 2, ad 7.
6Summa theologica II-II, q. 88, a. 10; q. 89, .a. 9; q. 120, a. I.
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contract corresponds no more to the originally envisaged end.' If the envisaged end (causa finalis)
cannot be attained by means of the contract, then the contract lacks a causa. Since the reason for the
enforcement of contracts is that the parties enter it in order to achieve a certain end, a "good cause" or
causa sufficiens, thereby giving the contract its causa, there is no point in enforcing it. Furthermore,
as described above, contracts, as being means to ends, were regarded as an exercise of the underlying
virtues (in the case of exchange the virtue of commutative justice, demanding equality in exchange),
the exercise of which was perceived as being the means best suited to achieve the parties' envisaged
aims just as they were - and because they were - best suited for the achievement of man's ultimate
end. Therefore, the contracts had to conform to these virtues.
This concept, however, only makes sense, if the will of the party is not treated separately from the
causa (as being the end, aim or purpose of the will) but in close relationship with it. When will and
purpose were divorced later on, beginning with the natural lawyers and culminating in the time of the
19th century pandectists, this concept could not work anymore and legal tools like the clausula rebus
sic stantibus were to be increasingly criticised and eventually abolished. One of the main reasons for
this was the fact that once Thomistic-Aristotelian philosophy was challenged by more modern
philosophers, the understanding of its basic ideas and concepts slowly faded into oblivion, often
leaving the jurists with legal rules which they could not explain anymore and therefore tended to
restrict and eventually abolish? The Aristotelian metaphysics of essences linked to ends was
especially attacked by later philosophers who challenged the legitimacy of speaking both of essences
andan ultimate end of man.'
One nevertheless feels reminded today of these Aristotelian-Thomistic concepts when observing the
modern German remedy of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage. The Geschaftsgrundlage (basis of the
transaction) reminds one of the causa and the two main reasons for granting the remedy, frustration of
purpose (Zweckstdrung) and frustration of equality in exchange (Aquivalenzstdrung), seem very
familiar after contemplating the doctrine of causa, since they today lead to the collapse (Wegjall) of
the Geschaftsgrundlage, just as they used to rob the contract of its causa in the Middle Ages.
'see for details: Gordley Philosophical Origins 86 87.
2Larenz Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung 3rd ed. 1963 12 fn. 20 at the bottom.
lsee for details: Gordley Philosophical Origins 23sqq. and 113sqq.
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2. The decline of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy
The philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas became largely discredited by modern philosophical
movements starting with nominalism and voluntarism and then especially in the Age of Enlightment
as a result of the thought of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and Hume.
This development originated in the great intellectual and philosophical struggle which called into
question the whole medieval perception of the world (Universalienstreit): the question of what was at
the origin of reality, what comes first (and must therefore be the basis for all reasoning): the
universalia (the abstract, general, the idea of a thing) or the realia (the concrete, empiric)?
The medieval perception of the world rested on the assumption that the realia derived from the
universalia, that at the base and origin of every concrete thing was the abstract idea of that thing by
which it was determined, which determined its essence. Thus one could define the order of the world
by tracing back all concrete things to their original ideas and all things inevitably had to behave
according to those ideas since they determined their essences. This was also the starting point of
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Scholars, however, increasingly turned away from the abstract
ideas to study the concrete things of the world right before their eyes and, observing their diversity,
became more and more sceptical about the validity of the abstract ideas.
John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) said that man possesses not a single form (or essence) but a number of
distinct "formalities". Matter, life, animality, rationality, intellect, will, - all are distinct formalities.
For Thomas, they are united in a single form because, for example, rationality is a certain realization
of the potentialities of animality and animality in turn a realization of the potentialities of being alive.
Scotus objected that this means describing purely in terms of potentiality something that is supposed
really to exist. Therefore, an entity is like a series of transparencies overlaid to form a picture, each
transparency being incomplete without the others. But the transparencies are not parts with separate
functions, one cannot study them as Aristotle and Thomas did. Consequently, Scotus discussed
contract by decomposing it into a cluster of conceptually distinct elements. Since they exist
independently from each other, they cannot be defined or explained in terms of their end or function.
The analysis is conceptual, but no longer teleological.
William of Ockham (1280-1349) went even further. He said that individual things have neither
essential forms nor formalities. To him, concepts such as "man" were merely "intellections",
"cognitions".' Nevertheless, Ockham claimed that a "demonstrative moral science" could "deduce
'William of Ockham Expositio super primum librum Perihermenias cap. I in Traditio 4 (1946), 323.
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conclusions syllogistically" from principles known either "of themselves" (per se) or "through
experience" (per experientiami.' Ockham's views influenced Descartes, who asked how he could
prove to himself that the objects around him really existed. He might be dreaming or the victim of
illusions.i According to Descartes therefore, one could prove nothing about the outside world on the
basis of perceptions alone.
Hobbes and Locke concluded that one ought not make assertions about the outside world that went
beyond one's experience. To be meaningful, the words we use should refer to an experience or a
combination of experiences.' Therefore, according to Hobbes and Locke, the fundamental terms of
Aristotelian metaphysics such as substantial form, nature, essence, and final cause or end were
meaningless, human thought proceeds not by abstracting the essence of an object, but by grouping
experiences together. This perception was reinforced by the impression which the physical
discoveries of Galileo and later Newton made on their contemporaries. Their method stressed
experimental observation and mathematics, the new science described its objects without regard to
their substantial form or end. Locke called the experiences themselves "simple ideas", the
combination of them "complex ideas"." Human thought would therefore have to be explained without
using the concept of essence, morality without using the concept of the end of man. Moral
Philosophy needed a new basis since one could no longer speak of activities that contribute to the end
of man or the virtues that make such activities possible. Experiences can be agreeable or disagreeable.
Hobbes spoke of these feelings as "appetite" and "aversion". Locke spoke of the "pursuit of
pleasure" and "avoidance of pain". He redefined good, happiness and obligation in terms of the
pursuit of pleasure: "What has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is
apt to produce pain in us we call evil".' But from that point of view, it seems one could have no
obligation except to pursue pleasure and avoid pain in any way one could. Hobbes and Locke tried to
avoid this conclusion by describing society as a contract in which each person limits the ways he
pursues pleasure and avoids pain in order to benefit from the limitations assumed by others." Both
rejected the idea of ultimate essences and an ultimate standard of contract. Yet, people were
supposed to be bound by a contract even when they could get away with violating it. Hobbes and
Locke maintained that one could formulate definitions even in a world without essences and derive
the necessary rules as consequences from these definitions. A contract by definition was binding.
'William ofOckham Quodlibeta ii q. 14.
2Descartes Méditations méd. I in Oeuvres (Paris, 1967), ii. 404-13.
lLocke Essay on human understanding II. i. 2 (in: The works of John Locke, London, 1823); Hobbes, Leviathan,
(Cambridge, 1935), I. i at I; I. iv at 18-20.
"Hobbes, supra, I. i at 1; I. iv at 18-20; I. v at 21-2; Locke, supra, II. ii. 1; xii. I.
5Locke supra II. xxi. 54; similarly Hobbes supra I. vi at 30.
"Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II. viii. 95; Hobbes, supra, II. xvii at I 19.
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The obligations of those entering into a contract follow from its definition by deductive logic. But
now, consequentially, definitions had to be reached in a way different from how Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas had defined things. Locke tried to explain how one could formulate definitions in his Essay
on Human Understanding. Definitions were "complex ideas" which were made by combining
"simple ideas". The simple ideas were combined either because they were observed to "go constantly
[logically, necessari ly] together" or "very arbitrarily ...without patterns or reference to any real
existence". Definitions of moral ideas such as "government" or "contract" were not made in the first
way. One did not define contract to entail an obligation because one observed by experience that the
persons who made contracts also happened to be bound by obligations. Therefore, definitions of
moral ideas were made by combining simple ideas arbitrarily. If that is so, however, it seems that the
conclusions drawn from these definitions were equally arbitrary. Locke himself observed the
dilemma: if "moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas" and these "be
of our own making", will there not be "a confusion of virtues and vices, if everyone may make what
ideas of them he pleases"?' The answer he tries to give sounds already like a partial retreat:
"complex ideas ...depend on the mind and are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made at
random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not always
copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made".' Locke's
answer, however, presupposed that simple ideas were related in some way that did not depend on the
arbitrary choice of the definer. To whose or what "end", however, are some definitions more suited
than others? One could no longer speak of an ultimate end of man but only of the different and
conflicting ends of individuals.
David Hume recognized that this answer was not satisfactory and was willing to face the intellectual
consequences. He concluded that morality could not rest on reason because it could not be deduced
from observing reality. "Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood". Truth or falsehood
depended either on "real existence and matter of fact" or on "real relations of ideas", of which there
are four kinds: relation by resemblance, by quantity, by quality or by contrariety. None of them has
anything to do with law and morals. Therefore, statements about morality were statements about
feelings for which no reasons could be given.' But how then explain why a contract should be
binding? Hume resorted to a historical argument: the feeling that one is bound by a contract must
have developed in societies so small that contracts would be kept out of self-interest alone, since, if a
person violated his contract, others would immediately lose their motive for co-operating with him.
When societies became larger, people were already accustomed to seeing contracts kept, and so they
'Locke, supra, IV. iv. 9.
2Locke, supra, III. v. 7.
lHume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (London, 1886), book 3, pt. 1, sect. 1, at ii. 236, 240.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19
felt displeasure at seeing them violated even when they were not the ones to suffer.' In a similar way,
the jurists of the 19th century, especially the "Historical school of law" explained law primarily as
something that had developed historically but did not concern themselves with explaining why to
abide by those rules in terms of virtues and morality, at least not in a manner which influenced their
account of the law in detail, apart from some general statements in introductory parts. In the end,
Hume's explanation gives a person no genuine reason whatever to abide by a contract.'
Thus, Hume pronounced in a most radical manner the apparently inevitable separation of the "Is" and
the "Ought" and the dilemma that resulted from it - especially crucial for the field of the law - which
has marked philosophical and legal thought until today. It was perceived that the Ought can not be
deduced from the Is, both are separated by a seemingly unbridgeable gap. Morality and ethics are
outside of and unconnected with empiric reality .. From this perception developed the tendency to
keep morality and ethics out of the field of scientific reasoning, which came to be seen as the only
legitimate form of human reasoning. Jurisprudence - considered as a legal science - was no exception
to this approach. Legal doctrine and moral philosophy were to be strictly kept apart.' The jurists of
the 19th century did not deny values but did not see them as an object of their science, claiming that
one could explain law without making philosophical commitments. For that reason too, the jurists of
the 19th and 20th century' rejected the natural law, because it built essentially on an Aristotelian-
Thomistic foundation and had been in fact founded by the late scholastics and later "secularized" by
Grotius and his successors by taking over Thomistic concepts without explaining them in terms of
Thomistic-Aristotelian philosophy. The jurists of the 19th century only took over the systematical
achievements of the natural lawyers and their scholastic predecessors because that served their
scientific aim. This development was also the root for philosophical and legal positivism.
3. Kant (1724 - 1804)
Kant built his philosophy on Hume's perception of the separation of the Is and the Ought, aiming at
formulating and drawing consequences from its implications. The Is is described empirically by
physics. The Ought therefore can only be described by metaphysics. Since the Ought is strictly
separated from the Is, there is no empirical evidence for it. The source of metaphysics can therefore,
'Hurne, supra, book 3, pt. 2, sect. 2, at ii. 262-4, 270-2.
2this is a summary of the account of the development given by Gordley, Philosophical Origins, supra, 23sqq., 113sqq.
3This development took place in the whole western hemisphere. See Gordley, Philosophical Origins, supra, 214sqq. A good
example for the attitude of the 19th century jurists is Sir Frederick Pollock's article "The nature of jurisprudence considered
in relation to some recent contributions to legal science" in F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, London 1882, I
at 19-20.
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according to Kant, be only in human reason, since it is the mediating factor between the individual
(subject) and the empirical outside world (object). Reason, in turn, leads the individual to the
realization of the categoric imperative, in which alone the Ought can be firmly rooted. Since ethical
rules can only come from reason, their existence can only be a priori, without cause or end, for causes
and ends are empirical facts. Kant interprets the dilemma in a positive way: since ethical rules do not
exist independently of human reason and have no causes or ends in the empirical world, this fact
constitutes the overwhelming dignity of the individual who also has no cause or end in the empirical
world but constitutes an end in himself. He can therefore never be a means to an end other than the
end in himself. He is always a subject and may never be reduced to an object or a means to an end
other than himself. This fact demands that the freedom of every individual must be respected and this
perception of the individual is the basis of the categoric imperative.' Kant thus established an
autonomous ethic, which consequently had to be totally disconnected from the Is - the empirical
world.
According to Kant, law is part of the Ought since it demands obedience to certain rules, but it has to
be strictly separated from ethics. These two form different categories. Law has primarily to do with
force and aims at the general public. It is restricted to the good conduct which is ensured by the use
of force. Ethics, on the other hand, aim at the individual and ask to be obeyed voluntarily, according
to the categoric imperative. Whether legal rules are just or unjust is determined by their conformity to
ethical rules, but nevertheless ethics are not part of law. Ethics, in turn, are rooted in reason in the
manner described above.
Kant defines the law as the means to balance the free will of the individuals:
" ...der Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkiir des einen mit der Willkur des
anderen nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereiuigt werden
kann"?
From the separation of the Is and the Ought follows the irrelevance of ends or purposes (as empirical
facts) for the law: Kant stresses that the law aims only at the relationship between the free wills of
the individuals, not at the relationship of free will and wishes - and thus ends, purposes - which would
be the content of the will. The law should not judge the content of the free will but only the form of
the relationship of the free will of individuals because otherwise it would impose ends and purposes
on the individual and make him an object of these ends which is incompatible with the dignity and the
'Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts, vol. III, 1976, pp. 19,22,23.
2Fikentscher, supra, 26.
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freedom of the individual.! Since the law is part of the Ought, it is totally disconnected from the Is
and therefore may not tie the individual to ends which are empirical facts and therefore parts of the Is.
The Is does not determine the Ought and thus empirical ends and purposes may not determine the
judgement of acts of individuals. Kant sees the law as an enforceable Ought resulting from a
purposeless morality.i The law itself, just like the individual, is without purpose or end but
constitutes an end in itself.
Kant's approach to law is therefore formalistic.' Ethics are not inherent in the law but a totally
different category. Kant's account of the law and his radical separation of law and philosophy and
ethics is one of the landmarks in the development of legal positivism. The law to him is "pure Ought"
for which the empirical Is is irrelevant. Ethics are not totally irrelevant but are not part of the law.
They form a different category outside the law. Although Kant acknowledges that legal rules should
correspond to ethical rules in some way, he does not specify how this should occur. The interplay
between law and philosophy remains largely obscure. The important question of how to control the
law, by what standards to measure the law, the whole question of evaluative judgement
(Wertungsfrage) in the law, is neglected. The importance of philosophy not only as a general basis
but also to provide concrete standards to measure the law, is underestimated. The law becomes an
independent organism which largely explains itself. The connection to ethics is loose and continues
to loosen in the course of the century. The ethical foundation of the law remains abstract, in very
general terms, without concrete consequences for individual legal rules. The respect for the freedom
and dignity of the individual alone does not provide useful guidelines for individual legal rules and
neither does the categoric imperative, which can be interpreted in various ways as soon as it comes to
detailed problems."
It could be argued that it was not Kant's primary concern to work out all concrete consequences of his
philosophy for the law and that it would have been the task of lawyers to integrate Kant's autonomous
ethic based on reason alone into the law. Yet this did not happen, and perhaps it would not have been
very successful anyway. The Kantian ethics remained in the background and the jurists of the time,
above all Savigny, only took over Kant's formalistic and individualistic (and thus subjective)
approach to law, regarding it as an autonomous organism, free of any purpose or end, whose content
is nothing but the positive legal rules themselves as inherited from history. Ethics are part of
philosophy, separate from the law, and therefore not within their field of study.' These jurists
accepted Kant's ethics of freedom and dignity of the individual as a - somewhat remote - basis but did
'Fikentscher, supra, 25.
2Fikentscher, supra, 29.
lFikentscher, supra, 29.
"Fikentscher, supra, 30,31.
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not concern themselves with it any further. They did not analyse Kant's ethical concepts in order to
derive specific conclusions for the law' When Savigny discussed the effect of mistake, fraud and
duress on a declaration of will, he said:
"We in the area of law are not at all occupied with the speculative difficulties of the
concept of freedom. For us, freedom is based simply on the appearance (Erscheinung),
that is, on the capacity, of making a choice among several alternatives".3
Philosophers like Kant, as well as jurists like Savigny were all responding to the common problem of
how to explain law and morality after the collapse of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. But
while the separation of the Is and the Ought led philosophers to search for the possibility of morality
without being able to discover a moral order outside the human will, it led the jurists to abandon
philosophy as a whole and to restrict themselves entirely to their "positive" subject matter, purging
Aristotelian concepts from it, borrowing little from new philosophers and without drawing
consequences from these borrowings to fill in the gaps left by the older concepts. They wanted to
explain the law without making philosophical commitments."
4. Savigny (1779 - 1861)
Savigny adopted the distinction between the Is and the Ought and Kant's rejection of everything
empirical, especially empirical ends and purposes. On that basis, he distinguished "empirical legal
reality" and the "real law" which are not the same thing but separated along the line of the separation
of the Is and the Ought. The "real law" to him, like to Kant, led an autonomous, independent
existence.' Savigny saw it as the task of a legal "science" to reveal the "inner unity" of the law, the
"real law", that is the system. The historical inheritance of legal texts and rules, identified by Savigny
almost exclusively as the Roman law as it was received and accepted by the Volksgeist of the German
people provided the raw material from which this system was to be derived. That was the programme
of the Historische Rechtsschule, founded by Savigny. The new legal science was to pursue this task
without commitment to any kind of natural law or philosophy, since these did not provide legitimate
explanations of the law and - as far as ethics are concerned - were not part of the law as such."
'Fikentscher, supra, 26.
2Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 225,226,227. He describes this as "secular agnosticism" of the jurists.
lSavigny, System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Berlin 1840, iii, § 114, 102.
"Gordley, supra, 228.
5Savigny, System I, 5(Fikentscher, supra 26.
6Savigny's "Fruhschrift", notes from a seminar in 1802/03, published by Wesenberg in 1951, 50.
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Savignys approach was thus purely historical and systematical.' The historical element of Savignys
approach, on the other hand, should not be overestimated. He regarded history as the raw material of
his systematic studies, as a complete body of inheritance, a "closed shop", which contained the law as
a whole that had to be revealed by historical exegesis. It has been said that Savigny stood with his
back turned to the future. In his eyes, history ended in the present. He did not see history as an
ongoing, dynamic process and thus did not see the law as a process open to the future.i To him, the
law as a whole was contained in the sources, his subject matter, to which one had to stick as closely as
possible.
Savigny also built on Kant's subjective approach and his concept of freedom and dignity of the
individual, which he placed into the centre of his system of the law: Savigny is the father of the
modern concept of private autonomy, the bearer of which is Kant's moral and perfectly free
individual. From Kant's definition of the law as the formal relationship and balance of the free will of
the individuals, Savigny developed the will-theory, which marked the legal science of the 19th
century.
Savigny, again, like Kant, rejected specific ends or purposes in the law as detrimental to the original
freedom and dignity of the individual.3 Such purposes would turn the individual as natural subject
into the object of outward forces. The individual represented an end in itself only and the self-
fulfillment of the individual was the only end which the law should recognise, no further end was to
be pursued by the law. Savigny was therefore sceptical about the legitimacy and usefulness of
imposed political and economic ends in legislation.
To criticise and reject the imposition of outward ends and purposes on free individuals suits
philosophy very well but is bound to encounter difficulties in the field of the law. What was no
problem for Kant became a problem for Savigny. To free the law of all kinds of specific ends and
purposes and thus evaluative standards (Wertungsmafistabey; made it difficult to reach justified
evaluative judgements (Wertungen) in countless legal questions. The availability of evaluative
standards is indispensable for the work of a jurist. These standards had to come from somewhere. As
pointed out above, Savigny rejected philosophy as the source for such evaluative standards in the law.
In his effort to "positivize" the law, he turned to the given historical inheritance of legal texts and
rules, especially the "pure" Roman law, as it was embraced and evaluated by the Volksgeist. This was
to be henceforth the only subject matter of legal science and meant to replace the illegitimate concern
with ends and purposes. This meant that the historical school of law mainly reproduced evaluative
'Fikentscher, supra, 61 sqq.
2Fikentscher, supra, 55 sqq.
lFikentscher, supra, 39.
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judgements made by the ancient roman jurists as they were contained in the sources and applied them
to modern problems. One could say that the whole approach of the historical school of law was
mainly reproductive and interpretative.' Of course, this subject matter, the historical legal sources, is
limited: the law of a society of so long ago, did not provide evaluative judgements directly applicable
to modern legal issues. At that point, the dilemma produced by the radical separation of the Is and
the Ought and the illegitimacy of establishing rules based on the observance of the empirical world
and thus empirical ends and purposes implicit therein, became inevitable. These "gaps", made
visible by the emergence of new problems for which no historically legitimised solution is offered (as
part of the "real law" to be extracted from the historical subject matter), usually call for an
amendment of the law by recourse to the underlying ends and controlling values of the law. But this
procedure was not tenable in Savignys time, since underlying ends and controlling values were
considered illegitimate and at least not part of the law. But since the need for evaluative standards is
inevitable, another way had to be found. This basic need thus inevitably resulted in a selective and
eclectic use of the historical subject matter. The sources were interpreted to meet modern needs and
aims. Their role was more and more to provide historical arguments for modern solutions. But these
arguments were presented as if they constituted the only historically legitimate solution, the unique
solution which the "real" law demanded. One has even spoken about a new "natural law" contained
in and extracted from the Volksgeist, which had to provide for the basic need for evaluative standards
concerning modern legal problems. 2 It seems that Savigny was not - as he had claimed - quite able to
avoid commitment to any kind of natural law whatsoever. The means to at least partly introduce and
at the same time (unconsciously) veil, the discovery and use of evaluative standards and thus ends and
purposes guiding the law, was Savignys use of the philosophical concept of Anschauung
(contemplationj.'
This required the jurist to establish the specific functions of the legal institutions by means of
contemplation, taking into account the individuality, concrete appearance and organic development
and functioning of these institutions as they emerge from history - and not only to deal with them by
means of systematical, deductive and conceptual logic, inherited from Kant. By means of
Anschauung, one could "reveal" characteristics of legal institutions which related to values,
'Fikentscher, supra, 75 sqq.
2Fikentscher, supra, 40, with references.
)Against Kant's deductive, logical way of cognition, the philosopher Herder developed the concept of Anschauung
(contemplation). He emphasized that in order to understand the essence of a thing, its whole being as such, in its very
wholeness and individuality, one could not only proceed purely deductively, logically in the abstract because deduction and
abstraction always involves moving away, distancing oneself from the original object. In order to account for individuality,
one should not decompose objects logically into their parts and attributes in order to form abstract concepts but try to
encompass with one glance all that constitutes the object in its individuality and wholeness; see Fikentscher, supra, 41, 70.
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evaluative standards or ends and purposes. But because of the reproductive and interpretative
approach, and the belief that the "real" law as such was in its completeness contained in the sources,
and could be unambiguously extracted from them, the results of the Anschauung were pronounced
authoritatively and were binding. The term Anschauung implied that one was simply observing an
objective, unambiguous fact so that the process of evaluative judgement (Wertung) of the interpreter
was thereby obscured. The results of Anschauung had to be accepted and could not be questioned.
The process of evaluative judgement, contained (and hidden) in the Anschauung was therefore
unconscious and uncontrollable. The concept of Anschauung was designed to avoid the shortcomings
of a purely systematical and conceptual approach, but the price was a serious loss of justification and
verification. Savignys use of history could at some point even be called "historical metaphysics".'
In accordance with his basic historical-systematical and logical-conceptual approach to law, Savigny
states four "elements" of interpretation: grammatical, logical, historical and systematical
interpretation.' But, being sceptical about all kinds of ends and purposes in the law, Savigny,
following Kant, basically rejected teleological interpretation, which searched for the reason (end or
purpose) of the rule (and which is the most important element of interpretation in todays German
jurisprudence). The end, or reason of the rule (Grund des Gesetzes), as Savigny calls it, does not, he
argues, become part of the content of the rule itself, the interpreter would only add it in an artificial
way.' The reason, or purpose, may therefore not be treated as a legal rule itself. Only what the
legislator actually stated is relevant and not his motives or ends. The approach of the jurist to the law
had to be, as mentioned above, purely reproductive and not creative, since law could not be "created",
but was believed to be complete and entirely contained in the sources and the statutes. While Savigny
held a very strict point of view on this issue in his earlier years, he later on adopted a slightly less
positivistic attitude in his System. He still emphasizes that the reason of the rule is not part of the rule
itself, but, he says, that reason (or end or purpose) may be used in the interpretation of the rule,
although only cautiously." In the framework of the historical element of the interpretation, one may
also ask for the specific reason that moved the legislator to adopt a certain rule, but only when the
term used by the rule was actually ambiguous.' Savignys remarks on the further development or
amendment of the law (Rechtsfortbildung), are few and show again that in principle he believed the
law to be already complete and that "gaps" should be filled in exclusively by interpretation of and
drawing analogies from existing legal institutions." But the subject of further development of the law
IFikentscher, supra, 77.
2Fikentscher, supra, 67.
lSavigny, System 1. 40.
"Savigny, System t. 218, 220.
SSavigny, System 1, 228,233.
6Larenz, supra, 13.
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agenda by the roman sources themselves, because the Roman law itself represents the best example of
an always dynamically developing legal system, constantly generating new rules from older ones. I
Savigny observed:
"Die Romer haben von der Erganzung des Rechts durch Analogie sehr richtige
Ansichten, nur unterscheiden sie in der Anwendung derselben nicht liberall die
Fortbildung des Rechts von der reinen Ausleguug't.'
Obviously, for the Romans, there was only a fluid boundary between interpretation and further
development of the law. The demarcation of, and the fluid transition from interpretation to further
development of the law remains one of the most important issues of discussion in German legal
science today.
5. Puehta (1789-1846)
The works of Puchta mark the climax of the Historical School of Law and the so-called conceptual
jurisprudence, which is characterised by the belief, that legal concepts can be deduced from each
other and thereby form a coherent system of law. Puchta developed the so-called "pyramid of
concepts". The pyramid of concepts meant that the highest concept (the subjective right - subjektives
Recht) determined the content of all the concepts following from it. But where does the content of the
highest concept come from? If determined by the more special (and thus theoretically lower)
concepts, the argument would be circular. Instead, the ethical essence of the highest concept was the
Kantian concept of the perfectly free and dignified individual. But descending down the concepts of
the pyramid, the ethical content becomes necessarily less and less concrete or obvious, and finally
fades into oblivion, since the lower concepts are only considered in terms of their logical-systematic
position within the pyramid and not with reference to their particular ends or functions in the
framework of the legal system. Kantian ethics serve as a starting point for the development of a
purely logical and systematic approach, but quickly lose relevance in the unfolding of it.3 The inner
unity and coherence of the law is not constituted by such ethical or political ends or purposes of the
law but the relationship and unity of the conceptual elements (Begriffselemente) within the law. The
'Fikentscher, supra, 58.
2Savigny, System 1, 294.
lLarenz, supra, 23,24.
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intriguing aspect of this approach was the image of a legal system ruled by logical necessity, albeit at
the price of the neglect of ethical-teleological and sociological relations.'
Puchta's exclusive emphasis on the deductive-conceptual method founded the kind of legal formalism
that dominated legal science for a considerable period and against which Rudolph von Ihering
militated unsuccessfully for a long time. Wieacker characterised this process as the final alienation of
legal science from the social, political and moral reality of the law. This remoteness and separation of
the legal science from reality, using scientific methods but focusing on the "pure Ought" as the
exclusive subject, was the reason that the counter-reaction, when it did come, did not originate in
philosophy but in the empirical sciences, especially sociology which emphasized the role of social
reality in the law.
6. Windscheid (1817 - 1892)
Windscheid moved away from the concept of the Volksgeist as the primary source of the law into the
direction of a statutory legal positivism (Gesetzespositivismus), which identified as the primary source
of the law the statutes and thus the will of the legislator.' In his interpretation of the subjective will of
the personified legislator, Windscheid introduced the strong psychological approach to the law that
henceforth characterised legal science in a marked manner. Windscheid has been portrayed as an
adherent of a rationalistic legal positivism, alleviated by an idealistic belief in human reason inherited
from Kant.3
The "will", to Windscheid, is no more an ethical category, as it was for Kant and to some extent also
for Savigny and Puchta, but a psychological notion. The legal concepts are not deduced from ethics
but defined psychologically. This approach soon encounters difficulties: a subjective right may exist
independently from the actual will of its bearer. Windscheid dismisses the problem by emphasizing
the will of the legislator, who accords these rights to the individual. The decision whether an
individual wills the exercise of that right or not is left up to him. Because the will of the individual is
only relevant as regards the possibility of exercising the right Windscheid prefers the notion of a
"claim" (Anspruch) above the term subjective right. This process illustrates the continuing erosion of
'Larenz, supra, 32.
2This is attributed to the influence of Hegel's positivism vis-a-vis the state and its laws which was the basis of Julius Stahl's
criticism of the concept of the Volksgeist. the common conviction of the people about a legal issue did not yet constitute the
law, the law only gets its binding force when that conviction is positivised by the state in the form of statutes. See
Fikentscher, supra, 94sqq,
3Larenz, supra, 30: "Es ist ein durch den Glauben an die Vernunft gemilderter, rationalistischer Gesetzes-positivisrnus",
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the original meaning and inherent sense of the legal concepts necessarily entailed by the purely
formalistic-logical-conceptual approach. The concepts derived by formal deduction remain at the
surface of the legal rule, its inner sense, while its core is almost totally eliminated. In a formal-logical
sense, the system is coherent, but the essential spiritual substance is missing and only implicitly
presupposed by Windscheid.'
But for Windscheid also, the question of evaluative judgement (Wertungsfrage) was inevitable. He
was forced to find back doors for and make concessions to, questions of evaluative judgement and
veiled it with logical-conceptual formulations, as for example was the case with his doctrine of
Voraussetzung' There is in Windscheid's thought an almost imperceptible transition from an
empirical-psychological to a normative concept of will. Windscheid has regard not only to the actual
will of the parties or the legislator, but also the "reasonable" will. Although he expressly rejected
interpretation on the basis of a presumed objective reasonableness, he presumed the legislator or the
parties to a contract to generally will reasonably, only slightly veiling it by means of arguments of a
seemingly psychological kind. Windscheid, like all jurists, remains sensitive to the equity of the
result:
"Endlich ist auch auf den Wert des Resuitats Ri.icksicht zu nehmen, insofern namlich
angenommen werden kann, daf der Gesetzgeber eher etwas Bedeutendes, Angemessenes,
als etwas Leeres und Unpassendes hat sagen wollen".'
It is also the duty of interpretation
"hinter dem Sinn, welchen der Gesetzgeber hat ausdri.icken wollen, dessen eigentlichen
Gedanken hervorzuziehen". 4
Interpretation should thus not stop at the empirical will but ask furthermore for the "real" will, the
reasonable will. This approach obviously tends to establish fictions in order to reach equitable results
on the basis of an obscured and unconscious evaluative judgement (Wertung). Windscheid still
regards this as interpretation, without realising that he has left the confines of the enquiry into an
empirical will. The same happens with respect to the filling in gaps in the law (Liickenfiillung): Gaps
'Larenz, supra, 33,34.
2see Part II 1.2.
lWindscheid, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, 7th ed 52.
"Windscheid, supra, 54.
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should be filled "aus dem Geiste des Rechtsganzen",' But such comments only make sense if one
assumes that there is an objective coherence of meaning, an inherent reasonableness in the law from
which one can deduce evaluative standards for problematic legal issues, although this does not fit well
with Windscheid's psychologism and legal positivism.' This inconsistency and even self-
contradiction between a positivistic and empiric approach on the surface and a fundamental belief in
the inherent reasonableness of the law at a deeper level, does not seem to have come to Windscheid's
attention, probably because he was more concerned with "practical" dogmatical issues than with the
consistency of legal theory.
7. Ihering (1818 - 1890)
Apart from his considerable dogmatic achievements, the most famous among them being the doctrine
of culpa in contrahendo, lhering took a great interest in legal theory and his work was of enormous
influence on the development of this field. He was one of the first after Kant who sought to bridge
the gap between the Is and the Ought and he was the first to reintroduce the topic of ends and
purposes (Zweck) to the law. He aimed at the renewal of the law by asking a new question: What is
the specific use of the law, what specific task is it supposed to serve? This question that had seemed
to be illegitimate after Kant, now returned with renewed force.
lhering started off on the basis of the Begriffsjurisprudenz and tried to develop it further in the form
of his "natural-historical method" (naturhistorische Methode) which resulted in a total exaggeration
of the technical, logical-deductive approach. When Ihering realized the artificiality, superficiality and
arbitrary constructionism of that approach, its deficiency in concrete meaning and content and the
extent to which it had lost touch with the real life of society, he turned away from the external, purely
technical side of the law. His interest shifted to the internal operations of the law, the exploration of
the dynamic forces behind the ongoing development of the law to which one had to turn in order to
understand the essential meaning and content of the legal rules. He did not regard history as
something static, given or inherited, like Savigny and his successors had done, but as a dynamic,
ongoing process continuing into the future. This fundamental difference to earlier jurists led him to
concern himself much more with the problem of the further development or amendment of the law
(Rechtsfortbildung).
'Windscheid, supra, 58.
2Larenz, supra, 32.
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Ihering changed the direction and emphasis of his research to what he regarded as the real driving
force beh ind the development of the law: the Zweck (end, purpose). He came to the conclusion that to
understand the law as such requires understanding of how ends and purposes work in the law. This is
why the "Geist" was never completed. He set out to investigate the working of the Zwëck in his book
Der Zweck im Recht, but never managed to make this entirely clear or to establish a coherent, clear-
cut, unambiguous concept of Zweck. He was influenced by and borrowed heavily from the Zeitgeist
of his time, especially the teachings of Darwin. He often used these for purely illustrative purposes,
without having a full knowledge of them, or being truly committed to them. This resulted in differing
interpretations of his understanding of Zweck and of his work and approach as a whole by modern
scholars such as, for example, Larenz, Wieacker and Fikentscher. But notwithstanding the fact that
Ihering did not make his understanding of Zweck entirely clear, his thoughts and his new approach
have generated an enormous influence on the development of legal theory. This was mostly due to
the fact that he clearly saw the deficiencies of the traditional approach and by boldly entering new
grounds, determined the direction of the future development in legal theory.
The reasons for the binding force of the legal rules are to be found in their content rather than in their
logical relationships.' Upon realizing this, Ihering's interest shifted drastically towards the content of
the rules and the reasons why such contents acquired binding force by being expressed as legal rules:
"DaB die Befriedigung, welche die Jurisprudenz dem bloben Verstande gewahrt, nicht
das hëchste ist, ist mir je langer je mehr klar geworden, und ich habe die Spuren der
Uberschatzung der logischen Seite des Rechts, welche die erste Auflage an sich trug,
mëglichst zu tilgen gesucht. Ober dem blof Formalen der juristischen Logik steht als
Hëheres und Hëchstes die substantielle Idee der Gerechtigkeit und Sittlichkeit, und eine
Vertiefung in sie, d.h. wie sie in den einzelnen Rechtsinstituten und Rechtssatzen zum
Ausdruck und zur Verwirklichung gelangt, ist nach meinem Dafiirhalten die schonste und
erhabenste Aufgabe, welche die Wissenschaft sich stellen kann".2
At first, Ihering realized that the content and meaning not only of the legal rules but also of the legal
concepts themselves changed during the course of history.' But then the belief that basic legal
concepts represented elements, or basic juristic bodies, from which all legal rules could be deduced by
combination and construction, became questionable. Ihering realizes that logical necessity had
nothing to do with the nature of the binding force of legal rules.
'Larenz, supra, 29.
2Ihering, Geist des remisehen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, vol II, 2, 361, footnote S06a.
Jlhering, supra, vol, IV, 1864,305.
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He observes that the sources of the Roman legal rules are to be found in psychological, practical,
ethical and historical reasons. He sees that the legal science of his time is, albeit unacknowledged,
strongly influenced by the fairness of the result reached in the individual case.' Ihering thus calls for
a more pragmatic approach to the law, he asks for the "practical value" (Lebenswert) of the
jurisprudence. This practical value, he believes, is best achieved in serving the inherent ends and
purposes of the law as such and the particular legal rules. With this idea in mind, Ihering wrote his
book Der Zweck im Recht, which was first published in 1877:
"Der Grundgedanke des gegenwartigen Werkes besteht darin, daf del' Zweck del'
Schopfer des gesamten Rechts ist, daf es keinen Rechtssatz gibt, der nicht einem Zweck,
das ist einem praktischen Motiv, seinen Ursprung verdankt't.i
The purpose defines the origin and the aim of the law, both are inseperably connected. This makes
the purpose the creator of the law and in order to understand and assess the law correctly, one has to
consider its inherent purpose. Iherings significance lies in choosing a whole new point of view, but
this step marks only the beginning of a whole new path, raising more new questions than it answers.
What is the origin of that purpose, what is its specific nature and way of functioning whithin the legal
system? Ihering did not succeed in clarifying these aspects. His account of the Zweck is multi-faceted
and ambiguous, influenced by popular philosophical ideas of his time, to which he had turned to in his
effort to find new paths in the development of the law: Corntes sociological positivism, Jeremy
Bentham's utilitarianism, and Darwin's natural selection. This is why Wieacker and Larenz saw
Iherings concept of Zweck as purely naturalistic - positivistic. Since the Middle Ages, one could not
speak anymore of ultimate, objective ends/purposes of man like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had
done, but only of ends or purposes of individuals or society at large. This is what Ihering did. To
him, society works through mutual promotion of the interests of all its members and this is where the
purposes of the law must come from.3
In the work of Ihering, the beginning of a shift of emphasis from the pure Ought (like in the case of
the conceptual jurisprudence) to the Is, to social reality makes itself felt. Scholars realised that they
had moved too far away from empiric reality and wanted to correct this deviation. The result was a
strong, sometimes exaggerated emphasis on sociology. But the mere shift from the pure Ought to the
pure Is in trying to find the source of the law did, and does not solve the dilemma of the division ofIs
'Ihering, supra, 3 15.
2lhering, Der Zweck im Recht, vol. I, viii.
31hering, Der Zweck im Recht, vol. I, 462.
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and Ought. The gap itself had to be bridged, the relationship of the two poles also required re-
evaluation. Wieacker and Larenz have said that Iherings shift to social reality, to the Is - his legal
naturalism - represented only the inevitable second stage of legal positivism after the legal formalism
of the conceptual jurisprudence in the search for the surrogates of the transcendent ideal which had
been discredited by the division of Is and Ought.' According to Wieacker Ihering, although he had
not read Darwin, was strongly influenced by the popular version of Darwin's theories of descendence
and selection, to the extent that he used these to explain the development of the law? Larenz wrote
that since Ihering did not elaborate any kind of hierarchy or value-system among the purposes of
society, he was the first scholar to totally relativize all standards of the law. But Larenz also
acknowledges that Ihering was not yet aware of the inherent dangers of popular social darwinism,
notably of the abuse of power by the "fittest" who define what is good for society.'
Fikentscher takes a more positive stance on Iherings concept of purpose, claiming that it was multi-
dimensional and consciously comprised not only a historical and a social element, but also an ethical
element." According to him, Iherings purpose was not arbitrary. Instead, because Iherings basic
interest was the pursuit of justice, he always as a matter of course had in mind the just cause.
Fikentscher points to several remarks in Ihering's work which also have been remarked on by
Wieacker: Ihering views the human spirit as a means of checking and evaluating his own development
in terms of his ethical standards.' In addition to Iherings remark about the whole purpose of his book
"Der Zweck im Recht" cited above," Ihering also states in his introduction to the Zweck:
"...die Annahme eines von Gott gesetzten Zweckes in der Welt oder des gëttlichen
Zweckgedankens vertragt sich nach rneinern Dafurhalten vollkommen mit der
Statuierung des strengsten Kausalitëtsgesetzes".'
Ihering always insisted that man has the freedom and capacity to choose.
From such remarks, Fikentscher concludes that Ihering had a concept of purpose very close to
Aristotle: that every legal institution had a purpose in the sense of a causafinalis and that Iherings
motto should have read: the just purpose is the creator of the law.'
IWieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe (transl. by Tony Weir), 357.
2Wieacker, "Jhering und der Darwinismus", Festschrift Larenz 1, 63sqq ..
3Larenz, Methodenlehre, 52.
"Pikcntscher, Methoden des Rechts vol III 230sqq. 238.
5especially in his Viennese lecture on legal intuition (Rechtsgefiihl).
6Ceist, supra, II, 2, 361, footnote 506a.
7Ihering, Introduction to Der Zweck im Recht, VIII, IX.
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Wieacker is more reserved about these aspects. Although acknowledging that one should always be
cautious when studying intellectual influences.i he considers these remarks as "relapses" into a moral
indeterminism, reservations inconsistent with the rest of Ihering's teachings and which created
contradictions eventually responsible for Ihering's inability to work out a coherent concept of
purpose.'
Maybe it was at that time too much to ask of a scholar even of Iherings stature. His great
accomplishment was nevertheless that he boldly entered entirely new paths in order to find out how
the law actually works. He emphasized the importance of social reality for the jurisprudence and re-
introduced the finalistic point of view. His ideas generated enormous influence on his successors who
tried to work out the consequences of his many insights. He even influenced the work of Roscoe
Pound in the United States and, through him, Benjamin Cardozo."
8. The Interessenjurisprudenz
Ihering's turn to a pragmatic jurisprudence, orientated at the social reality, was the starting point for
the so-called jurisprudence of interests, advocated by Philipp Heck,s Heinrich Stoll6 and Rudolf
Mi.iIIer- Erzbach. 7
The jurisprudence of interests regarded jurisprudence primarily as a means for the protection of
(legal) interests. Legal rules, said Heck, result from a competition of interests, be they of material,
national, religious or ethical nature." These interests must be made visible and taken into
consideration as the basis for the interpretation of the law. Like Ihering, Heck relinquished the search
for the psychological will of the historical legislator in favor of the forces of society behind the
development of the law. Heck's method of interpretation is a "research of historical interests", which
he elaborated as the "genetische /nteressentheorie" (genetic theory of interests). In this respect, he
remained true to the positivistic concept of science by describing the law purely causally in terms of
'Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts III, p. 276.
2Wieacker, "Jhering und der Darwinismus", supra, 91.
JWieacker, "Jhering und der Darwinismus" 78,79,84.
"Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts III, p. 268.
s"Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz", Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis (AcP) 112; Das Problem der
Rechtsgewinnung, 1912.
6"Begriff und Konstruktion in der Lehre der Interessenjurisprudenz", Festschrift fur Heck. Rumelin und A.B. Schmidt, 1931
60.
7Die Hinwendung der Rechtswissenschaft zum Leben, 1939; Die Rechtswissenschafl im Umbau, 1950.
8Heck, "Gesetzesauslegung", supra, 60.
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the interests present in society. But he and his colleagues naturally observed that the legislator did not
simply codify the interests present in society but favoured some above others by means of an
evaluative judgement (Werturteil, Wertung). Not all interests merit the same protection by the law.
Every single legal rule contains
"mittelbar ein Werturteil liber die ihm zugrundeliegenden Interessengegensatze".'
The legislator makes such evaluative judgements in order to make society conform to a certain social
ideal? The notion of Wertung, which was to become the central element of the future
Wertungsjurisprudenz (evaluative jurisprudence) which was to succeed the jurisprudence of interests,
.did not fit in well with a positivistic explanation of the law. Heck and his colleagues stuck to
positivism by explaining the phenomenon of evaluative judgement as yet another basic interest, as
idealistic interests, "decision interests" (Entscheidungsinteressen) which consisted of fundamental
interests of the community, such as legal certainty or equity that determine the evaluative judgement.'
Thus, the concept of interest, just like Ihering's concept of purpose, became multi-dimensional, being
cause but also object and at the same time standard, of an evaluative judgement. The reason was,
again, that scholars consciously or subconsciously wanted to remain true to the positivistic concept of
science that sought to explain the law objectively by reference to its causes without judging its
content, which seemed illegitimate. Heck and his colleagues treated the evaluative judgements of the
legislator Iike phenomena of the natural world which could be treated and described in the same way
as the natural or logical sciences described their respective subject matters: as clearly and
unequivocally causally determined. But evaluative judgements belong to another category altogether
since they involve conscious choices based on certain ideals and standards, they are not determined by
unequivocal natural causes. There was as yet no understanding that legal science is not to be
understood with reference to the positivistic concept of science."
Heck and his colleagues nevertheless strongly moved in direction of a positivistic concept of science
when they analyzed the underlying evaluative judgements of the law and advised the judge to follow
their pattern and re-produce them in his decisions. They also made another step into this direction by
applying this procedure to fill in "gaps" in the law (Gesetzesliicken) and encouraging the judge to
develop the law further (Rechtsfortbildung) under the guidance of the fundamental evaluative
judgements of the legislator. Heck emphasizes that the law never entails a clear solution for every
IStall, Festschriftfiir Heck etc., 67.
2Heck, "Gesetzesauslegung", supra, 41.
lHeck, "Gesetzesauslegung", supra, 232, footnote 357.
"Larenz, Methodenlehre, 57sqq.
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possible case. To him, the problem of the further development of the law is the centrepiece of legal
methodology.' He rejects the method of conceptual jurisprudence, that is the deduction of logically
new concepts from already established general legal concepts, and calls instead for an "evaluative
creation of a norm" (wertende Gebotsbildungs: He realizes that the perception of a gap in the law in
itself entails an evaluative judgement about the content of the law, since such gaps are not obvious.
To fill in such gaps, one has to identify and analyse the underlying interests involved and then to rate
them, that is, to make an evaluative judgement developed from and guided by evaluative judgements
already present in the law. If the constellation of the interests in a given case equals that in a case
provided for by the law, an analogy can be employed, if the situation is not similar, the law has to be
interpreted restrictively. In this way, the law has to be amended according to the given evaluative
. d 3JU gements.
The jurisprudence of interests has had an enormous impact in German legal science, especially insofar
as it introduced the weighing of interests as the means of evaluating a given case appropriately.
German jurisprudence and judicial organs became more conscious of their methods. The
jurisprudence of interests is the direct progenitor of the Wertungsjurisprudenz (evaluative
jurisprudence), the predominant methodological approach in modern German jurisprudence. The
Wertungsjurisprudenz developed after the positivistic concept of science was finally abandoned
because of the influence ofNeo-Kantianism and legal phenomenology.'
9. Neo-Kantianism
Neo-Kantianism brought the first great challenge to the positivistic concept of science, which would
accept as scientific only the method of the natural sciences based on experience or the strictly logical
methodology of mathematics and geometry. But these methods could not satisfactorily deal with
disciplines within the sphere of the humanities, such as history, phi losophy, theology and
jurisprudence. Eventually, it became questionable whether the methods of the "exact" natural
sciences could adequately account for the whole of reality, as experienced by humans.
In 1902, the philosopher Heinrich Rickert pointed out that it is impossible to portray reality as a
whole, in its vast diversity and complexity. Every attempt to investigate reality, entails a conscious or
unconscious decision to approach the enquiry in a certain way, and our perception of reality depends
'Heck, Das Problem der Rechtsgewinnung, 7.
2Heck, "Gesetzesauslegung", supra 100.
lHeck, Das Problem der Rechtsgewinnung, 36.
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entirely on the approach we choose to adopt. We always regard reality with certain conceptual pre-
conditions, because we have somehow to digest the information from outside in order that reality
might make sense to us. Our perception of reality is necessarily always the result of a process of
digestion and transformation of information in our mind, of our conceptualisation (Begriffsbildung).
In that process, our mind is always selective, depending on the aim of our research because it would
be impossible and useless to try to take into account the whole of reality at the same time - the
selection and digestion of information is a necessary and inevitable aspect of human thought. This
naturally also applies to the natural sciences. They too, due to their aim to discover the general laws
that govern nature, have to use selection and simplification-generalization to uncover these general
laws, and in that process have to move more and more away from the individual item to description of
nature in general. This process of selection and digestion in the mind, natural to all human thought, is
determined by basic pre-conceived criteria which Rickert identifies as "values". These determine our
approach to reality. They make us consider something as "important" or "relevant". Without such
values, there could not be any reason to concern oneself with the phenomena of reality. Everything
we study, we put into relation to these values just by the way we approach them. Rickert points out
that this does not mean that we immediately judge the object of our studies, the values simply
determine our general approach. By developing this notion of value-related or teleological
conceptualisation - teleologische Begriffs-bildung: Rickert introduced the notion of "value" into the
theory of knowledge and identified it as an epistemological a priori of all sciences.
Since anyone studying a certain subject normally wishes to attract the interest of other people, the
enquirer will let himself be guided by values generally shared in his community. These values are thus
to a certain extent, empiric facts. Although these values may change and are thus to a certain extent
arbitrary, their mere existence as values suggests the existence of an "absolute" value of some kind,
even though it only exists reflected in the factual values:
" ...das schlieêt die i.iberempirische Voraussetzung em, dal) irgendwelche Werte
unbedingt geiten, zu denen die menschlichen Werte in einem bestimmten Verhaltnis
stehen" .3
For Rickert, the term "culture" is of central importance. To him, culture in its broadest sense means
everything that has meaning and significance (Sinn und Bedeutung) through its relatedness to basic
'Larenz, Methodenlehre, 64, 89sqq.
2Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 371sqq.
JRickert, supra, 640.
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values for the human being who acknowledges these values as such.' Rickert divides the sciences into
the natural sciences, which are free of specific values and meaning, and the cultural sciences
(Kulturwissenschaften) whose very nature is its concern with values and meaning. Natural sciences
"perceive" (wahrnehmen), cultural sciences aim at "understanding" (verstehen). The natural sciences
aim at that part of the Is which is pure perception, independent from, and not concerned with meaning
and values, the cultural sciences aim at that part of the Is which is determined by just that: values and
. 2mean mg.
Consequentially, the philosopher Emil Lask saw jurisprudence as an "empiric cultural science" which
studies the meaning of norms resulting from their relation to acknowledged values and purposes. He
called that the "value- and purpose-orientated method of the jurisprudence" (wert- und
zweckbeziehende Methode der Jurisprudenzy.'
Like Rickert, Rudolf Stamrnier distinguished two different ways of thinking: while Rickert spoke of
"perceiving" and "understanding", Stamrnier called it "perceiving" (wahrnehmen) and "willing"
(wollen). The first way, or form, of thinking deals with its object in terms of cause and effect (causa
effectus), the second in terms of means for purposes (causa finalis). Both ways of thinking are of
equal methodological value. There are natural sciences and "purposive sciences"
(Zweckwissenschaften), of which the legal science is one. Its concepts and terms are therefore
completely independent from the concepts of the natural sciences.
Ihering had already called the purpose "the creator of the law", but he studied the individual purposes
and the purposes of society as a natural phenomenon in the way the natural sciences would do. His
purpose was sociological. Stamrnier's purpose is not sociological but methodological, a characteristic
trait of legal thinking. Stamrnier's approach was largely systematical ad analytical. He sees the
subject matter of law basically as a given, which only has to be brought into the correct form by
application, but without changes or additions in its content. This, to him, would be illegitimate: he
sees the task of the legal science as being primarily reproductive, not creative. Nevertheless, there is
an important creative element in his doctrine of the correct law - Richtiges Recht. Stammier said that
all thinking - and thus also legal thinking - is measured against the final requirement of correctness
(Richtigkeit). The distinction between correct and incorrect is the basic feature of how we evaluate
the results of our thinking. Correctness is achieved when all possible thoughts are in perfect
coherence and harmony with each other. A legal rule is therefore correct when it fits into the body of
'Larenz, Methodenlehre, 102.
2Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, 20.
JEmil Lask, "Rechtsphilosophie", Festschriftfiir Kuno Fischer, 1905 316.
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the law in general in perfect harmony without any contradiction. The correct law represents a "social
ideal", its aim is that all social conduct should be brought into a harmonious order. I Stamrnier does
not mean that there is an existing "ideal law", a kind of natural law: he emphasizes that all law
depends on its empirical matter and is therefore necessarily "positive" in nature. There is no correct
law in general as such, there is only the positive law that is partly correct and partly incorrect, but
always aiming at and striving for correctness. The idea of the correct law is nothing but a guideline, a
measure, a standard for the evaluation of the law just as for every other kind of human thinking. The
law always represents an effort to be correct law.' Stamrnier has defined "principles of the correct
law", but their nature is purely methodical, they are not legal rules themselves, only guidelines.' The
legal rules themselves can only be taken from the empiric matter of the law.
Gustav Radbruch built on the works of Rickert and Lask and moved away from Stamrnier's purely
formal analysis of the thought structures of the "value-related" sciences to study the content and the
interrelationship of the determining values. He thus moved from a more formal to a more "material"
value-philosophy." Radbruch picked up on Rickert's understanding of culture and defined it as:
"die Gegebenheit, die die Bedeutung, den Sinn hat, Werte zu verwirklichen".
Thus, the law is
"[die] Gegebenheit, die den Sinn hat, die Rechtsidee zu verwirklichen".5
An "idea" in Kantian terminology means a final, not further deducible value. The central value of the
law is therefore the idea of the law, which is nothing else but justice and the law thus must always
serve and strive for justice." The law is not necessarily always just but it is always required to be just,
it always stands under the requirement of justice (unter der Anforderung der Gerechtigkeit), it is
orientated towards that ideal. While for Stammier, the idea of the law represented only a guideline,
an evaluative standard of the law, it is for Radbruch a constitutive element of the positive law itself,
the basic principle of positive law. Law, to Radbruch, is not just formed matter but a meaningful
reality related to values and therefore the positive law necessarily needs a central point of orientation.
While Stammier restricted the use of the guidelines of correct law to cases where the formed, positive
IStamrnIer, Die Lehre von dem Richtigen Recht, 1926 141.
2Stammler, supra, 57.
lStammler, supra, 153.
"Larenz, Methodenlehre 104
5Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 19324.
6Radbruch, supra, 30,32.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
39
law did not provide answers, Radbruch wants the idea of the law to determine the interpretation of the
positive law and even more so also the further development of the law. Interpretation wants to clarify
the inner meaning of a legal rule. In order to do this, it has to take into account the underlying
purpose and the basic idea of the law at which the rule is aimed. This methodology necessarily blurs
the border between interpretation and the further development of the law.'
Radbruch partly rehabilitates juristic constructionism. He says that what Ihering and the adherents of
the jurisprudence of interests found lacking in the conceptual jurisprudence was that it made juristic
constructions in the wrong way - only by means of abstractions based entirely on formalistic logic
(formalistic, or "categorical", construction). The true juristic construction is "teleological
construction", whose aim is
" ...die Zwecke der einzelnen Rechtsinstitute als Mittel zu hëheren und immer hëheren
Zwecken und letzten Endes zu einem hëchsten Zwecke alles Rechts zu begreifen und
darzuste lien". 2
10. Legal phenomenology - Gerhart Husserl
Legal phenomenology was based on the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husser! and the
philosophical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann.3 One of the most important scholars to apply the ideas
of these philosophers to the law was Gerhart Husser!. The phenomenologists were also of the view
that the idea of the law and guiding values were not only tools of the digesting mind, not only
epistemological categories, but part of reality, part of the outside world itself and a decisive element
of the subject of thinking itself. The principles a priori should not be understood as simply "forming
activity of the mind", but as the immanent structure of the essence of the subject."
Gerhart Husser! seeked to clarify the interaction of the positive law and the a priori principles in the
law. He portrays the relationship as that of potentiality and reality, the positive legal rules are
realizations of the a priori potentialities.' Legal rules can vary in their content, but they cannot totally
move away from the a priori potentialities, for then they would lose all meaning for failing to
conform to the idea of the law. The content of legal rules, therefore, is not arbitrary as legal
positivism had claimed. This approach reminds one of the potentialities of Aristotle and Thomas
'Radbruch, supra, III.
2Radbruch, Einfuhrung in die Rechtswissenschaft. 1952 246.
Je.g. Das Problem des geistigen Seins, 3rd ed., 1962; Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, 1948; Ethik, 4th ed., 1962.
4Welzel, Naturalismus und Wertphilosophie im Strafrecht, 193544.
sO.Husserl, Der Rechtsgegenstand, 1933, IV.
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Aquinas, which had been criticised by Duns Scotus. The binding nature of the a priori principles is
different from that of the positive legal rules though, their nature is teleological, whereas the positive
legal rules derive their binding force primarily through their normative nature. They are not
statements of cognition but statements of will. The principles a priori represent a timeless "core of
meaning" (Sinneskern), legal truths, but do not of themselves have normative power. I This makes
clear that legal phenomenology does not head towards a new natural law but to the discovery of the
eternal "core of meaning" within the positive law. The "core of meaning" means that there are similar
traits to the legal institutions of all legal systems no matter how varied they may be, that determine
their essence by being the condition of their possibility. Without such traits, these institutions would
be meaningless. Consequentially, the positive law is a concretisation of the principles a priori and
naturally this concretisation may vary considerably. Yet, the principles a priori cannot have normative
power themselves, they need the concretisation through the- positive law, otherwise they would be too
general to apply in specific situations. These principles a priori remind one of the" Universalia' of
the philosophy of the Middle Ages, which were the basis of Thomistic legal thinking and of the
concept of causa finalis.
The nature of the positive law is its normativity, its destination to be enforced, also against the will of
the individual. This normative nature is no less "real" than the manifestations of nature itself, it
therefore does not have to be reduced to sociology or psychology but requires to be seen and studied
as a phenomenon in itself with methods appropriate to its proper nature. Furthermore, in the positive
law is also historical nature. It is part of history and thus subject to change, it shares in the "time-
structure of historicity" (Zeitstruktur der Geschichtlichkeiti.' The law cannot be simply a body of
unchanging verbally formulated sentences, its authority depends entirely on the meaning of these
sentences and different tirnes can understand this differently. Husserl points out that a legal rule can
only exert its normative power by being applied to a specific case by the judge, which represents a
further, and final, step of concretisation. Through the judge, the Zeitgeist will necessarily influence
the process of concretisation.'
The consequence is that although the historical "will of the legislator" does play a role in the
interpretation in legal materials, it is not decisive. The law has to respond to the problems of the
present, and to this end it is legitimate and necessary that the law must be interpreted according to the
understanding of its era. Interpretation therefore, is a constant process which continually develops the
idea expressed in a legal rule into the future. The result is - although the words of the law might not
'Husserl, Recht und Zeit, 1955, 14.
2Husserl, Recht und Zeit, 21 sq.
lHusseri, supra, 23.
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have changed - "today's law" which may well differ from "yesterday's law": It is the product of the
combined forces of legislation, jurisdiction, legal science and the "silent forces" of public
intercourse.'
11. The Wertungsjurisprudenz - Karl Larenz
The aim of the jurisprudence of interests to identify the interests underlying legal rules led to the
question, how such interests were to be evaluated and thus ranked. The jurisprudence of interests saw
interests at the same time as causal factors, the subjects of and the standards of evaluation. The
adherents of the so-called evaluative jurisprudence (Wertungsjurisprudenz) distinguished these
elements and made the evaluation of the interests their prime methodological concern. Overcoming
the rigid rule of the positivistic concept of science through Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was
a prerequisite for a new understanding of the role of values (and thus purpose) in the law. The
Wertungsjurisprudenz has become the predominant methodological approach in German legal science
and among the judiciary.' One of its most influential exponents was Karl Larenz.
Larenz saw the nature of the legal order essentially as the product of the dialectical relationship of law
(Recht) and justice (Gerechtigkeit), because the binding character of the law is only justified by its
inherent (finalistic) focus on justice, the idea of the law. Larenz further emphasizes the spiritual
nature of the law which cannot adequately be dealt with by the positivistic concept of science. The
science of law has to develop its own methods suited to its subject. Since the subject's nature is
teleological, "structures and relations of meaning" (Sinnstrukturen und Sinnzusammenhangei, based
on values and value-judgements, jurisprudence has to develop objective, scientific (in the non-
positivistic sense) methods of "value-orientated thinking" (wertorientiertes Denken). Since the law is
always orientated towards certain values which serve as its basis and from which the law derives its
essential meaning, the methods for its deeper understanding and further development must be equally
value-orientated.
The law aims at the realization of the original idea of the law, which is justice itself. Justice is the
ultimate value towards which the law is directed, it is "the meaning-a priori of all law". Its function
is to provide the source of meaning and thus the justification of the normative character of the law,
but also to control the law: whatever is incompatible with justice must be - in the end - regarded as
'Husserl, supra, 58, 60.
2Larenz, Methodenlehre, 9, 10.
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unlawful and therefore not part of the law. The focus on the ideal of justice is therefore, according to
Larenz, constitutive for the law as such. He consequently defines the law as an
"order of human relationships under the requirement of justice" (eine Ordnung
zwischenmenschlicher Beziehungen unter der Anforderung der Gerechtigkeity'
The law cannot deny this requirement without ceasing to be law.2
Larenz' methodological enquiries centre on the following key-issues: interpretation, filling-in gaps in
the law (Luckenfullungj and the further development or amendment of the law (Rechtsfortbildung).
Through interpretation, the judge extracts basic value-judgements from the positive law which are
needed to develop and justify the value-judgement in the individual case. The rules of the positive law
are two-dimensional: they point to certain basic objective values such as, above all, justice, promise-
keeping, protection of faith, honesty, but also represent the first step of concretisation of these values
through the "legal conscience" (RechtsbewujJtsein) of society and thus indicate how these values are
understood and treated by the historical society of the legislator.
The filling in of gaps is required when the law is perceived to be incomplete. The perception of a gap
presupposes teleological thinking: a gap can only be assumed to exist when something is missing
which should be there in order for the law to make sense.' This presupposes that the law has a certain
comprehensible plan. Therefore, one speaks of a "gap adverse to the plan" (planwidrige Lucke). To
close a gap, Larenz proposes a resort to the methods of analogy, teleological reduction and (rarely and
only under strict requirements) teleological extension. Gaps must be filled according to the
"immanent teleology" of the law, which consists not only of the intentions and value-judgements of
the historical legislator but also of objective legal purposes and principles common to the legal system
as a whole. Larenz describes the filling in of gaps also as "gesetzesimmanente Rechtsfortbildung"
(further development of the law within the written law) because it remains within the original
intentions (plan) of the positive law."
The next step is the gesetzesubersteigende Rechtsfortbildung (further development surmounting the -
written - law). That means that the positive (written) law is developed beyond its original plan,
ILarenz, Methodenlehre, 355.
2see the section on Radbruch, § 9 above.
lsee the sections on Heck, § 8 above.
"Larenz, Methodenlehre, p. 354sqq.
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beyond the legislator's original intentions in a manner which transcends the "immanent teleology" of
the positive (written) law. But, Larenz insists, this development has to remain within the confines of
the legal system as a whole, that is its basic principles and constitutional value-order, and must be
justified by these principles.' Larenz describes this development as extra legem - intra ius. He
accepts such a further development of the law in only three instances: 1. a compelling need in the
legal intercourse (unabweisbares Bedurfnis des Rechtsverkehrs), 2. with regard to the "nature of
things" (Natur der Sache); 3. with regard to an ethical principle (mit Rucksicht auf ein rechtsethisches
Prinzips'
Larenz does not deny the fact, that the differences between the three steps are gradual and that there
are no clear boundaries between them.' But exactly because of that it is all the more important that the
judge must be conscious of exactly what he is doing. Since he moves more and more away from the
solid ground of the positive law, the requirements for the justification of his results must accordingly
become more strict and well defined. It is the most important aim of legal methodology to define
objective, apprehensible criteria for the justification of (inevitable) further development of the law.
12. Legal ontology - Arthur Kaufmann
Kaufmann's hermeneutical ontology of the law can be regarded as the culmination of the attempts of
Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology to bridge the gap between Is and Ought after Kant. This in turn
was the prerequisite for the renaissance of Aristotelian-thomistic ideas in the understanding of the
nature and essence of law.
Kaufmann transcends the evaluative jurisprudence, which still accepts a certain dualism between
value and reality, insofar as he builds his theories on a universal ontology in which values and reality
are conceived as being essentially connected to each other.
To Kaufmann, this legal ontology, based on a hermeneutical understanding of the law in the tradition
of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, represents the desired "third path", midway
between the poles of natural law and legal positivism.
Isee Radbruch's teleological construction.
2Larenz, Methodenlehre, 402sqq.
lLarenz, Methodenlehre, 351. See also the sections on Savigny and Radbruch, §§ 4 and 9 above.
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The separation of Is and Ought, the realization that the Ought does not follow naturally from the Is
and is not part of it, sooner or later had to bring about a crisis in the law, since law belongs to both
spheres. Although the law constitutes an Ought which is based on the Is, the connection between the
two spheres had seemingly been decisively severed. That meant that the why of the law remained
unanswered. It could apparently not be the topic of scientific discussion anymore, since "reality" was
understood as consisting of empirical facts only, verified through experience. The why of the law, its
inherent meaning, essence, underlying values, virtues and morals - its justification, did not fall into
that category. In consequence, law could not be justified anymore, but only described. The result was
a heavy emphasis on the formal aspects of the law - its outward appearance. The only justification of
the law now possible was formalistic and - in the end - arbitrary: force and history. In order to
persuade, the Ought of the law could not be justified without constant reference to the Is. Detailed
rules could not be based on Kant's abstract reasoning. His categoric imperative was too abstract and
remote from daily legal problems, it was no alternative to Aristotle's ideas in the law. 1 But the jurists
of the day did not even attempt to find a new philosophical basis for their teachings.
But if the question as to the why, the source of the binding character of the law, remains unanswered
for a long time, the law inevitably runs into difficulties. The law establishes an Ought and the source
and justification of the Ought must be clear. If it isn't, the law cannot remain coherent and consistent,
it loses its persuasive force, on which its efficacy depends much more than on outer force. The why
cannot be answered only with reference to formalities, but only with reference to its substance, its
binding force depends on its substance, not its form.i This fact has consequences for - and might even
determine - the working of the detailed rules of the law in everyday practice, which cannot be
independent from the why of the law. A philosophy of substance is indispensable for the law.
Without a coherent theory of law, there cannot be a coherent set of detailed rules. If the nature of the
law is not understood properly, the rules cannot work or be handled properly. The formal aspects do
not really account for the nature, the essence, the operation of the law. That question and with it the
question of the relationship between Is and Ought had to be posed anew. This development in fact
started with Ihering, who sought the substance of the law in a totally new way. In the meantime, the
understanding of what constitutes "reality" had changed and became more differentiated through the
results of Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Hegelianism and especially Phenomenology. These insights were
finally, after due time, also received in the field of the law.
IThis view is shared by Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts, supra, 30,31; Kaufmann, Grundprobleme del' Rechtsphilosophie,
1994, 158; Gordley, Philosophical Origins, supra, 232 sqq.
2Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 1994, 137.
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A new concept of the law was needed, which said something about the specific "reality" of the law
and about its substance, its essence. Thus, one was back to the old problem of Universalia, the
question of the relationship between the general and the singular, the abstract and the concrete, and -
in close correspondence to that - the relationship between the Is and the Ought.'
Law has to do with Is and Ought. Is and Ought cannot be said to have no relationship with each other.
The Ought (or: values) is orientated towards the Is (and vice versa), it is not an end in itself, entirely
on its own. It is always something real, an "Is" which "ought" to be something or in a certain way.
The Ought relates to the Is as an evaluative standard and in this particular sense it has to do with
"essence". The Ought can be described as the gap between the Is and the essence which has to be
bridged. The essence is not disconnected with the Is, it is the foundation, the basis of the Is. In the
intellectual world of Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, the Is was the reality of the essence - the Ought
was immanent in the Is, after the separation of Is and Ought, the Is was only the reality of empirical
facts. For Thomas Aquinas, man was supposed to be good. To be good meant the realization of the
essence of being human and to be bad meant to miss the essence of being human and to deny one's
potential.
In the same way as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas did, Kaufmann points out that since the law is a
tool to serve humanity, the nature, or essence (or understanding), of the law must correspond to the
nature (or understanding) of man.
The nature (or essence) of man cannot be reduced merely to his empirical existence. He is more than
a heap of flesh. He is person in the ontological sense - that is the entity of relations which man has to
other humans or things. Person is not substance but relation. Only through his relations can man live
up to his full potential, become a full personality. Man's personal relations are the subject matter of
the law and law is always only legitimised in that it gives everybody what is due to him: suum cuique
tribuere. This is characteristic for all forms of order: the nature/essence of order is relation. Thomas
Aquinas already saw that: "Ordo non est substantia, sed relatior' What is needed is not an ontology
of substance, but an ontology of relation, to describe the "reality", the essence of the law.
The subject matter of the law is the relation between Is and Ought itself. The law wants to bring Is
and Ought into correspondence, as Edgar Bodenheimer put it: "Law is a bridge between Is and
Ought".' Unity in relation means analogy, as Thomas Aquinas said.' Analogy is unity of two
[Kaufmann, Analogie und Natur der Sache, 1982,55.
2Surnrna theologica, I, 116,2.
JE. Bodenheimer, Ratio iuris, Vol. I , No.2 July 1988, 137 sqq.
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essentially different things, neither identity nor difference, but both: unity of identity and difference.i
dialectical identity'. Not identical but "similar".
For Kaufmann, analogy becomes the crucial concept to describe the essence of the law: the law is not
a unity of norms but a unity of relations, a relation-unity - law is essentially analogous:
"Das Recht ist ursprunglich analog"."
The law is only "real" where Ought (rule) and Is (case) are assimilated:
"Recht ist die Entsprechung von Sollen und Sein".5
The idea of the law, the principles and even statutes and rules are only potentialities of the law. What
the law needs to become full reality is the concretisation in the concrete case - when the Is meets and
merges with the Ought. The assimilation of Is and Ought is brought about by way of analogy (in a
broad sense). What is needed to create a unity of two different things is to find a tertium
comparationis which both have 111 common, a mediator between Is and Ought. This tertium,
Kaufmann says, is the "meaning" ("Sinn"), in which the idea of law, the rule and the case - all three
levels of concretisation - can be identical (identity of meaning-relationship: "Identitdt des
Sinnverhd/tnisses"). Thus, the teleological identity is the place where reality (Is) and value (Ought)
are assimilated.6 The te/os is an Universale, neither ante rem nor post rem but in re, an Ought within
the Is.
The similarity and the relatedness of things is not something which exists only in the mind of the
spectator but something which lies in the nature/essence of the things themselves. Just as the abstract
is real in analogous form in the concrete thing, the telos is real in analogous form in concrete cases,
that is, human undertakings. Kaufmann says that Is and Ought are "structurally interwoven":
"Die Frage Engischs: 'Wo hort denn die Seinsstruktur auf und wo setzt der
Wertgesichtspunkt ein?' ist im Grunde unbeantwortbar, weil es in der Wirklichkeit keine
ISumma theelogica I, 13,5; Quaestiones disputate de veritate, Ed. Edith Stein, VoU, 1952,75.
2Heidegger, Identitat und Differenz, 2nd ed., 1957, p.1O.
3Hegel, Samtliche Werke (Ed. Glockner), 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 525sqq. iPhanomenologie des Getstesi.
"Kaufmann, Analogie und Na/ur der Sache, 19.
sKaufmann, Analogie und Natur der Sache, 18.
6Kaufmann, Analogie und Na/ur der Sache, 44.
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Grenze zwischen beiden gibt. Wertfreie Lebenssachverhalte und vom Sein geloste Werte
sind reine Gedankengebilde, aber keine Realitaten.,,1
Kaufmann identifies "meaning"/tefos with the Natur der Sache and Typus, but "meaning" always also
refers to purpose/causafinalis. The causafinalis is thus the Universale in re, the mediator between Is
and Ought. Basically, "meaning", purpose, Natur der Sache and Typus eventually refer to the same
phenomenon, they are all situated on the teleological level.
Kaufmann's understanding of the essence of the specific reality of the law determines also his
understanding of the working of the three levels of concretisation in the law (the idea of law -
principles and rules - individual and concrete case), which he calls the levels of realization of the law
(Stufenbau der Rechtsverwirklichungi. The nature of this process of concretisation is neither merely
deductive (deducing concrete rules from abstract concepts) nor merely inductive (establishing abstract
rules from concrete cases by way of generalisation). Deduction cannot do without elements of the Is,
induction cannot do without evaluative elements of the Ought. Rather, this process is in its nature
like all human reasoning - hermeneutical. The direction of concretisation is neither linear from top to
bottom nor linear from bottom to top - it develops from and in both directions and rather in the form
of a spiral (the hermeneutical circle). Concretisation is in its nature dialectical between deduction and
induction - it is analogous. Aristotle had already described the nature of analogy as mixed deductive-
inductive.i That means that no level of concretisation is dispensable, neither can represent the
specific real ity of the law on its own, only all three levels, seen together, make up the specific nature,
the reality of the law, in the ongoing process of assimilation from both directions.' The idea of the
law is only a potentiality without the concretisation in rules and decisions, the rules and principles
need the idea of law to derive their content from in order that the content will not be arbitrary, a case
cannot be decided without a rule to measure it against. Kaufmann refers to Gustav Radbruch, who had
already recogn ised the relational character of the law and the role of the tefos as mediator between Is
and Ought in his classic definition of the law: law is
"die Wirklichkeit, die den Sinn hat, der Gerechtigkeit zu dienen,,4 (the reality, whose
purpose it is to serve justice - the idea of the law).
'Kaufmann, Analogie und Natur der Sache, 46.
2Aristotle, Erste Analytik II, 24; Rhetorik I, 1357b.
lKaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 135.
"Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 9th ed. 1983 119.
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Since all law is directed towards the idea of law, that is justice, the essence of justice requires
specification. Again, Kaufmann refers to Radbruch and to Aristotle.
The idea of law, he says, is and must be derived from the idea of man, law is a reflection of man.
Kaufmann sees the nature of man as threefold:
formal: man as an autonomous being who shapes his world - and consequently the law.
functional: man as a heteronomous being - in being subject to the law.
substantive (content): man constitutes an end/purpose in itself, he is his own purpose -
Man therefore is the concrete, substantive, historical purpose of the law.
Justice consequently also has three features/principles:
A formal principle: equality.
A functional principle: legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit).
A substantive principle, which determines the content: Purposiveness/practicability
(Zweckmafiigkeiti - equity.
Justice is always therefore form, function and substance at the same time. The three sides (or
demands) of justice may conflict with each other, but this conflict of justice with itself ("Konflikt der
Gerechtigkeit mit sich se/hst"l) is necessarily rooted in the nature of justice itself. It is inevitable and
needs to be resolved in every case anew.
Purpose or causa finalis is therefore the substantive principle of justice, an integral part of the idea of
law. Not the only one, but a crucial one.
Kaufmann emphasizes the continuing relevance of Aristotle's ideas about commutative and
distributive justice and the relationship between justice and equity for the discussion about law and
justice. Aristotle too, saw justice as something proportional, relational, analogous, in need of an
evaluative standard, a tertium comparationis, a mediator:
"Auch heute noch bildet das 5. Buch der 'Nikomachischen Ethik' des Aristoteles den
Ausgangspunkt aller ernsthaften Uberlegungen zur Gerechtigkeitsfrage. Kern der
Gerechtigkeit ist, so hat schon er gelehrt, die Gleichheit. Aber wahrend noch viel Spatere
'Radbruch, Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie, 3rd ed. 1965 32sqq.
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(z.B. Kant) die Gerechtigkeit als eine formale und numerische verstanden haben ..., hat
Aristoteles sie sehr viel angemessener als eine proportionale, geometrische, analogische
erkannt. Das Gleiche ist ein Mittleres und sonach die Gerechtigkeit das Proportionale.
Proportion aber verlangt ein Ma/3, Analogie ein tertium comparationis. Aristoteles nannte
dieses Maligebende die 'Wurdigkeit', Es ist klar, daf damit der Angelpunkt, aber auch die
ganze Problematik der Gerechtigkeitsfrage angesprochen ist." 1
According to Radbruch, purpose (causafinalis) determines the substance, the content of justice. The
question is what serves the bonum commune. Radbruch makes no difference between purpose and
value.' The source for the purpose, or purposes is the ethics. The problem here is and always will be
to determine what is the best for all. It is the old question of the highest good, or value. Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas saw happiness as man's highest good, his ultimate end. This value may be universal
but its decisive handicap is that the more concrete it becomes, the more relative it becomes. For every
individual concrete happiness is something different. The same applies in the final analysis to e.g. the
general principles of law or the basic rights of the individual. All these topics and values are useful
and necessary points of orientation, but not universally decisive at the concrete level. Later
philosophers have no more been able to solve the problem and this situation has led to the rise of
procedural ethics.'
Kaufmann acknowledges that in times of widespread value-relativism, the procedure is the necessary
and crucial element to reach consensus about values, which in tum influence the law. But, he urges,
consensus alone is not a sufficient criterion for the "truth" or "correctness" of the law. What is
needed is not simply consensus, but convergence (Konvergenz - a process similar to the assimilation
described above). Procedure cannot be an end in itself, it needs a subject matter and the procedure
must always be oriented towards its subject matter. Here again, the result of the procedure is not and
cannot be determined by the procedure as such but by the relation between the procedure and its
subject matter. Consensus must always mean consensus in relation to a specific subject matter. Truth
or correctness develops not through the procedure, but in the procedure. Again, it may never be
forgotten, that form alone does not suffice, only form in relation to substance creates justified and
dependable result.4
'Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 144.
2Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 153. In contrast, e.g. to Max Weber, who distinguishes purpose-
rationality and value-rationality.
3Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, IS6sqq.
"Kaufmann, Grundprobleme der Rechtsphilosophie, 216, 217.
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Part II: Germanv
1. The clausu/a rebus sic stantibus of the ius commune and the development of the doctrine of
Wegfall der Geschiiftsgrundlage in Germany
l.I. History of the clausuia rebus sic stantibus!
The ancient Roman lawyers did not have a specific concept dealing with changing circumstances in
general. The first scholars who deal with changing circumstances concerning promises are Cicero
(106-43 BC) and Seneca the Younger (4-65 AD). In his De officiis, Cicero stated the example of a
lawyer, who had promised to assist somebody in court but could not be reproached for not doing so,
because his son became deadly il1.2 The other famous example holds that one should not return a
borrowed sword to somebody who has in the meantime become insane:
"Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit,
officium non reddere".3
Seneca stated more generally, that circumstances had to remain the same in order to keep somebody to
his promise:
"Omnia esse debent eadem, quae fuerunt, cum promitterem, ut promittentis fidem
teneas ...".4
Cicero's example of the sword was taken up by St. Augustine in his Enarrationes in Psalmos, Y, 7,
which was in turn incorporated in the Decretum Gratiani? In the 13th century, the canonist Johannes
Teutonicus added a gloss to this text that seemingly became the starting point of the clausula doctrine
of the ius commune:
IFor a general account on the clausula see: Pfaff, "Die Clausel: Rebus sic stantibus in der Doktrin und der ësterreichischen
Gesetzgebung", in: Festschrift Iiir Joseph Unger (1898); Fritze, "Clausuia rebus sic stantibus" (1900) 17 Archiv Iiir
Burgerliches Recht 29 sqq.; Beck-Mannagetta, "Die clausuia rebus sic stantibus und die Geschaftsgrundlage in der
Dogmengeschichte", in: La formazione storica, vol. III, 1263 sqq.
2De officiis, 3, X- 30.
JDe officiis, 3, XXV- 95.
4De beneficiis, Lib. IV, XXXV,J.
5Secunda Pars,Causa XXII, Quaest. II,c. 14.
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" ...semper subintelligentur haec conditio, si res in eodem statu manserit" .1
Here already, we have the concept of an implied condition that the circumstances will remain the
same.
This assumption ran parallel with Thomas Aquinas' view in moral theology, that breach of a promise
is not a sin,
"si sint mutatae conditiones personarum et negotiorumr'
In the civil law, the thread was taken up by the greatest of the glossators, Accursius, in his gloss to the
passage in the Digest D. 12,4, 8, § Quod Servius.
The passage referred to a man who reclaimed the money he donated with a view to a marriage of two
people of whom one turned out to be a minor and thus incapable of marrying. The Digest denied the
claim of condictio ob eausam datorum, because the couple could still marry in the future and thus the
purpose of the donation had not failed yet. Accursius found that the possibility of future marriage
had to be circumscribed more specifically, and that in particular the possibility of marriage to a person
other than the one the donator had in mind, had to be excluded. To achieve this, he stated that
reclaiming the money was not possible under the condition that the original circumstances remained
the same:
" ...rebus sic se habentibus".3
The commentator Bartolus de Saxoferrato takes over this view4 and further specifies the significance
of rebus sic se habentibus. He also puts the specific legal act of renuntiatio - renunciation of pleas
under the condition of rebus sic se habentibus and supports a retroactive reduction of paid rents if
circumstances had changed to the extent that the tenant could not make any profit.' Accursius and
Bartolus use the term rebus sic se habentibus as a rule of interpretation, they do not yet speak express
of an implied or tacit condition, but the underlying idea is the same.
19!. Furens, ad C. 22, q. 2, c. 14.
2Summa theologiae, Secunda Secundae,q. 110, art. 3, ad quinturn.
lG/ossa Ordinaria, p. 358 ( Augustae Taurinorum 1968 ).
4Commentaria,D. 12,4,8, § Quod Servius, 3.
5Commentaria D. 12, 4, 8, fol. 42 ra, col.2 ; Quaestiones Aureae ( Venetiae 1450), quaest.4, fol.12 v". col. 2.
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Bartoluss pupil Baldus de Ubaldis (1327 - 1400) proceeded by providing this rule with a
philosophical explanation and enlarging its range of application.
Baldus' lively interest in philosophy - in that time consisting largely of the philosophy of Aristotle -
considerably exceeded that of his predecessors, and his unprecedented willingness to use it in the field
of the law marks the culmination of Aristotelian influence on the law. Baldus believed that moral
philosophy was the mother of law.' He accordingly saw jurisprudence as a part of moral philosophy
and held that the rules of moral philosophy should also be applicable in law. This was the widely
held view in his time which was later repudiated by philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and
Kant who challenged and eventually dismissed the moral philosophy of the Middle Ages that was
based on Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas? The more the scholastic philosophy declined, the more
Baldus' philosophical argumentation was criticised as being "unscientific". This criticism which
began during the Middle Ages, intensified in the 16th and 17th century and continued during the time
of the 19th century pandectists. Savigny saw the age of the commentators as a period of decline of
the scientific legal method due to - as he thought it - the superficial and formalistic use of popular
philosophical and dialectic notions.' This judgement is not generally adhered to today." Baldus'
approach and the criticism which it drew highlights the at all times important question of the
relationship between law and philosophy. Baldus held that since philosophy explained the general
foundations of human reason and cognition, it should also explain the foundations of legal reasoning.
It is recognized today, that the great contribution of Baldus was that he, while leaving the scattered
and disparate rules of the law unaltered, provided them with a coherent concept, a homogeneous
understanding, a rationale in an effort to harmonize them. The means to do this was the Aristotelian
philosophy. From this basis, he proceeded to draw specific methodological and dogmatic
consequences and thus introduced new Iines of argument which became the motor of the further legal
development.' The lesson Baldus learned and passed on is that a coherent concept of the law,
provided by philosophy, is an important prerequisite for the explanation and the further development
and improvement of the law."
The most significant example of Baldus' reception of Aristotle was the famous doctrine of causa. He
harmonized the civil lawyers' concept of pacta vestita ("ex nuda pactu non oritur actio"), meaning
ICommentaria D. 1, 1, 1,2.
2Part I §§ 2,3.
lSavigny, Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Milte/alter VI, 2nd ed. 1850, p. 6sqq.
"Horn, "Philosophie in der Jurisprudenz der Kommentatoren", in: 1 lus Commune, 105, with references.
sHorn, supra, 147, 148
"this argument has been taken up by James Gordley in The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, see the
Introduction, § 1.
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that only certain enumerated contracts were actionable, and the canon lawyers' concept that all
agreements, thus also pacta nuda, should give rise to an action because promises should always be
kept according to christian teachings. I
In formulating the doctrine of causa, Baldus drew strongly from Aristotle's ideas about the four basic
causes of the substances that make up the world. These ideas had been "christianized" and applied to
moral law by Thomas Aquinas and were in turn digested by the canonists.'
Baldus handled the doctrine of causa in a way that shows that he was not thinking of any arbitrary
causes, but was distinguishing according to the requirements of liberality and commutative justice -
liberality meaning more than giving without receiving, exchange meaning more than giving and also
receiving, the doctrine of causa therefore not being a tautology.' Baldus held that when a party gives
out of liberality, he does not use his substance badly and the other party is not enriched unjustifiably."
He also stated that a notarial document in which a promise was made, had to mention the causa,
otherwise one had to presume that the contract was made out of foolishness rather than liberality.'
Equally, he stated that an unjust price violated natural equity." Baldus' successors, on the other hand,
soon began to simply talk of causa gratuita or causa onerosa.
The Roman lawyers did not have a special concept of causa. The word causa was used in relation to
innominate real contracts in D. 2,14,7,2 and 4, and in relation to the stipulation in D.44,4,2,3 ,
D.22,3,25,4 , and C.4,30,13. The term did not have a coherent meaning and related only to the special
circumstances of the specific contracts.
The Glossators wanted to harmonize these texts by concluding that this causa was to be equated with
the iusta causa traditionis in the case of the passing of ownership. Therefore, the causa of a
stipulation had to be a negotium anteeedens (in the case of innominate real contracts a datio vel
factum) which had to be expressed in the contract. Without this causa, the contract could not beget an
action.
Ifor details see Sëllner, "Die causa im Kondiktionen- und Vertragsrecht des Mittelalters bei den Glossatoren, Kommentatoren
und Kanonisten", Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte Rom.Abt. 77 (1960), 182sqq.; Zimmermann, Law of
Obligations, 549sqq.; Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 49sqq.
2Part I§ t.
lGordley, Philosophical Origins, 55.
4Baldus, fn Decretalium volumen commentaria to X.I.4.II, no. 30.
5Commentaria C. 4,30, 13, no. 14.
6Commentaria C. 4, 44, 2, no. 18.
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With the newly acquired Aristotelian understanding of causa, Baldus proceeded to bridge the gap
between legist and canonist contract doctrine by saying that causa could not be taken as only referring
to a negotium anteeedens but to every causa extrinseca (that is either causa finalis or efficiens).
Thus, even a causa impulsiva, a reasonable motive, could be sufficient (causa sufficiens) to give rise
to an action. If that was the basic reason why contracts are binding, the same had to apply to pacta
nuda.'
On the other hand, a reasonable causa was also considered a requirement for any contract to beget an
action. If the contract lacked a causa, an error had to be presumed and no action could result from it.
This was the decisive argument to make the pacta nuda actionable because the doctrine of pacta
vestita was mainly justified with the argument that the formal requirements of these pacta protected
those who were inexperienced and careless in handling their affairs from entering unconscionable or
foolish contracts. If the party had to act on the basis of a sufficient causa (causa sufficiens), this
causa had the same effect as a vestimentum. Though the concept of pacta vestimenta was still
continued to be used also by Baldus, it had lost its reason and slowly faded into oblivion.
The consequence of the causa doctrine for the notion of rebus sic se habentibus and the ensuing
doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus was profound: if an obligation constituted a means to an end,
circumstances could arise in which that means would no longer be appropriate or fair in relation to the
end so that the parties would have to be released from the obligation.'
The doctrine of causa explains why the very same authors who established the rule of pacta sunt
servanda (ie that all pacta were regarded as binding and giving rise to an action provided they had a
sufficient causa) also developed its exception, the clausula rebus sic stantibus. Pacta sunt servanda
and clausula rebus sic stantibus are in facttwin concepts, springing from the same underlying notion.
Baldus also enlarged the range of application of rebus sic se habentibus by applying it to all kinds of
promissiones - unilateral promises that could only be enforced when reinforced by an oath - though he
does not give specific reasons for it.3
Under the later commentators, the range of application of the doctrine rebus sic stantibus was steadily
enlarged with the development reaching its peak with Jason de Mayno (1435 - 1519). By this time, the
'Baldus, Commentaria in Decretales, I, De Pactis, n. 14.
2Commentaria D. 12, 4, 8 pr., fol.364 r", col 2.
JCommentaria D. 12,4,8 pr., fol. 364 rO, col 2.
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notion of rebus sic se habentibus was applied not only to all sorts of contracts, but also to testaments,
oaths, and also privileges and statutes.
During the 16th century also, the term rebus sic se habentibus was gradually replaced by the term
rebus sic stantibus, the change being one of terminology only. The uncertainty about whether rebus
sic stantibus was to be dealt with as an exceptio, a conditio or a tacita clausuIa , was settled in favour
of the concept of an implied clausuIa. Philippus Decius (1454 - 1535 ) could therefore sum up the
development by stating that the clausuIa rebus sic stantibus had become a general rule of law:
"Et est regula communis, quod verba contractus et statuti intelliguntur rebus sic
stantibus ideo ex causa supervenienti contraveniri potest."
At this stage, however, the view developed that the range of application of the doctrine had become
too extended and that the clausulas requirements were lacking precision to an intolerable extent.
There was no agreement on the requirements for the operation of the doctrine and the clausula
seemed to have become a collective term for a heterogeneous group of cases which permitted
rescission and revocation of contracts? The universal application of the clausula was seen as a
considerable threat to legal certainty because all obligations are, to a greater or lesser extent, subject
to changing circumstances.
At this point began the long process of the restriction and finally the abolition of the clausuIa.
The first scholar to criticise the clausula was Andreas Alciatus (1492 - 1550) who, as a general rule,
wanted to restrict it to unilateral obligations. The application to bilateral obligations was to be
permitted only in four instances: when the parties made their promise under a basic misconception,
when the performance claimed runs against the nature of the contract, when rescission or revocation is
allowed by statute, and - most importantly - when circumstances arise which the parties had not
negotiated on.'
One of the mam reasons for the decline of the clausuIa was the fact that the currency of the
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical ideas of means to ends (final causes) had already been on the
retreat for some time." This is particularly obvious in the treatment of changing circumstances by
'Consilia, 1512, cons. 335,n. 4, 367.
2Kobler, Die "clausula rebus sic stantibus" als aLLgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz 199031.
3Aleiatus: Tractatus de orationibus, Tom. 6, I, 3, n. 36, fol. 308 va, and Tractatus de praesumptionibus.
"Part I § 2.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56
Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645). It still reveals the influence of the doctrine of causa but Grotius adopts
the argument of causa in a different manner, which was to influence successive generations of
lawyers:
"But the way to find the natural truth is opened to us by a principle concerning the force
and efficacy of statutes which is universally accepted. If a statute is founded on a
presumption as to some fact and the fact is really otherwise, then the statute is not
binding for the entire foundation of the statute fails if the truth of the fact fails. When a
statute is founded on such, a presumption is to be gathered from its matter, words and
circumstances. Similarly, therefore, we say that if a promise is founded on a presumption
as to some fact that is really otherwise by nature the promise has no force because the
promisor does not consent except on a certain condition which in reality is not met".'
Grotius uses the tacita conditio (clausuIa) but restricts it: the status rerum at the time of the
conclusion of the obligation must be included in the "unique reason" of the obligation. The tacita
conditio will only come into effect, if the change of circumstance obstructs this unique reason.
Grotius defines this reason as
"the unique and efficacious cause which moved the promisor",
without which the promise becomes unjust and useless. The words of the promise should be extended
beyond their literal meaning to include cases within that unique reason? Furthermore, Grotius
restricted the application of the clausuIa to executory contracts (though he did not restrict it to private
law) and stated as a major requirement that performance had become intolerable - or excessively
onerous - to the party.'
But Grotius did not explain his unique reason by talking about means to ends or final causes, derived
from man's ultimate end or cause. He also does not explain how the unique reason differs from the
concept of causa or, if at all, from a presumption on which a promise is founded." He derives the
unique reason solely from the interpretation of the intentions or wills of the parties': this is apparent
from the fact that the failure of the unique reason, the cessatio rationis, is one of three examples
Grotius gives of defectus voluntatis originarius, which renders an obligation unenforceable.
'Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, (Leiden, 1939), II. xi. 6.
2De iure belli ac pacis, I. I, c. 21, § 20. 2.
JDe iure belli ac pacis, 1. I, c. 16, § 27, p. 199.
"Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 91.
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Heinrich von Cocceji (1644 - 1719) expressly identified Grotius' tacita conditio si res maneant quo
sunt loco with the clausuia rebus sic stantibus. Though he accepted the clausuia as a general rule,'
he did not accept every change of circumstances as sufficient but differentiated according to the
relevance of the change of the original status. He distinguished status mutatio substantia/um and
status mutatio accidentium - substantial and non-substantial change of circumstances. A change of the
former kind would activate the clausuia, the latter not. He further distinguished between the express
addition of the clausula to the obligation and its mere implication. In the latter case the clausuia
would only come into effect when the change was unforeseeable.
Augustinus von Leyser (1683 - 1752) opposed the mainstream legal science of his time in this respect
and advocated the retention of the clausula in the field of contract law.' According to Leyser the
consent to the contract depends on its underlying causa and if this is frustrated by changing
circumstances, the consent is rendered invalid because the parties' consent related to another situation.
Remarkably enough, Leyser is one of the last to utilise the argument of causa. Leyser admitted that
there had been an abuse of the clausuia concept, but contended that the threat to legal certainty could
be addressed if three basic requirements were met: the change in circumstances had to be substantial
so as to render performance intolerable for one party, the change must not be attributable to the fault
of the affected party, and the change should have been unforeseeable for the affected party.
Leyser furthermore improved on Grotius by pointing out that a contract may not only have one
"unique reason" or one cause, but several, and that changing circumstances may frustrate one or
several causes but not necessarily all of them. To deal with this situation, Leyser advocated the idea of
merely adjusting the contract to the new circumstances instead of dissolving it in an all-or-nothing
fashion. The adjustment, in turn, should be left to the discretion of the judge whom Leyser regarded
as best suited to ensure equitable results and watch over the fulfilment of the requirements of the
clausuia.
The criticism of the majority of contemporary scholars notwithstanding, the clausuia was
incorporated in different ways in the 18th century codifications. These codifications nevertheless
reflect the move towards the restriction and eventual abolition of the clausuia as a general rule.
The Bavarian Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis, promulgated in 1756, formulated the clausuia
as a general rule along the line proposed by Leyser. The clausuia is stated to be tacitly implied in all
obligations, but in order for it to come into effect, the change must not be attributable to the fault of
'Cocceji, Disputatio De Clausula Rebus sic stantibus (1699).
2Meditationes ad Pandectas, 1717 (Lipsia 1741), spec. 40, § 4, p. 411.
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the affected party, must have been unforeseeable and so considerable that performance has become
intolerable for the affected party. I
The Pruss ian General Land Law ( ALR ), promulgated in 1794, still retains the clausula as a general
rule, but the formulation already seeks its restriction as far as possible. During the drafting process
Carl Gottlieb Suarez (1746 - 1798) sought, against considerable resistance, to retain the clausula as a
general rule. He warned that the unconditional enforcement of all contracts would in many cases lead
to inequitable results. He conceded, on the other hand, the possibility that the clausula might be
abused and stressed the need for precise rules of application.' As a result it was provided that:
"Auêer dem Fall einer wirklichen Unmëglichkeit, kann wegen veranderter Urnstande die
Erfullung eines Vertrages in der Regel nicht verweigert werden." (§ 377, l, 5 ALR)
"Wird jedoch durch eme solche unvorhergesehene Veranderung die Erreichung des
ausdri.icklich erklarten, ader aus der Natur des Geschafts sich ergebenden Endzweckes
beider Theile unrnëglich gemacht, so kann jeder derselben von dem noch nicht erftillten
Vertrag wieder abgehen."
(§ 378, l, 5 ALR)
§ 380, I, 5 ALR gave one party the right of unilateral withdrawal from the contract, if
durch die Veranderung der Urnstande nur der ausdri.ickl ich erklarte ader sich von
selbst verstehende Zweck des einen Theils ganz vereitelt wurde."
"
§ 381, I, 5 ALR, in turn, required the withdrawing party to compensate the other, if the change fell
within his sphere.'
The provisions thus confine the effect of the clausula to the thwarting of the contractual purpose, but
not any purpose - only the purpose expressly agreed upon or which self-evidently arose from the very
nature of the contract. Any other kind of change or any other kind of purpose is considered part of the
parties' consciously assumed risk.
I§ 12, IV, 15.
2Kobler, Die "clausula rebus sic stantibus" als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz 47.
Jcited from Kobler supra 48.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
59
Apart from these provisions, the idea of the clausuIa was incorporated 111 a number of narrowly
circumscribed special provisions, mostly relating to long-term obligations. I
The French Code Civil, promulgated in 1803, and the Land Law of the German state of Baden,
promulgated in 1809 which almost literally repeated the Code Civil, were the first codifications to
totally deny a general rule of rebus sic stantibus. Art. 1134 c.c. and Bad.LR states authoritatively:
"Rechtmaêig abgeschlossene Vertrage geIten als Gesetze unter denjenigen, die sie
geschlossen haben. Nur mit ihrer gegenseitigen Einwilligung oder aus Ursachen, welche
das Gesetz billiget, lassen sie sich widerrufen.,,2
The idea of the clausuIa as a qualification of contractual liability is restricted to a number of special
provisions, such as donation and lending.'
The pandeetist Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut expressively rejected the clausuIa: contracts are to be
fulfilled as long as there is no impossibility of so doing." Friedrich Carl von Savigny does not even
mention the clausu/a and restricts the rescission of contracts to cases of duress, fraud, mistake and
impossibility' This is typical of most of the pandeetist authors who deal with change of
circumstances only in respect of the few cases such as donation discussed by the Roman lawyers.
Bernhard Windscheid, while rejecting the c/ausu/a itself," tried to accommodate change of
circumstances by way of his doctrine of contractual assumption'. This amounted to another attempt to
bridge the gap between a legal transaction and reality, individual will and the facts of the case. In spite
of the doctrine of mistake which held errors in motive to be generally irrelevant, Windscheid wanted
to make certain motives legally relevant. This he sought to do by portraying some assumptions as
"undeveloped conditions", in the sense that they were not made into express conditions because
certain circumstances were assumed as a matter of course. Because it did not prevent the obligation
from coming into being, the "assumption" was not a condition in the strict sense but it amounted to a
"self-restriction of the will". If the assumption was not met, the legal consequences might well
correspond to the "real will" C'wirklicher Wille") but not to the "actual will" ("eigentlicher Wille ")
'Kobler, supra, 49 sqq.
2cited from Kobler, supra 55.
3Kobler, supra, 55 sqq.
"System des Pandectenrechts, 1803, § 20 I.
SSavigny, Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen Romisohen Rechts, vol. 2 (I 853) § 81.
6Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, vol. I, § 98.
7Die Lehre des romischen Rechts von der Voraussetzung, 1850.
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of the party. The distinction between the "assumption" and the legally irrelevant motive was found
in the requirement that the assumption should have been recognizable for the other party at the time of
the formation of the contract. Because it entailed a purely subjective approach, this theory drew much
contemporary criticism. It sought reservations in the minds of the parties about factual constellations
which the parties had ordinarily not consciously thought of, let alone made into a condition of
contracting. But at the same time Windscheid attempted consistently to adhere to the will-theory, thus
revealing one of its weaknesses. I It was furthermore criticised for being unable to distinguish the
contractual assumption in a precise way from a condition or a legally irrelevant motive.'
The development in respect of the doctrine of Voraussetzung nevertheless shows that there was by the
end of the 19th century a slight tendency to relax the rigid rejection of the clausuia in order to reach
reasonable and fair results where an inflexible rule of pacta sunt servanda produced obvious inj ustice.
The problem was, however, to justify a deviation from the strict rule while adhering to the 19th
century will-theory. On the basis of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, there was no conflict between
interpreting the will of the parties and asking what was fair and reasonable, since promises constituted
means to contemplated ends, and circumstances could therefore necessarily arise in which the
adherence to the means would no longer be reasonable or fair. Windscheid himself drew the
conclusion that if thrown out of the door, the idea of the clausuia would always re-enter through the
window.' The idea at the root of the clausuia is simply too closely connected with fundamental
questions about the law to be ignored.
This slight tendency towards a more benevolent view of the clausuia failed to influence the
codification of the BGB. Windscheid s doctrine of the assumption was rejected as posing a threat to
the security of legal intercourse, mainly because of Lenel's criticism that the doctrine could not
sufficiently distinguish assumption and irrelevant motive." The BGB does not contain a general rule
relating to change of circumstances, the idea of the clausuia is only contained in some special
provisions which do not permit generalisation.' The most general rule concerning change of
circumstances states that a party obliged to perform in advance may refuse to do so, if the counter-
IKobler, supra 66, 67; Gordley, supra, 185.
2Lenel in AcP 74, 213 sqq.
lWindscheid, "Die Voraussetzung" in AcP 78, 197.
"Protokolle II 2, p. 690.
5confirmed by the Reichsgericht in: ROZ 50, pp. 255, 257 (11.4.1902); ROZ 60, pp. 56, 58 (28.1.1905); ROZ 65, pp. 185,
188 (16.2.1907); ROZ 86, pp. 397, 398 (4.5.1915); ROZ 99, pp. 258, 259 (8.7.1920); ROZ 100, pp. 130, 131 (21.9.1920).
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performance is endangered due to a deterioration of the other party's financial integrity.' Other
provisions dealing with change of circumstances turn on special circumstances pertinent to donation',
lending' and long-term contracts like rent", custody', service", mandate and associations.
1.2. The development of the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage (lapse of the underlying
basis of the transaction)
As early as 1889 and 1898, two decisions of the Reichsgericht, although not expressly taking up
Windscheid's arguments, inclined in a direction away from the mainstream of pandectism." Both
decisions concerned mills which had been destroyed by fire, and in issue was whether the miller
remained obliged to deliver the meal when the mills were rebuilt after several months. According to
the general rule, this result was to be expected in the absence of a real impossibility of performance.
The court nevertheless made an exception in these two cases, arguing that circumstances had in the
meantime changed in such an unforeseeable way so as to impair or thwart the original purpose of the
transaction, and thus to change its original content.
Soon after the promulgation of the BGB on the 1st of January 1900, the need to relax the strict rule of
pacta sun! servanda in certain cases began to make itself felt. Although the Reichsgericht strictly
rejected a general clausula-rule until the end of the First World War, it made exceptions in cases
unsatisfactorily dealt with by the Code. This was done by constructing analogies to §§ 321, 610 BGB
and by holding that the rejection of a general clausula-rule did not exclude its application in
exceptional cases. These cases all concerned credit agreements, maintenance contracts and long-term
contracts based on special considerations of trust'".
I§ 321 BGB. The rule is reflected in § 610 BGB which permits the revocation of a promise of loan if the claim for repayment
is endangered by the decline of the promisee's financial position. The same applies to § 775 Nrs 1,2, which gives the surety
who has acted on the debtor's orders a right to claim release if the debtor's financial position has deteriorated.
2§§ 519, 528, 530 BGB.
3§ 605 Nr. I BGB.
4§ 570 BGB.
s§ 696 BGB.
6§ 626, 627 BGB.
7§ 671 BGB.
8§ 712, 723 BGB.
9See the decision of the 12.7.1889, Seufferts Archiv, vol. 45, p. 114; and that of 6.7.1898, RGZ 42, p. 114.
1DRGZ60, p.56,60 (28.1.1905); RGZ 65, p. 37,38 (22.12.1906); RGZ 65, p. 185,188 (16.2.1907); RGZ 78, p. 385,389
(27.2.1912); RGZ 78, p. 421,424 (27.12.1912); RGZ 79, p. 156,16 I (27.3. I9 I2).(Cited after Kobler, p. 90).
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In legal SCience, some authors argued for the recognition of a general clausula-rule, dogmatically
justifying such a development by once again making it a problem of interpretation with reference to
§ § 133, 157 BGB. I Contracts were to be interpreted to reflect what Erich Kaufmann called the
"spirit" of the agreement. This approach was also, as was the case with Windscheid, criticised for
proposing to interpret a non-existent will: the parties ordinarily do not think possible changes of
circumstances but take the continuation of existing circumstances for granted. This line of argument,
furthermore, brought the risk of supplementary interpretation under § 157 BGB going beyond the
actual content of the contract and resulting in a fiction of intention.
This approach to interpretation, however, revealed the renewed tendency towards a more objective
approach to a change of circumstances and its consequences for the contract. References to the
"spirit" of the agreement are not far removed from the "nature" or "essence" or "purpose" of the
contract and a perhaps unconscious return to Aristotelian and Thomistic legal thinking. 2
Stahl, for instance, wanted to re-establish a doctrine of clausu/a independent of the will of the parties,
which would come into effect whenever the "nature" of a contract was frustrated.' The Reichsgericht
also justified some of its exceptional references to the idea of the clausu/a by referring to the "nature"
of the contract."
Erich Kaufmann took a similar line in the field of international law.' He distinguished an "empiric
will" from the "effective will" ("Wirkungswille ") which is directed towards everything corresponding
to the nature of the type of contract and which ensures the attainment of the "essential purpose"
("Wesenszweck") of the contract. The obligation of every party to a contract is limited to what is
reasonable for that party according to his will, understood as an effective will, directed towards an
end." Today, the clausu/a rebus sic stantibus is an integral part of international law. Kaufmann's
views did not, however, have an impact in the field of private law.
A general change of attitude towards the clausu/a was therefore not decisively inspired by legal
reasoning. Instead the political and economic crisis resulting from the First World War and continuing
'Namely Endemann, Lehrbuch des burgerlichen Rechts, vol, I, 1899, § 63, p.19, § I 06, p. 16, § 184, p. 27; Dernburg,
Burgerliches Recht, vol, II, § 93, p. 10, § III; Bindewald, Rechtsgeschichtliche Darstellung der Clausula rebus sic stantibus
und ihre Stellung im BGB (Diss. 190 I), p. 30sqq.; Artur Kaufmann, Die Klausel: rebus sic stantibus (Diss. 1907), 12.
2Kobler, supra 91.
3Die sogenannte clausula rebus sic stantibus, 1909,20, 53sqq.
"e.g, RGZ 60, 56, 59.
sErich Kaufmann, Das Wesen des Volkerrechts und die clausula rebus sic stantibus, 1911.
6Erich Kaufmann, supra, IlO.
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into the era of the Weimar Republic, virtually left the courts no choice but to resort to remedies
similar to the clausula.
During the war, the Reichsgericht persisted in its rejection of the clausula. In a decision of the 3rd of
July 1917, I the court reaffirmed that it did not have a power to relieve the parties from the hardships
imposed on them by the war. But in a decision of the 8th of July 1920,2 the same court recognized
that, even though it was not so in the case before it, the principle of pacta sunt servanda might under
certain circumstances conflict with the principle of good faith and equity. This would be the case
where as a result of a change of circumstances, the performance due under the contract was in truth
different from that contemplated by the parties at the formation of the contract.
The first breakthrough came with the decision of the 21st September 1920 dealing with the
readjustment of rent.' In this decision the court recognized generally that supervening economic
crises could in certain cases result in an "economic impossibility". The court drew an analogy with §
325 BGB (regarding impossibility), based on the idea that although it might be still possible for the
party to perform, it might in the changed circumstances be unreasonable for her to do so. This idea
had developed from the assumption in the cases of 1889, 1898 and 1917 that change of circumstances
might alter the content or purpose of a contract in such a way as to make the due performance an aliud
compared to what the parties originally had in mind. The court now openly accepted that this was a
revival of the clausula. It stated further that the ruling opinion up to then
" ist durch die Erfahrungen i.iberholt, die der Senat im weiteren Veri auf des Krieges
und insbesondere durch dessen ungeahnte Umwalzung aller wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse
gemacht hat. Diese Verhaltnisse erfordern unbedingt ein Eingreifen des Richters in
bestehende Vertragsverhaltnisse dann, wenn anders nicht ein Treu und Glauben und
jedem Gebot von Gerechtigkeit und Billigkeit hohnsprechender, einfach nicht zu
ertragender Zustand gesehaffen werden soll.,,4
The court stated three conditions for judicial intervention: that both parties desire to maintain the
contract, the change of circumstances must be "exceptional" and that the assessment of the parties'
interests should lead to a division of the disadvantage. But this was still only a partial
acknowledgement of the clausula, based on the principle of good faith and equity and the notion of
IRGZ 90,374.
2RGZ 99, 258.
JRGZ 100, 129.
4RGZ 100, 132.
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reasonableness. Although this approach initially required that the change of circumstances should
entail the ruin of the party upon execution of the contract, this requirement was soon relaxed to the
extent that performance should merely produce intolerable results for the party in question.
In 1921, Paul Oertmann I published his book Die Geschaftsgrundlage. Ein neuer RechtsbegrifJ. He
introduced the notion of the "basis of the transaction", wh ich he expressly wished to be understood in
an objective way, thereby distancing himself from Windscheid's approach. The "basis of the
transaction" was not part of the legal act (and thus not a condition) and was also not to be identified
with its purpose.' Oertmann defines:
"Geschaftsgrundlage ist die beim Geschaftsabschluf zutage tretende LIndvom etwaigen
Gegner in ihrer Bedeutsamkeit erkannte und nicht beanstandete Vorstellung eines
Beteiligten oder die gemeinsame Vorstellung der mehreren Beteiligten vom Sein oder
vom Eintritt gewisser Umstande, auf deren Grundlage der Geschaftswille sich aufbaut.?'
Although Oertmann sought to move towards a more objective approach by distinguishing the basis of
the transaction from the transactional will, his approach remains in essence a subjective one. The
minds of the parties still form the focus of enquiry, and the basis of the transaction is still sought in
the parties' conceptions. Like Windscheid, Oertmann considered it a basic requirement that the
partners shared or at least recognized the conception as being fundamental to the contract. He tried to
distinguish the assumption-basis of the transaction from an irrelevant motive by saying that the
opposing party must have actually recognized the assumption and "tacitly" consented to it. The mere
possibility of recognizing the assumption - as Windscheid had said - would not be sufficient. Thus,
Oertmann said that the assumption constituted not only the basis for the individual declaration of one
party - as it did for Windscheid - but for the whole transaction. It was, however, still not sufficiently
clear how the assumption-basis of the transaction differed from an irrelevant, although perhaps
emphasized, motive. If one party expresses a motive for the transaction but does not indicate that he
wants to make it a condition, one cannot expect the other party to object to something he will regard
as irrelevant to the binding force of the transaction. In fact, seen purely from a psychological
perspective, there seems to be nothing "in between" a condition and an irrelevant motive. The only
distinction from a psychological perspective might be if the assumption motivated both parties equally
to enter into the transaction. But Oertmann did not want to confine the doctrine to such cases,
because to do so would exclude most cases of unforeseeable objective change of circumstances. The
'who incidentally was Windscheid's son-in-law.
2Die Geschaftsgrundlage 26sqq,
JDie Geschaftsgrundlage 37.
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attempt to include these cases in his understanding of the assumption, revealed the limits of the purely
psychological account of the will-theory: Even when it was clear that the parties did not consciously
think about the change of circumstances because it was unforeseeable, Oertmann argued that the
parties would at least rely on the continuation of the status quo. But this obviously is not the same
thing as if someone has a clear understanding which he wants to make the basis of the transaction.
Oertmann thus inevitably slides into a logical deduction and normative interpretation from and of the
parties' will, hiding it behind a pseudo-psychological argumentation.' In this respect, he did not differ
from Windscheid, whose "actual will" ("eigentlicher Wille") was also not really a psychological, but
rather a normative will. The result of this lack of methodological clarity was that Oertmann s formula
could theoretically account for all kinds of change of circumstances in an almost unrestricted manner.
Considering the question of when exactly the transactional basis falls away, Oertmann was also
unable to offer more precise criteria other than the reasonableness for the parties in the individual
case. The consequences of the lapse of the transactional basis would vary from case to case:
rescission or partial rescission if the collapse concerned only a part of the transaction. This shows
that although Oertmann did not expressly say so, he had in mind the possibility of an adjustment of
the contract.i
Oertmanns views inevitably attracted the same criticism levelled at Windscheid and Kaufmann,
namely that he put too much emphasis on subjective requirements. One could not construct contracts
on the basis of imputed, hypothetical and rather fictional conceptions extracted from what the parties
did not actually expect. Furthermore, his views were reproached for lacking in precision and it was
claimed that the resort to provisions of the BGB regarding the clausuIa - idea was unjustified.'
Despite this criticism, Oertmanns doctrine came at a time when the courts were in need for a
justification for their attempts to move away from the strict rule of pacta sunt servanda in special
cases. Thus, in its decision of the 3rd of February 1922, only one year after the publication of
Oertmann's views, the Reichsgericht anointed the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage with
the highest legal acknowledgement."
In this case - dealing with the devaluation of currency due to massive inflation - the court established
that the doctrine was to be employed when the equivalence of performance and counter-performance
was substantially disturbed because of a change of circumstances. The dogmatic basis of the doctrine
'Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung, 3rd ed. (1963), lO.
2Abas, Rebus sic stantibus 19,20.
lKiibler, supra 96.
4RGZ 103, 329,332.
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was (and is) sought in the principle of good faith and equity, § 242 BGB. The adjustment of the
contract was to be undertaken by encouraging the parties to re-negotiate the terms of the contract.
The doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage goes beyond the limits of the old clausula doctrine
since the latter only comprised objective changes and not subjective conceptions or expectations.
By 1923, the new doctrine had found application in no less than twelve of the Reichsgericht's
decisions, and from that time on, it has had a remarkable career in German jurisprudence. This was
mainly due to the flexibility of its broad terms and its legal effects, which gives the judge a
considerable discretion to bring about equitable results. The courts were, and are so fond of using the
doctrine, that today there are again widespread calls for a restriction of the Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage:'
Apart from Oertmann, other jurists also attempted to account for changing circumstances. The most
significant of these is the approach of Locher' in 1923. He also uses the term of basis of the
transaction but defines it differently as
"... die Gesamtheit derjenigen Urnstande, ohne deren Vorhandensein, Fortbestand ader
Eintritt der mit dem Geschaft nach seinem Inhalt bezweckte Erfalg (der Geschaftszweck)
durch das Geschaft trotz ordnungsmaêigem Abschlusses und trotz Aufwendung der nach
dem Inhalt des Geschafts den Beteiligten zuzumutenden Opfer nicht erreicht werden
kann."
In short:
"Geschaftsgrundlage sind die zur Erreichung des Geschaftszwecks mit den
Geschaftsmitteln notwendigen Urnstande. ,,3
By emphasizing the objective circumstances and speaking of the purpose of the contract, Locher, in
contradiction to Oertmann, who in essence did not desert the will-theory, built his theory on the
clausula-concept of the old ius commune (and thus on Aristotelian-Thomistic legal thinking). Locher
accepts as transactional purpose only what has been accepted by both parties and is reflected by the
content of the contract, thereby deliberately retaining a subjective element. All unilateral conceptions
are irrelevant. This aspect has been criticised. Locher enlarged the range of application of the
'Roth in Munchener Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 3rd ed. (1994) § 242 Rn 512 sqq.; Kobler, supra, 144 sqq.
2"Geschaftsgrundla"ge und Geschaftszweck", AcP 121, 71 sqq. 1923.
lLocher, supra, 71.
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clausuia by giving up the requirement of subsequent change. It should make no difference whether the
transactional basis fell away later or had been missing right from the beginning. To him the crucial
point was the assessment, with reference to the content of the contract and to good faith and equity, of
the limit of efforts which could be reasonably demanded from the party in order to carry out the
contract. He also spoke of an Unzumutbarkeit (intolerability). A major criterion, according to
Locher, is that there should ordinarily be an equivalence of performance and counter-performance, in
order for a contract to be enforceable.
A number of other authors 1 saw the clausuia, as was done at the beginning of the century, mainly as a
problem of interpretation, seeking the hypothetical will of the parties, in the event that they had
contemplated the changes that were to come.
Under national-socialist rule, the development of the doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage
continued unaltered. The Judiciary applied the doctrine largely without employing national-socialist
vocabulary to give content to the broad terms of Oertmann' s definition. Only in one decision, of the
15th December 1941, was the transactional basis related to the volkische Gesamtordnung (general
order of the peoplej.'
In this time, Larenz, too, dealt with Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage, which he, drawing expressly on
Locher, understood in an objective sense, rooting it firmly in the principle of good faith.'
The Second World War did not - as might have been expected - bring about a further development of
the doctrines of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage or clausuia. This was due to the fact that the
national-socialist government, foreseeing the impact of the war on the economy, provided for changes
of circumstances by means of the Vertragshilfe statutes. Several ordinances empowered judges to
balance the interests of the parties in an equitable manner in the case of economic predicament. The
rule stated in § 4 I of the Kriegsvertragshilfeverordnungï for instance, was that losses should be
apportioned by half, but the judge was given a large discretion on what measures to apply in
individual cases in order to ensure a new allocation of risk. There was accordingly no need, and no
'eg Wacup, Der augenblickliche Stand der Lehren von der Voraussetzung, der clausula rebus sic stantibus und
Geschaftsgrundlage, Diss. 1928, p. 24; Schmitz, in Schlegelbergers Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch, 1929, vol, II, p.
635; Rhode "Die beiderscitige Voraussetzung als Vertragsinhalt", AcP 124 1925, 257, 322; Heck, Lehrbuch des
Schuldrechts , 1929, 180sqq.
2RGZ 168, 121, 124.
J Ver/rag und Unrecht I, 1936, 162sqq., 165.
"Cited by Kobler, supra 122.
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authority for the courts to apply Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage except in those cases not covered by
the ordinances.
After the war, this approach was carried further with the Vertragshilfegesetz (contract aid law) of the
26th March 1952, which applied to contracts affected by the long-term consequences of the war, and
the Umstellungsgesetz, which dealt with the consequences of the change of currency from Reichsmark
to Deutsche Mark on the 21.06.1948.
Three interesting re-statements of the idea of the clausuia have been formulated during the nineties
which are likely to influence further discussion both nationally and internationally.
In 1991, the German commission tasked with the revision of the law of obligations by the minister of
justice (Kommission zur Uberarbeitung des Schuldrechts) in its concluding report, suggested the
incorporation of the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage into the BGB. According to this
submission, the new § 306 BGB would read:
"(1) Haben sich die Umstande, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden sind, nach
Vertragsschluf schwerwiegend verandert und hatten die Parteien den Vertrag nicht oder
mit anderem Inhalt geschlossen, wenn sie diese Veranderungen vorausgesehen hatten, so
kann Anpassung des Vertrags verlangt werden, soweit einem Teil unter Berucksichtigung
aller Urnstande des Einzelfalls, insbesondere der vertraglichen oder gesetzlichen
Risikoverteilung, das Festhalten am unveranderten Vertrag nicht zugemutet werden kann.
(2) Einer Veranderung der Urnstande steht es gleich, wenn VorsteIlungen, die zur
Grundlage des Vertrages geworden sind, sich als falsch herausstellen.
(3) Ist eine Anpassung des Vertrags nicht rnoglich oder einem Teil nicht zumutbar, so
kann der benachteiligte Teil vom Vertrag zurucktreten. An die Stelle des Rucktrittsrechts
tritt fur Dauerschuldverhaltnisse das Recht zur Kundigung aus wichtigem Grund.":
The "Principles of International Commercial Contracts", published in 1994 by the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit), contains in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3. a general
rule regarding change of circumstances. The principles merely speak of a "hardship" which exists
when certain events fundamentally change the contractual equivalence. For relief to be granted, it is
required that (1) the change of circumstances occurred after the conclusion of the contract or was
unknown to the parties at its conclusion and could not reasonably have been known, (2) the possibility
of such change of circumstances could not reasonably be considered at the time of the conclusion of
IRoth in Munchner Kommen/ar, supra, § 242, Rz 516.
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the contract (unforeseeability), (3) the risk of these changes was not attributed to the affected party by
the contract, and (4) the events were outside the control of the parties.
The "Principles of European Contract Law, Part I" published in 1995 by the Commission on European
Contract Law (Lando-Commission) deals with change of circumstances in sections 2.117 (1) and (2).
This section reaffirms that the principle of pacta sunt servanda will prevail if performance has only
become "more onerous", but not when it becomes "excessively onerous" because of a change of
circumstances. Except for the last element, the requirements for relief are the same as in the Unidroit-
Principles. Both sets of "principles" state as the consequence, that the parties are obliged to re-
negotiate their contract in order to adjust or terminate it.'
2. The approach of the Courts
2.1. The principle
Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Bundesgerichtshoj, in a decision of the 23rd May
1951,2 confirmed the case law of the Reichsgericht' that the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage is part of German Law:
"Bereits das Reichsgericht .... hat erne Beri.icksichtigung des Fortfalls der
Geschaftsgrundlage ... anerkannt, wenn mit Ri.icksicht auf den Geschaftszweck das
Festhalten an dem Vertrag nach Treu und Glauben dem Verpflichteten nicht mehr
zugemutet werden kann, und der Operste Gerichtshof fur die Britische Zone ist in dieser
Richtung noch weitergegangen, indem er die Durchbrechung des obersten Grundsatzes
der Vertragstreue unter diesem Gesichtspunkt nur zur Vermeidung untragbarer, mit
Recht und Gerechtigkeit schlechthin unvereinbarer Ergebnisse zugelassen hat ...".
Following the Reichsgericht, the BGH thus adopted Oertmann s formula of the Geschaftsgrundlage
and identified the requirement of Unzumutbarkeit (intolerability) according to the standard of good
faith and equity in § 242 BGB as the key issue and central point of the investigation. All other
requirements, like unforeseeability, were just circumstantial evidence suggesting a possible
Unzumutbarkeit (intolerability).
'both sets of "principles" cited after Zimmermann, "Konturen eines Europaischen Vertragsrechts", Juristenzeitung (JZ)
1995, Nr.lO, p. 486, 487.
2BGHZ 2, 188.
3RGZ 141, 216sqq.; RGZ 148, 172sqq.; RGZ 160, 265sqq.
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This has remained the Court's basic approach towards the Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage up to
today. In a decision from the 8th of January 19781 for instance, concerning the effects of the Oil-crisis
in 1973, the BGH reaffirms its position:
"Nach der gefestigten Rechtsprechung des BGH wird die Geschaftsgrundlage eines
Vertrages gebildet durch die nicht zum eigentlichen Vertragsinhalt erhobenen, aber bei
Vertragsschlu/3 zutage getretenen gemeinschaftlichen Vorstellungen beider
Vertragsparteien oder die dem Geschaftsgegner erkenribaren und von ihm nicht
beanstandeten Vorstellungen der einen Vertragspartei von dem Vorhandensein oder dem
ki.inftigen Eintritt oder dem Fortbestand gewisser Umstande, auf denen der Vertragswille
sich aufbaut .... Bei gegenseitigen Vertragen ist in der Regel die Vorstellung von der
Gleichwertigkeit von Leistung und Gegenleistung Geschëftsgrundlage, Dieser Grundsatz
gilt allerdings dann nicht, wenn der Vertrag ergiebt, wie die Parteien die Veranderung
bestimmter Urnstande geregelt wissen wollten. Wie der BGH in standiger
Rechtsprechung entschieden hat, geben Umstande, die nach dem Vertrag ersichtlich in
den Risikobereich einer Partei fallen, dieser kein Recht, sich auf eine Stërung der
Geschaftsgrundlage zu berufen. ... . Nicht jede Stërung der Geschaftsgrundlage ist
narnlich rechtlich bedeutsam. Angesichts der i.iberragenden Bedeutung, die dem
Grundsatz der Vertragstreue zukommt, ist die Berufung auf eine Anderung oder einen
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage nur zulassig, wenn das zur Vermeidung eines
untragbaren, mit Recht und Gerechtigkeit nicht zu vereinbarenden und damit der
betroffenen Partei nicht zumutbaren Ergebnisses unabweislich erscheint."
The basic rule remains pacta sun! servanda - this rule may only be put aside by means of the doctrine
of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage under exceptional circumstances amounting to Unzumutbarkeit
(intolerability) for the affected party.
The doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage serves as an exceptional ultima ratio, a last resort,
which is employed when the rules of interpretation or the rules of the Code which enjoy priority of
application do not offer a binding, satisfactory and equitable result. It is therefore essentially of a
subsidiary nature. This demonstrates that the doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage is simply a
concrete application of § 242 BGB, the principle of bonafides. It exemplifies the role of bonafides
in the legal system as a whole. Oertmann s formula of the basis of the transaction is thus a technical
tool used to operationalise the principle of good faith, one of the several possible dogmatic garments
in which this principle may appear. The final decision depends on whether the duty of unaltered
IJZ 1978, 236.
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performance is in conflict with bona fides - which is the case when there IS an Unzumutbarkeit
(intolerability) - or not.
The question of how to assess the significance of changes of circumstances in relation to contracts is
today generally considered to be a question of the allocation of risk. The consequence of a Weg/all
der Geschaftsgrundlage is a redistribution of the risk of changed circumstances or error and
disappointed expectations among the parties to the contract. This is only justified when the risk which
was manifested by the change had not been clearly allocated by the contract to one of the parties
alone. The doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage as tool of ultima ratio cannot supersede an
allocation of risk made by the contract itself or by the Code. When the parties have recognized a risk
and made provision for it, this provision generally prevails. Exceptions may be made when the
provision turns out to be inefficient and futile. That the parties have recognized a risk and
nevertheless not made any special provision for it indicates that they wanted the affected party to bear
the risk alone. Only when the parties have mutually not foreseen the risk at all, or have misjudged it as
trivial, does the affected party merit protection.
In practice it is often difficult to decide whether the contract or the Code does not offer a reasonable
solution to the problem, and in fact, the courts are considered to be quite liberal in assuming that in
the particular case neither contract nor Code indicates a reasonable solution in order to avail
themselves of the great flexibility of the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage in order to bring
about an equitable solution. This rather liberal approach towards the finding of gaps in the provisions
of the contract or the Code has prompted much criticism in the jurisprudence: these will be described
in the next chapter.
2.2. First prerequisite: the risk of a change of circumstances is not allocated by the provisions of the
contract or the rules of the Code
Risk may be allocated contractually or by the rules of the code. Each party, as a rule, must bear the
risk attributed to her either by the terms of the contract or imposed by the law governing the contract
and may not question it: pacta sunt servanda prevails. Only if the change of circumstances entails a
risk which has not been allocated expressly or implicitly by the contract or by law, or, on the other
hand, if the contractual or the allocation of risk by law produces an intolerable result, incompatible
with the principle of bona fides in a particular situation, may the doctrine of Weg/all der
Geschaftsgrundlage be resorted to. The analysis has therefore to proceed on three levels, namely, in
order of priority: the contract itself, the provisions of the Code and finally the basis of the transaction
tGeschaftsgrundlagei. . If any of the levels enjoying priority offers a conclusive solution, the
remaining levels are thereby excluded from the search for a solution.
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2.2.1. Contractual allocation of risk
As a rule, according to the principle of freedom of contract, any contractual allocation of risk has
absolute priority and thus excludes a recourse to the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage.
Since it is the very purpose of a contract to create a bond which compels a party to honour an
agreement until its execution, it is a natural characteristic of the contract to place certain risks typical
of the performance of a contract on the parties, according to their role in the contract. Each contract
must therefore be examined to determine the allocation of risk under it. This may already become
clear from express provisions, such as, for example, index clauses.' In any case, the content of the
contract has to be interpreted according to §§ 133, 157 BGB, that is, the actual intention of the parties
has to be determined according to the principle of bona fides and accepted customary standards
(Verkehrssitte). If the express provisions of the agreement do not solve the problem, interpretation
according to § 157 BGB goes beyond the content by enquiring into the hypothetical will of the
parties. This method of interpretation is called supplementary interpretation (erganzende
Vetragsauslegung): it asks what the parties would have willed, had they recognized their agreement to
be incomplete. Supplementary interpretation presupposes a gap in the agreement. There is no room
for supplementary interpretation if it appears that the parties wanted the agreement to be final.' There
is also no room for supplementary interpretation if that would extend the original content and produce
legal consequences which go further than the original agreement.' It is furthermore excluded if
various possibilities of filling in the gap present themselves and there are no reliable clues to
determine which of the alternatives the parties would have chosen.4
On the level of interpretation, a distinction must be made between the construction of an implied
condition and Wegfall der Geschafisgrundlage. The existence of an implied condition is established
by interpretation. It thus forms part of the content of the contract itself, and not of its basis.' The
consequence of an implied condition, furthermore, is inevitably the invalidity of a contract, not its
adjustment as in the case of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. The modern German version of the
clausula rebus sic stantibus has therefore outgrown the device of the implied condition.
In practice, the difference between supplementary interpretation and the basis of the transaction often
becomes blurred as soon as the case requires an evaluative judgement (Wertung). In borderline
IBGH in WM 1969,869.
2BGHZ 2, 383.
lBGHZ 16, 77; BGHZ77, 304.
4BGHZ 90, 80.
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situations it is often arbitrary to distinguish between the content established by interpretation and the
basis of the contract. In such cases, the courts sometimes base their decision generally on "§§ 157,
242 BGB".2
2.2.2. Allocation of risk by the rules ofthe Code
If no express or implicit allocation of risk can be determined from the contract itself, it has to be
found in the law in general. Allocation of risks effected by the rules of law governing contracts have,
as a rule, to be accepted. Priority is given to the rules governing the individual types of contracts and
especially the rules governing impairment of the performance in general (Leistungsstorungsrechïï,
concerning impossibility, delay, positive breach of contract (positive Vertragsverletzung or p VV) and
culpa in contrahendo.
Rules concerning situations of change of circumstances or common mistake related to special types of
contracts generally have priority. The doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage can therefore only
be employed if these special rules appear to be inconclusive in an individual case. The purpose of the
special law may, for instance, clearly be inapplicable in a given situation so that the employment of
the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage does not collide with that purpose. Of crucial
importance is that the question whether a special rule is conclusive or not, already entails an
evaluative judgement (Wertung).
An example is § 779 BGB concerning settlement contracts. It states that the contract is invalid if the
parties had been mistaken about the facts of the case which according to the content of the contract
had been made the basis of their agreement. The doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage is
excluded to the extent that this special rule is applicable. A requirement of § 779 BGB is, however,
that the facts forming the basis of the agreement should somehow have been reflected in the content
of the contract itself. The doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage, on the other hand, may be
employed in situations not covered by § 779 BGB. Such situations were held to be present, for
example, when unforeseeable later consequences of a damage causing event led to a gross
inequivalence between the loss and the settlement sum;' or when the value of a performance changed
IBGHZ 16, 8.
2e.g. BOH in NJW 1977, 385.
3BOH in VersR 1967,804; NJW-RR 1992,714.
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unexpectedly and considerably.' Changes in the law may also affect the settlement and would not fall
under § 779 BGB.2
The application of the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage is also restricted by the need to
preserve certain legal consequences entrenched in the Code. Paragraphs 626, 723 BGB, for example,
prescribe cancellation for an important reason iKundigung aus wichtigem Grund) as the only way to
terminate a long-term contract de futuro, in order to avoid retroactive rescissions. This rule may also
not be circumvented by the application of the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage. For
example, cancellation may not be granted because of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage on the basis of
requirements less strict than those stated in the provisions of the Code. It is only justified to move
away from the rules of the Code in the cases of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage if the party entitled to
cancel the contract desires a less strict legal consequence, namely only adjusting the contract instead
of terminating it.
In the cases of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage, performance has not become literally impossible for
the party affected by changed circumstances, it has only become a considerable hardship or useless
for that party.
The Reichsgericht initially attempted to subsume the cases of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage under
impossibility by saying that performance would mean such a hardship for the affected party that it
would amount to an "economic impossibility".' But this solution was soon abandoned because it was
incompatible with the literal meaning of the notion of impossibility, and it also did not bring about
better results than the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage. The notion of impossibility would
have had to be interpreted very widely to comprise all the cases of hardships due to fundamental
change of circumstances and this entailed necessary evaluative judgements (Wertungen) to no lesser
extent than the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage itself. Furthermore, the flexible legal
consequence of adjustment of the contract suited the interests of the parties (and the basic principle of
pacta sunt servanda) much better than the strict consequence of dismissing the contract as in the case
of impossibility.
But frustration of purpose (Zweckvereitelung) must be distinguished from the cases of termination of
purpose (Zweckfartfall or Zweckerreichung). In these cases, the purpose of the contract has been
attained, but by other means than the performance of the parties. This represents a kind of
ISGH in BB 1970,1191.
2SGH in NJW 1958, 1540.
3RGZ 100, 129.
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impossibility. The regular example for this is the ship trapped on a sandbank which comes free on its
own before another hired ship arrives to tow it away. The owner of the hired ship cannot claim
payment because his performance - to save the ship trapped on the sandbank - has become impossible
due to the fact that the trapped ship has come free on its own. In the cases of Zweckvereitelung,
performance is still possible but it has lost its reason, it has become useless for the affected party
because the purpose of the performance has been frustrated due to the change of circumstances.
If a party is in delay with her performance, that party bears the risk of accidental impossibility of
performance.' Consequently, Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage cannot be employed in such a case.
The risk is allocated to the party in delay without regard to the nature of the change of circumstances.
Compensation claims like those based on the German notions of positive breach of contract (p VV) and
pre-contractual fault (culpa in contrahendo or cic) require fault on the side of one of the parties. The
doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage is thus excluded since it only applies to cases where the
change of circumstances is not attributable to either of the parties?
Paragraph 812 I sentence 2, 2nd alternative BGB (condictio causa data causa non secutai states that
the performing party may reclaim her performance if the purpose evident from the content of the
contract has not been attained. This condiction of purpose (Zweckkondiktion) is particularly difficult
to distinguish from the notion of Geschaftsgrundlage. The condictio requires that there was an
agreement on a common purpose which goes beyond the mere execution of the contract and which
does not exhaust itself with the execution of the latter. It is required that the common purpose must
have been reflected somehow in the content of the contract although not made an express part of it.'
This kind of agreement regarding a purpose is considered to occupy a position midway between an
express condition and the basis of the transaction (Geschaftsgrundlageï. It should therefore not be
confused with the Geschaftsgrundlage, although it is often difficult to distinguish the two."
Therefore, in cases where there is a common purpose which is not at all reflected in the content of the
contract itself, the doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage might be employed if that purpose is
frustrated due to a change of circumstances.
If a common mistake relates to circumstances which are vital for the formation of the contractual will
itself, the rules of the Code governing mistake and avoidance (Anfechtung) have priority. Paragraph
119 I BGB concerns error about the content of the transaction itself (Inhaltsirrtum). Paragraph 119 II
I§ 287 BGB.
2Roth in Munchener Kommentar, § 242 Rn 542.
lBGH in NJW 1992, 2690.
4BGH in NJW 1966, 448.
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BGB makes error about characteristics of things and people (Eigenschaftsirrtum) a basis for
avoidance as well. This provision of the Code is considered to be problematic because it fails to make
a clear distinction between errors in the contractual will relevant for avoidance and errors in motive,
which are generally considered irrelevant. Different opinions have developed on the matter. I These
rules usually apply to mistake irrespective of whether they are unilateral or common. But this is
where the problem starts because § 122 BGB imposes on the avoiding party the duty to compensate
the other for her losses due to the avoidance. This result is inequitable in the case of common
. mistake. When both parties were labouring under the error, it is arbitrary which party will choose
avoidance first and have to pay compensation. For that reason, the courts tend to assume Weg/all der
Geschaftsgrundlage whenever possible so as to avoid the result of § 122 BGB.
In some cases of error about the subject matter of a sale, the rules governing liability for defects, §§
459 sqq. BGB, might also apply and thus exclude Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage. This is due to the
prevailing subjective theory of defect (subjektive Fehlertheorie) which says that an item is defective
when it differs from what the parties had mutually assumed it to be. For example, liability for defect
was assumed when the parties erroneously believed the land sold was building land.i
2.3. Second prerequisite: common subjective basis of the transaction iGeschaftsgrundlageï
The second important requirement, from which the doctrine derives its name, results from the
subjective relationship of both parties to the change of circumstances. This is especially evident in
the cases of common error and disappointed common expectations, but applies as well to the cases of
supervening change of circumstances. The doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage therefore
makes an error in motive or a frustration in motive legally relevant under certain requirements. The
parties must share certain motives, that is conceptions or expectations concerning the present or the
future. They must at least have jointly relied on the continuation of the existing state of affairs at the
time of the formation of the contract or a "normal", foreseeable development. In order to justify the
sharing of a risk of changing circumstances, normally attributed to the affected party alone, to the
opposing party, it is necessary that the latter somehow shared, or at least recognized, the conceptions
or expectations of the affected party as being fundamental to the contract. If these common
conceptions or expectations (be they based on the foreseeable course of events or on an error) are
frustrated by reality (be it by the unforeseeable change or emergence of circumstances or the
Isee Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 617; Larenz Allgemeiner Teil des BGB § 20 II b; Medicus Allgemeiner Teil des
BGB Rz 770; Kramer in Munchner Kommentar, § 119, Rz 89sqq.
2BGH lZ 1977, 177.
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discovery of the error), it is considered equitable to let the opposing party participate in bearing the
consequences which fortuitously fell on the affected party alone.
The question of the extent to which the opposing party should have shared the affected party's
conceptions, depends on the weighing up of the interests of the parties in the individual case. There
are cases where it was considered sufficient that the opposing party merely recognized the affected
party's conceptions as fundamental for her performance. In other cases, it was required that the
opposing party should not only have recognized, but actively adopted, these conceptions as vital to
her own interest. But the general rule remains that there must be evidence in the individual case to the
effect, that - based on the shared conceptions of the parties - the affected party was not destined to
carry the risk of change alone.
The importance of the subjective basis of the parties' conceptions has diminished since the days of
Oertmann. In the original version of his doctrine the common subjective basis, the
Geschoftsgrundlage, was the crucial element, and the determination whether a certain circumstance
formed part of it or not was decisive to its operation. Now the emphasis has shifted almost
completely to the notion of Unzumutbarkeit as the indicator of when it is justified to intervene on the
basis of bonafides. Oertmann followed Windscheid in adopting a subjective approach because of the
prevalent "will-theory" of the late 19th century. The courts nowadays, although retaining Oertmann's
formula as a starting point, prefer a more objective approach. The common subjective basis is by no
means superfluous, however. It is one of a number of criteria which have to be evaluated when
determining Unzumutbarkeit by weighing up the parties' interests.
2.4. Third prerequisite: intolerability (Unzumutbarkeit)
This is the vague, but crucial normative criterion for every intervention into legal transactions on the
basis of § 242 BGB, the principle of bona fides. Here, eventually, the decisive evaluative judgement
(Wertung) comes into play: the objective hardship of the individual case has to amount to an
Unzumutbarkeit . The principle of private autonomy in contract law grants self-determination to, and
demands self-responsibility of the parties and in consequence imposes a high degree of judicial self-
restraint in respect of interventions into contractual relationships. It is in any event questionable
whether a judge is a more satisfactory arbiter of contractual fairness than the parties themselves. For
that reason, the objective hardship must always cross a certain "threshold of intolerability"
(Unzumutbarkeitsschwe!!e) before a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage can be assumed. This
evaluative judgement is the result of an all-encompassing process of weighing the parties' interests
(lnteressenabwiigung) according to the circumstances of the individual case. There is no fixed
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standard of Unzumutbarkeit, the degree of hardship required to amount to Unzumutbarkeit can vary
from case to case according to the individual circumstances. I Certain aspects always play an
important role in the determination whether there is Unzumutbarkeit and thus a Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage and which are inextricably interwoven in the weighing up of the parties' interests.
Thus, Unzumutbarkeit is always excluded in the following situations.'
2.4.1. Speculative transactions
If a transaction entails an unusually high risk which is, however, balanced on the other hand by the
chance of an unusually high profit, and the parties have consciously accepted these risks, neither party
may claim a Wegfall der Geschéiftsgrundlage. The risks in such cases are obviously allocated to the
affected party only.'
2.4.2. Self-induced frustration
If the crucial change of circumstances is attributable to the conduct of the affected party or occurs
while she is in delay, she may not claim Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage" The opposing party's fault
may on the other hand be considered in favour of the affected party.'
2.4.3. Foreseeability
The affected party may not claim a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage if she had foreseen or was able to
foresee the change of circumstances because in that case she could have made adequate provisions. If
she did not do so, she is considered to have assumed the risk on her own. The same rule applies in the
case of mistake: the affected party should not have been able to recognize the error."
2.5. Legal consequences
'Roth in Munchner Kommen/ar, supra, § 242 Rn 540.
2Roth in Munchener Kommen/ar, supra, § 242 Rn 541 sqq.
lBOH LM(Bb) Nr. 47, Nr. 61: BGHZ74, 370.
4BOH LM (Bb) Nr. 61; BOH in ZIP 1993,234.
5BOH NJW 1992, 2690.
6Roth in Munchner Kommen/ar, supra, § 242 Rn 543.
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The consequences of a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage are neither invariable nor automatic. The
adequate distribution of risk and balancing of the parties' interests which lie at the heart of the
doctrine require a considerable judicial discretion, guided by parameters established by the expressed
intention of the parties and the provisions of the Code. I
Any intervention into the contract should be as restricted as possible. Contracts are therefore only to
be adjusted cautiously, with ex nunc termination and especially the possibility of an ex tunc invalidity,
being considered as ultima ratio only. Concerning long-term contracts, termination ex nunc is a less
harsh consequence than invalidity ex tunc, but even termination will in most cases not be in the
interests of the parties. Adjustment of the future relationship will prevail in most cases, with the
criterion of Unzumutbarkeit playing an important role in the determination of the legal consequence.
The Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage is meant to be an exception to the principle of pacta sun!
servanda, so that the need for a favor contractus is best met by the possibility of adjustment of the
consequences of the contract.
2.6. The legal nature of the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage
Whether the application of the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage is of a declaratory or a
constitutive nature (involving Rechtsfindung as against Rechtsgestaltung), remains obscure. Because
the prospect of an arbitrary judicial interventionism is frowned upon, the prevailing opinion is that,
despite appearances, the court gives effect to a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage by means of a
declaratory judgement, rather than shaping these consequences by means of a constitutive judgement
(Gestaltungsurteilji This cannot, however, distract from the fact that albeit that the judge's flexibil ity
is guided by weighing the parties' interests on the basis of allocation of risk and Unzumutbarkeit, the
legal consequences of a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage are not self-evident.
It has been argued that the best way to safeguard the principle of party autonomy would be to simply
oblige the parties to re-negotiate the terms of their contract.' It is questionable, however, how far this
concession to party autonomy extends. Judges are obliged to give a detailed judgement on cases
brought before them and thus have to pre-determine the results of the parties' negotiation anyway.
Furthermore, if the parties do not reach consensus, the final decision here, as always, remains with the
'Roth in MunchneeKommeruar, supra, § 242 Rn 544.
2Roth in Munchner Kommentar, supra, § 242 Rn 551.
Je.g. Hom: "Neuverhandlungspflicht" AcP 181 (1981), 255sqq., 276; Haarmann: Wegfall der Gescháftsgrundlage bel
Dauerschuldverhtiltnissen, 1979, 103sqq.
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court.' The assumption also that the court may only impose a duty of consent to an adjusted contract,
or may only grant a rescission right which still has to be executed.' is rather formalistic since in such a
case also the real decision is taken by the court itself.'
3. The doctrine of Wegfall der Gescluiftsgrundlage in German legal science
The thought of two of post-war Germany's most influential scholars in Private law: Werner Flume and
Karl Larenz, exemplifies criticism and support for the doctrine of Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage.
3.l. Werner Flume
Flume became the most influential opponent of a general doctrine of Weg/all der
Geschaftsgrundlage? In his work Das Rechtsgeschaft/ he elaborates his fundamental criticism. The
doctrine, in his view, reflects the con stant temptation not to take contractual obligations seriously
anymore. It tends to reduce the importance of the contract and look for solutions outside the contract,
instead of concentrating on the contract itself:6
"Die Lehre von der Geschaftsgrundlage wird immer wieder begunstigt durch
Entscheidungen, welche im Ergebnis richtig sind und dadurch, daf sie auf die Lehre von
der Gescháftsgrundlage gestutzt sind, glauben machen, daf diese Lehre notwendig sei
und zu richtigen Ergebnissen fuhre, wah rend in Wirklichkeit der Vertrag selbst die
Lësung ergibt"."
IRoth in Munchener Kommentar. supra, § 242 Rz 552.
2BGH NJW 1975, 390; BGHZ 101,143; BGH NJW 1993,1641.
3Roth in Munchener Kommentar, supra, Rz 552, 552a.
"Other authors have followed his position, with the majority stressing that Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage should be treated
as a question interpretation. Among them are: Dieter Medicus, "Vertragsauslegung und Geschaftsgrundlage", in: /.
Festschrift fur Werner Flume, 1978, pp. 629sqq.; Beuthien, Zweckerreichung und Zweckstorung im Schuldverhaltnis, 1969;
Koller, Die Risikozurechnung bei Vertragsstorungen in Austauschvertragen, 1979; Nicklisch, "Erganzende
Vertragsauslegung und Geschaftsgrundlagenlehre - ein einheitliches Rechtsinstitut zur Luckenausfullung?" , m:
Betriebsberater 1980, pp. 949 sqq.; Littbarski, "Neuere Tendenzen zum Anwendungsbereich der Lehre von der
Geschaftsgrundlage", in: Juristenzeitung 1981, pp. 8 sqq.; Wieling, "Entwicklung und Dogmatik der Lehre von der
Geschaftsgrundlage'', in: Jura 1985, pp. 505 sqq.; Emmerich, Das Recht der Leistungsstorungen, 3rd ed. 1963, p. 2.
51965,494 sqq.
6Flume, Das Rechtsgeschaft. 526.
7Flume, supra, SIS.
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Flume identifies as the main problem the relationship of contract and reality. The question is who has
to bear the "risk of reality" ("Wer tragi das Risiko der Wirklichkeitrr'Y. Flume emphasizes that this
question is the main theme of the rules of the Code concerning the law of obligations. Their allocation
of risks must be respected. The solution should therefore always be sought by interpreting the rules of
the Code with reference to the individual contract. Flume claims that the rules of impossibility,
rescission and other rights for termination, liability for defects and all the other rules concerning the
specific types of contracts entrenched in the Code suffice to solve most of the cases in which the
doctrine is invoked:
"Die Lehre von der Geschaftsgrundlage ist nichts anderes als erne Erganzung der
gesetzlichen Normierungen im Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse fur alle Falle, von denen
man meint, daf sie gesetzlich nicht geregelt seien".'
These cases are so diverse, he says, that they cannot be dealt with in a unifying manner.' To deal with
the cases simply on the basis of §242 BGB does not improve the situation since the invocation of
"good faith and equity" is nothing but another way of saying that one has to look for a just solution."
" ...eine rechtliche Wertung hinsichtlich der naturalia negotii [ist] nur mëglich ..., wenn
der konkrete, zur rechtlichen Entscheidung stehende Schuldvertrag nicht als Singularitat
sondern als Vertragstypus begriffen wird. An Stelle von Einheitslësungen, urn welche
man sich in der Lehre von der Geschaftsgrundlage bemliht hat und die im Ergebnis zu
einer bloben Billigkeitslësung gefuhrt haben, geht es darurn, jeweils fur den konkreten
Vertragstypus als naturale negotii die sich fur ihn gehorige Regelung der Frage zu finden,
wer von den Vertragspartnern das Risiko der Wirklichkeit tragt".' "Man
kënnte ...vielleicht meinen, daf es nicht darauf ankomme oder es nui em
Formulierungsproblem sei, ob man auf die Geschaftsgrundlage ader die vertragliche
Vereinbarung abstellt. Dem ist aber nicht so. Die Orientierung an der vertraglichen
Vereinbarung schafft eine prazisere Abgrenzung der fur die rechtliche Wertung zu
beachtenden und nicht zu beachtenden Wirklichkeit und bietet allein die Gewahr,
daê, ....die vertragstypische Risikoverteilung .....verwirklicht wird".6
IFlume, supra, 500.
2Flume, supra, 498.
3Flume, supra, 499.
"Flume, supra, 500.
5Flume, supra, 501.
6Flume, supra, 526.
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Concerning common mistake, Flume emphasizes that the mistake must have become part of the
contract's content. If the error is unilateral, it is irrelevant; if both parties have erred, there are two
different versions of the contract and the question is which one has priority. If both versions are of the
same rank, neither party can be held to the more unfavourable version (for the respective party) of the
contract. I
The cases in which performance becomes more onerous, to Flume, are a problem of the rules
concerning impossibility. The relevant rules of the Code show that a party should be relieved only
when the performance becomes "extraordinarily" onerous. But to determine this, Flume also has to
resort to the measure of "intolerability" tUnzumutbarkeiïy.:
Concerning contracts of lease, Flume assigns the purpose of the envisaged use (Verwendungszweek)
to the content of the contract in most cases. If so, it is part of the "vertragsmafiiger Gebraueh"
(stipulated use) of the rented item, and thus the landlord is liable for this particular use under § 536-
538 BGB. Again, if that purpose has not become part of the content of the contract, it remains
irrelevant. 3
Flume wants to solve almost all cases dealt with in terms of the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage, by means of a resort to the interpretation of the contract and the relevant rules of
the Code. This approach, however, entails the danger of an overly generous interpretation of the
contract and Code in cases which are not obvious, in order to reach fair results. This does not
necessarily make the results more reliable, let alone obvious." Flume does not indicate the limits of
interpretation in this regard, but maintains that if the circumstances in question cannot be said to form
part of the contractual content, they should remain irrelevant. As a matter of principle, he rejects the
consideration of any conception, motive or the objective aspect of the parties' interests falling outside
the ambit of the content of the contract. He is confident that a reasonable solution can almost always
be found on the basis of the contract and the Code itself.
"Almost" implies that even Flume acknowledges that his approach does not suffice for all cases
covered by the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. He exempts cases of" general changes
of social existence" (Anderungen der Sozialexistenz), comprising change of currency, large-scale
inflation, changes in the law, natural catastrophes and wars. These risks are never part of any
'Flume, supra, 507.
2Flume, supra, 509.
JFlume, supra, 513.
4Roth in Miinchener Kommentar, supra, § 242 Rz 573.
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contractual or statutory allocation of risk. But these, says Flume, comprise highly exceptional cases,
which should be dealt with by the legislator. Only if the legislator does not react, is judicial
intervention on the basis of purely equitable arguments justified, and then only until the legislator
reacts:
"Da der Vertrag keinen Anhalt fur die Risikoverteilung betreffs des Geschehens der
Sozialexistenz gibt und durch allgemeine Rechtsnormen die Risikoverteilung nicht
geregelt werden kann, bleibt keine andere Lësung als die Billigkeitsentscheidung".'
Flume's position reflects his basic attitude towards the law which is in essence determined by his
strong orientation towards Savigny. Flume consciously and deliberately goes back to Savigny in his
adoption of a primarily historical-systematic approach in Das Rechtsgeschaft which does not deal
extensively with the methodological developments until then.' Like Savigny, Flume accepts only the
four classic elements of interpretation: grammatical, logical, historical and systematic, the most
important being the systematic interpretation." Flume furthermore also rejects the consideration of
outward purposes (ends), because the ratio legis, the underlying value-judgement of the legislator, is
not really part of the law itself so that it would be illegitimate to impose inferred purposes from the
outside by interpretation.' Teleological interpretation, the crucial element of the
Wertungsjurisprudenz, is therefore dismissed by Flume just as it was by Savigny. The basic reason for
this is, again, that Savigny believed that the jurist should not occupy himself with philosophy, with
the why of the law, but only with the historical material of the law as it has come down to him. Flume
adopts the same attitude when he speaks about the principle of private autonomy as being based on
(Kant's) ethical personalism: he does not consider in detail why it is justified to make private
autonomy the centrepiece of civil law, but simply by way of justification to its positive entrenchment
in the constitution and regards this as settling the matter."
With Savigny, Flume does not deny the necessity of the further development of the law, but is equally
cautious: such further development, like the interpretation, has to take place by means of the
contemplation (Anschauung) of the - systematic - whole of the legal system, its organic structure.'
'Flume, supra, 525.
2Part I § 4 ..
JBrox, "Fragen der rechtsgeschaftlichen Privatautonomie" in Juristenzeitung 1966, 762, a review on Flume's book Das
Rechtsgeschaft and a critique from the perspective of the Wertungsjurisprudenz,
"Flume, supra, 293.
sBrox, supra, 763.
6Flume, supra, I; Brox, supra, 762.
7Flume, supra, 297.
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This purely systematic approach to the further development of the law, which accepts the law as a
given and does not enquire into the why of the law, restricts further development to the cautious
drawing of analogies to already existing legal rules, legal institutions or the "types" of contracts
entrenched in the Code, just like Savigny had done.' Applied to contracts this approach means that
the contract and its content, as the law of the parties, is the sole basis of interpretation - motives,
underlying interests or value-judgements of the parties are irrelevant. The contract has to be
interpreted and evaluated in the light of the relevant rules of the Code. The value-judgements and
basic principles underlying these rules are, again, irrelevant, since they are to be evaluated in a purely
systematic and formal way. Systematicly, the Code identifies certain types of contracts and these are
thus the sole legitimate points of reference for the contracts in question. Only if these rules offer no
solution at all, is there space for supplementary interpretation, which should consist preferably only of
drawing analogies from existing rules dealing with similar problems.
At the basis of Flume's position concermng the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage,
therefore, is his purely systematic understanding of the legal act (Rechtsgeschafti, and especially the
contract, which differs fundamentally from the view that is held by the Wertungsjurisprudenz: Flume
observes that the decision to entrench principles of private autonomy and pacta sunt servanda in the
Code must be respected. Exceptions are only permissible in situations mentioned in the Code.
The adherents of the Wertungsjurisprudenz reject this approach. They want to enquire further because
the Code is not perceived as the ultimate authority. They observe that the authority of the Code is
justified by its aim of compliance with the idea of the law and the realisation of justice. They enquire
about the why of the legal rules, they want to interpret and understand the rules on the basis of their
underlying reasons with reference to the ideal of justice. They investigate the why of private
autonomy and pacta sunt servanda, and the role of these notions in the pursuit of justice are
interpreted and analysed. The contract is accordingly perceived as a means to a certain end, which is
to achieve a just balance of the parties' interests. In this respect, individuals can only exercise their
will with the sanction of the law if they reach an agreement in which each takes account of the interest
of the other. The parties have to be ad idem as regards their interests at the time of the formation of
the contract and only then will the contract become binding. Parties therefore have to adjust their
respective interests to those of the other. Because a contract derives its binding character from this
aspect, the Wertungsjurisprudenz has regard to common motives and value-standards of the parties
when interpreting the contract. The contract is thus entrenched in the Code as a means to order
human relationships because it offers a high probability of achieving equal balances of the interests of
'Flume, supra, 324.
2Brox, supra, 762.
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individuals.' From the correct understanding of the rationale of principles such as private autonomy
and pacta sunt servanda, the Wertungsjurisprudenz also proceeds to develop solutions on the basis of
the interpretation of the contract, understood correctly as the means to an end. A complete frustration
of the contractual end in an individual case, must have consequences for the contract. And the less
the rules of the Code offer solutions to the problems, the more inevitably the Wertungsjurisprudenz
has to search for solutions by referring back to the basic principles and value-judgements of the legal
system.
3.2. Karl Larenz
Larenz claimed that the problem of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is not only restricted to
exceptional, extraordinary cases but represents one of the basic problems of every legal system: how
to accomplish the inevitable limitation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in a justified and
dogmatically sound manner in order to avoid the result of the old maxim summum ius - summa
iniuria? The legal order should not capitulate before the problems which the cases of clausuia and
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage pose.'
In 1951, in the first post-war monograph on that this subject, Geschaftsgrundlage und
Vertragserfullung, Larenz took positions which he consistently upheld since then. In his foreword,
Larenz warned of the dangers of judicial decision making based on purely equitable arguments
("reine Billigkeitsrechtsprechung"), and stated his aim of contributing clarification of the doctrine of
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, and particularly the criterion of Unzumutbarkeit in the interests of
legal certainty." He also emphasized the essentially philosophical nature of the question underlying
the doctrine. This related to the implications of the dialectical relationship between private autonomy
and commutative justice (ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit), which are lying on the same level as the
relationship between legal certainty and substantive justice. The solution of the problems resulting
from these questions should not be left entirely to legal intuition (Rechtsgefuhh? In the same vein, he
sought to contribute to the correct understanding of § 242 BGB, which he regarded as sometimes
misunderstood by the courts as entailing a free ticket for judges to devise a solution on the basis of
IBrox, supra, 762.
2 Verhandlungen zum 40. Deutschen Juristentag, 1953, vol. II, B 32sqq.
3Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, vol. I, 14th ed.; 1987,331.
"Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung, 3rd ed. 1963,2.
5Larenz, supra, 160.
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purely equitable arguments. Judges were (and are) not quite free because § 242 BGB binds them to
objective value standards which need concretisation in a methodologically sound way.'
On this basis, Larenz distinguishes three kinds of gesetzesubersteigende Rechtsfort-bildung (further
development transcending the written law): unabweisbares Bedurfnis des Rechtsverkehrs (compelling
need of legal intercourse), Natur der Sache (the nature of things) and Rechtsfortbildung mit Rucksicht
auf ein rechtsethisches Prinzip (with regard to an ethical principle). The doctrine of Weg/all der
Geschaftsgrundlage is a prominent example of the last form of further development of the law
because it has been perceived to be an emanation of the principle of bonafides=
According to Larenz, ethical principles of the law are value-standards which serve as guidelines for
all kinds of legal development. They can justify legal decisions by mere power of persuasion. They
must be distinguished from the merely technical principles of the law which are only based on reasons
of practicability. Principles are specifications of the idea of law itself, linked to the legal conscience
(RechtsbewujJtsein) of the general public in a given period of the historical development. These
principles are not specific rules applicable to individual cases but guidelines which normally do not of
themselves have a normative character, and which therefore need concretisation (Konkretisierung)
into positive rules by legislation or jurisdiction. Some are entrenched in the constitution, some - like
the principle of bona fides - are expressly entrenched in the Civil Code and thereby given immediate
normative character, some have to be gathered from the ratio legis. As "objective-teleological
criteria", these principles playa guiding role on all levels of legal development: interpretation, filling
in gaps as well as in the further development of the law.
A gesetzesubersteigende Rechtsfortbildung with regard to an ethical principle occurs upon the
recognition and persuasive formulation of a principle or a novel application of an already known
principle. The impulse for this is usually provided by cases in which interpretation or
gesetzesimmanente Rechtsfortbildung fail to satisfy the demands of the legal conscience. After their
articulation, such principles are quickly acknowledged by the legal conscience of the time because of
their inherent persuasiveness. At that stage it also becomes clear that the courts have already been led
by that principle albeit without consciously recognising it as a principle in its own right. After the
realization and formulation of the principle, a process of concretisation and demarcation on the basis
of exemplary cases takes place until a coherent doctrine is established. The principle of bonafides has
been especially fertile in this respect.
'Larenz, supra, 167sqq.
2Larenz, Methodenlehre, 405, 406.
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The context of the gesetzesiiberschreitende Rechtsfortbildung is the framework of the legal system as
a whole. The new principle or novel application of a principle has to conform to the immanent
reasonableness and structure of the legal system as a whole, and fit into the framework of all the other
basic principles and their implications. Another limit is constituted by the separation of powers
between the legislature and the jurisdiction as entrenched in the constitution: all considerations which
are not of a specifically legal nature and do not evolve necessarily from the law itself, especially
considerations of pure practicability, must be left to the legislator. In that respect, the legislator enjoys
the "primacy of concretisation" (Konkretisierungsprimat). Beyond this limit, the courts are only
entitled to further development of the law in the case of a "real legal state of emergency" (echter
Rechtsnotstand). This may happen when there are drastic problems in society which need to be
addressed urgently in order to avoid great damage and harm to a considerable part of the population
and the legislator does not react timeously.' The most famous example for such a situation was the
revalorization jurisdiction of the Reichsgericht on the height of inflation in I923?
Larenz was the first to distinguish an objective basis of the transaction (objektive
Geschaftsgrundlagei - supervening change of circumstances - and a subjective basis of the transaction
(subjektive Geschaftsgrundlagei - common mistake and disappointed common expectation.' He sees
the objective basis as part of the rules governing impairment of the performance
(Leistungsstdrungsrecht) and the subjective basis as part of the rules governmg error
(Rechtsgeschaftslehre, lrrtumslehre). He further identified frustration of equality of exchange
(commutative justice) and frustration of purpose as the typical situations in which a Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage might come into effect. With regard to the principle of equality in exchange
(Aquivalenzprinzip) Larenz adopts a subjective approach: in general, it is up to the parties to decide
what they regard as a fair exchange. But since everybody enters into a contract of exchange in the
expectation of obtaining a leturn that he subjectively regards as an equivalent in value of what he
gives, a limit has to be drawn when the counter-performance cannot in any way be seen as an
equivalent judged from the perspective of the two parties (" ...nicht mehr annahemd als Gegenleistung
zu sehen,,).4
Larenz identifies as the purpose of the contract the common, and to that extent objective, purpose of
both parties (" ...gemeinsam, und in diesem Sinne objektiv"). Although Larenz acknowledges that the
'Larenz, Methodenlehre, 410,411.
2RGZ 107, 78, 87sqq.
lLarenz also deals with the objective basis of the transaction in his Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, vol. I, 14th ed., (1987), §21
II,320sqq.; and with the subjective basis of the transaction in his Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen burgerlichen Rechts, 7th
ed., (1989), § 20 III, 39lsqq.
"l.arenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 78sqq.
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parties originally have diverse or even conflicting purposes, he maintains that at the time of the
formation of the contract, the purposes of the parties merge, for otherwise there would have been no
consensus and no contract. This entitles one to speak of the objective purpose of the contract. I
Larenz' distinction between an objective and subjective basis has been criticised as artificial because
the borderline between the case-groups often becomes blurred. In various places, Larenz has,
however, pointed out that he does not understand the two notions as mutually exclusive, and that his
aim was merely to identify typical situations, which are nevertheless closely related and
complementary, for the sake of clarification."
Larenz rejects Oertmann's psychological approach based on the 19th century will-theory and picks up
the thread from Locher and Kri.ickmann, as well as Erich Kaufmann. To Larenz, the key-element is
not the individual will of the parties as a psychological reality, but the result of what the parties have
willed and to which they are bound: the contract itself as an independent "objective, comprehensible
structure of meaning" (" ...Vertrag als ein objektives, verstehbares Sinngebilde'ïY, The enforcement of
the will of the parties through the law - the consequence of the principle of private autonomy -
depends on the form in which that will is voiced, in most cases the contract. The will can therefore
only be enforced in the form and expression which it has found in the contract and the parties are
bound to that form and expression - pacta sunt servanda. That means that the contract is not entirely
subjectively determined by the psychological will of the parties, but has to be considered detached
from the parties as an objective fact which has to be interpreted objectively, not merely from the
perspective of the parties, but also from that of the legal system. The legal system has its specific
reasons for bestowing a binding character on contracts (as being a means to an end) and if the parties
want their transactions to be binding, they have to submit to the aims of the legal system as expressed
in its basic rules and principles." The contract must therefore also be interpreted in the light of the
basic rules and principles of the legal system as a whole - Larenz speaks of the imperative of
immanent contractual justice (Gebot der immanenten Vertragsgerechtigkeiti, which in the case of
reciprocal contracts is nothing else than commutative justice.' Larenz sees the idea of commutative
justice as part of the spirit of the legal order which is not stated expressly in the Code, but
'Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, I04sqq.
2Larenz, Geschafisgrundlage, foreword, V,VI; Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts. 327.
lLarenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 157.
"see above the section on Flume's understanding of contract and how it differs from the understanding of the
Wertungsjurisprudenz,
50n commutative justice see also Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Burgerlichen Rechts, §2 V, 45.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89
undoubtedly underpins many of its rules. J If the contract does not comply with these principles, the
law has no reason to honour it:
"lndem aber die Vertragschlielienden sich wechselseitig an das von ihnen Erklarte binden
und sich damit selbst eine Norm fiir ihr beiderseitiges Verhalten setzen, unterstellen sie
diese von ihnen selbst gesetzte Norm zugleich dem hëheren sittlichen Gebot der
'immanenten Vertragsgerechtigkeit'. Das darf nicht miêverstanden werden. Unsere
Meinung ist nicht, daf die Parteien rechtsgilltig von vornherein nur etwas vereinbaren
kënnten, was nach irgendwelchen objektiven Kriterien auch 'gerecht' ware. Von der
Privatautonomie - in den bereits angedeuteten Schranken, die keiner bestreiten wird - soli
nichts wieder abgezogen werden. Wie die Parteien ihre Angelegenheiten ordnen, das ist,
in den angegebenen Grenzen, ihre eigene Sache. Aber: indem sie fur diese ihre Regelung
rechtliche Verbindlichkeit beanspruchen, zu ihrer Durchfiihrung notfalls die Hilfe der
Rechtsordnung in Anspruch nehmen, unterstellen sie sie damit dem Grundgedanken des
Rechts, der Idee des Sozialen. Deshalb kann ein gesetzes- ader sittenwidriger Vertrag
keine Rechtsgi.iltigkeit beanspruchen. Und deshalb sind Vertrage so auszulegen (und
nach ihrem eigenen Sinn zu erganzen, § 157 BGB), wie 'Treu und Glauben' mit
Rucksicht auf die Verkehrssitte (immerhin eine objektive Norrnl) es erfordern ........
Jedem Vertrag walmt einfach deshalb, weil er eine rechtsverbindliche Regelung sein
will, die Richtung auf ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit inne. ........ Der Maêstab der
ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit ist dem Vertrag nicht wesensfremd - wird nicht erst durch
ein nachtragliches Gebot der Rechtsordnung an ihn herangetragen -, sondern sinngemaf
immanent"."
When the contract is thus understood objectively, then its "nature", its purpose, its basic ideas must be
considered.' Then the contract and its content can be to a certain degree independent of the actual will
of the parties in the sense that some consequences can be derived from the nature and purpose of the
individual contract and not merely the "type" of contract which the parties have not consciously
thought of. This is the task of supplementary interpretation (ergonzende Vertragsauslegung) under §
157 BGB which supplements the content of the contract on the basis of what the nature and purpose
of the contract implies in respect of the given problem. The limit of the supplementary interpretation
is reached where the content of the contract itself offers no more indications for the solution of the
problem or where such interpretation would run against the expressed will of the parties:
'Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Burger/ichen Rechts, § 2 V, 47.
2Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 161, 162.
JLarenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 159.
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"Die erganzende Vertragsauslegung reicht...so weit, als die zu erganzende Bestimmung
aus dem Zusammenhange des Rechtsgeschafts in einer fur die Parteien verstandlichen
Weise gernaf Treu und Glauben gefolgert werden kann und muJ3; sie findet ihre Grenze
also nicht schon dort, wo es an dem entsprechenden Parteiwillen, sondern erst dort, wo es
an einem hinreichenden Anhalt im Gesamtinhalt der Vertragserklarungen und damit an
der Mëglichkeit fehlt, das zu Erganzende als (in einer jedem Vertragsteil verstehbaren
Weise) sinngemafi miterklart anzusehen".'
Supplementary interpretation is confined to the framework of the contract itself. It can only solve the
problem with recourse to the content of the contract. Only if that fails, and the content does not offer a
solution, is it possible - under strict conditions - to revert to the understanding of the role of contract
itself in the legal system with reference to the basic rules and principles.
The essential difference between supplementary interpretation and Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage
(with regard to its distinct origin in the further development of the law), has been emphasized by
Larenz at various stages vis-a-vis the claims of its opponents that it is in reality only a question of
interpretation.' Larenz points out that both legal devices have different origins and different purposes
and thus yield different results. Larenz therefore cannot accept a general rejection of the doctrine:
"Ein derartig rigoroser Standpunkt wird jedoch dem Problem, urn das es in der Lehre
vom Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage geht, nicht gerecht. Dieses Problem ist nicht das
der Ausfullung von Vertragslucken, sondern das der Vermeidung der Gerechtigkeit Hohn
sprechender Ergebnisse bei Aufrechterhaltung des Vertrags mit unverandertern Inhalt.
Die Anwendungsbereiche mogen sich uberschneiden; ersetzen kann der eine
Rechtsbehelf den anderen nicht".3
Larenz differentiates by clarifying the notion of Liickenfii!!ung (filling in of gaps). Supplementary
interpretation seeks to fill in the gaps of contracts. Such gaps are also described in German legal
science as a "planwidrige Lucke", because the term "gap" pre-supposes an incoherent whole, which is
the underlying plan of the legal transaction envisaged by the parties. A gap exists when the conclusion
is that something is missing, and that the plan is incomplete in the absence of an element necessary to
'Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 159, 160.
2Larenz, "Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die Geschaftsgrundlage", 25 Jahre Karlsruher Forum, 1983,
156sqq.; similarly in his Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts, 7th ed., 1989, 544sqq.
JLarenz, "Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die Geschaftsgrundlage", supra 159,
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make the whole plan meaningful and reasonable. Supplementary interpretation thus adds an absent
element in order to make the contractual plan effective. This is a necessary requirement because
supplementary interpretation is restricted to the framework of the contractual content and thus its
plan. It cannot change the plan as such, but may only fill in elements which are objectively necessary
to prevent a failure of the plan.
Cases of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage are different because of the nature of the doctrine and its
origin in the gesetzesiiberschreitende Rechtsfortbildung with regard to an ethical principle. lts aim is
therefore to ensure a minimum level of contractual justice and to avoid drastic injustice, but only
under strict conditions (" ...Wahrung eines Mindestmaj3es an Vertrags-gerechtigkeit'ïï,'
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage therefore deals with cases where there are no gaps in the strict sense,
but where the plan as a whole is frustrated. What is required is a changed plan, and not merely the
supplying of a missing aspect. This is the case when, as described above, the content of the contract -
and thus the plan - offers no indication, no hint for a solution which could still be based on the content
of the contract itself. Up to this point, supplementary interpretation has priority. In those cases
dogmatic clarity and intellectual honesty requires recognition of the fact that no solution can be
inferred from the contract itself. If the consequences of the contract violate basic principles of the law,
a solution must be sought by means of another legal device which itself has to comply with the
demands of a rational and critical legal science. In this respect, Larenz is more positive about the
doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage than many of his fellows. He perceives the doctrine as an
indispensable ultima ratio to ensure the minimum of contractual justice in the individual case required
if the law is to comply with its ultimate aim: the realisation of justice, which gives the legal system its
authority and justification.
Larenz is therefore critical of Flume and his followers for understanding the notion of interpretation
too widely and not respecting its limits. In order to avoid unjust results, this inevitably means that all
elements of interpretation must in some way or other be portrayed as being part of the contractual
content. This will at some point necessitate a resort to fictions at the expense of the clarity,
preciseness and persuasiveness of legal dogmatics.' Larenz also criticises Flume's understanding of
contracts as always reflecting one or other "type" of contract which have to be dealt with by means of
the rules of the Code pertaining to the relevant kind of contract. He stresses that the rules of the Code
also contains gaps if they provide no appropriate rules for the specific problem of an individual
transaction. The rules of the Code should also not be interpreted too generously merely to reach a fair
ILarenz, supra, I6 1.
2Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil, supra, 396.
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result: the task should rather be left to supplementary interpretation. If that fails, only the doctrine of
Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage remains as ultima ratio. J Larenz summarises:
"Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die Geschaftsgrundlage sind
verschiedene Rechtsinstrumente, die unterschiedlichen Zwecken dienen. Die erganzende
Vertragsauslegung dient der Ausfullung einer Vertragsli.icke zum Zweck der
Durchfiihrung des Regelungsplans der Vertragspartner. Eine solche Lucke liegt vor, wo
der Regelungsplan - wie im Fall des Praxistausches - eine zusatzliche Regel erfordert
oder das von den Parteien gewahlte Mittel - wie im Fall der Roggenklausel - sich als
ungeeignet erweist, nicht' greift'. Die Li.icke ist auszufullen gernaf dem 'hypothetischen
Parteiwillen', wie er sich aus dem Regelungsplan und dem Gesetzeszusammenhang der
getroffenen Regelung ergiebt. Der Ruckgriff auf die Gescháftsgrundlage dient der
Vermeidung krasser Ungerechtigkeiten, wie sie sich fur den Fall des Festhaltens an dem
unveranderten lnhalt des Vertrages dann ergeben kannen, wenn die Parteien beim
Vertragsschluf die Wirklichkeit beide falsch beurteilt haben oder sich die fur den
Vertrag bedeutsamen Urnstande entgegen ihrer Voraussicht grundlegend geëndert haben.
Er kann dann zu einer Anpassung des Vertragsinhalts an die (veranderten) Verhaltnisse,
zur Auflësung des Vertrags oder zu seiner Umwandlung in ein Abwicklungsverhaltnis
fiïhren. Maêgebend ist, soweit ein soleher hier noch zu ermitteln ist, der hypothetische
Parteiwille, sonst der Gedanke eines gerechten Interessenausgleichs. Bei der Anpassung
sind die urspri.inglichen Wertungen der Parteien - bei einem gegenseitigen Vertrag also
die von ihnen angestrebte 'subjektive Áquivalenz' - beizubehalten. Die erganzende
Vertragsaus legung hat da, wo sie durchfiihrbar ist, den Vorrang vor dem Ruckgriff auf
die Geschaftsgrundlage. Diese ist aber als 'ultima ratio' - nicht nur in den Fallen der
sogenannten 'gro/3en . Geschaftsgrundlage' unverzichtbar. ..Die erganzende
Vertragsauslegung vermag die Lehre vom Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage nicht ZLi
ersetzen".'
As Larenz points out, his view IS largely confirmed by the approach of the courts. The
Bundesgerichtshof obviously wants to restrict the understanding of a gap when it says:
'Larenz, supra, 540.
2Larenz, "Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die Geschaftsgrundlage", supra 162.
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"[Von emer Vertragslticke kann] nach feststehender Rechtsprechung nur gesproehen
werden, wenn ein Vertrag innerhalb des tatsachlich gegebenen Rahmens oder innerhalb
der wirklich gewollten Vereinbarungen der Parteien eine ersichtliche LUcke aufweist".'
Larenz further points to two cases which illustrate the difference between the application of
supplementary interpretation and the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage: the
Roggenklauselfall (rye-clause-casej.' in which the court applied supplementary interpretation and
excluded Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, and another, dealing with the adjustment of interest on a
heritable building right on account of inflation and the increase of costs of living;' in which the court
had applied the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. The only difference between the two
cases was the fact that in the rye-clause case the contract contained a stable value clause which was
frustrated, whereas there was no such clause in the other case. The stable value clause showed that the
parties had contemplated the problem of inflation, the problem was therefore part of their plan. In that
case, supplementary interpretation must be employed because a solution can be developed the
problem can be solved on the basis of the original pian .. The intention of the parties was clear, the
only problem being that the envisaged measure to deal with inflation was unsuccessful. In the other
case the parties did not contemplate the problem of inflation, or at least not in any discernible way, so
that their plan offered no indication as to what to do in such a situation .. In this case, Larenz argues,
there is no gap in the correct sense of the word and the court correctly resorted to the doctrine of
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage"
Larenz is sceptical of the usefulness of the notion of Unzumutbarkeit which figures so decisively in
the approach of the courts, because it does not shed much light on the process of weighing the parties'
interests and the evaluative judgement required from the court. He instead emphasizes the necessity of
defining legal requirements, such as equality of exchange and frustration of purpose, and to identify
case-groups, and secondly distinguish two steps of the evaluative judgement.
The first step is to establish the purpose (causa finalis) of the individual contract, as well as the
interests and underlying evaluative standards (Wertungsgrundlagen) of the parties (as far as they are
conceivable from the contract). A second step is to measure the current state of the contract (after the
supervening circumstances have occurred or the common mistake came to light) against the principle
of commutative justice, and to evaluate whether the contract still achieves its end of establishing a
IBGHZ 9, 278.
2BGHZ81,135.
JBGHZ77,194.
"Larenz, "Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die Geschaftsgrundlage", supra 157, 158.
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balance of interests, seen from the point of view of the parties as reflected in their consensus at the
time of the formation of the contract. This can, as a matter of course, only be denied in sufficiently
grave cases. I The legal consequences, in turn, have - for the sake of private autonomy - to be
considered in view of the same interests and evaluative standards of the parties from which the whole
evaluation started.
Larenz points out that the idea of commutative justice, as a fair balance of interests in a contract
requires that every party should at least be able to safeguard her most basic interests. In a manner
reminiscent of Kant, it is contended that no party should be left at the mercy of the other party, no
party should be subjected only to the other party's purpose without having the possibility of
promoting her own purposes as well (a hint from Kant).2 Larenz concedes that this is ontological, and
not psychological, thinking, but maintains that even though every party pursues primarily her own
purposes, they both desire to be treated fairly and should therefore both be held to that standard. The
law, furthermore, only sanctions contracts because it requires and assumes that the parties think
honestly and interpret the contracts accordingly.' Larenz summarises:
"Wir kommen damit zwar auch zu dem Ergebnis, daf die Beri.icksichtigung des Fehlens
oder Fortfalls der Geschaftsgrundlage - in den von uns beschriebenen Fallgruppen - eine
Forderung ist, die sich aus dem Grundsatz von 'Treu und Glauben' ergiebt. Insofern
befinden wir uns in Ubereinstirnrnung mit der heute [1963!] in Deutschland in Schrifttum
und Rechtsprechung durchaus herrschenden Auffassung. Aber im Gegensatz zu der
Auffassung der Rechtsprechung, jedoch in Ubereinstirnmung mit Schrnidt-Rirnpler" und
mit fast allen fri.iheren Bearbeitern dieser Lehre, verstehen wir unter 'Treu und Glauben'
nicht die Anweisung zu einer alles umfassenden, i.iber das konkrete Vertragsverhaltnis
weit hinaus-greifenden und letzten Endes nur noch in das Ermessen des frei
'gestaltenden' Richters gestellten 'Billigkeit', sondern die Forderung der ausgleichenden
Gerechtigkeit, unter der jeder Vertrag als eine von den Parteien sich selbst gesetzte
Rechtsnorm steht, und die dieser Forderung entsprechende Denkweise 'redlicher'
Vertragsparteien. Nur solche Urnstande kormen daher als Geschaftsgrundlage in Betracht
kommen, die gerade dieses konkrete Vertragsverhaltnis betreffen, seinen Inhalt und
Charakter zu andern vermogen. Und nur solche Folgen di.irfen aus dem Fehlen oder
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage gezogen werden, die sich aus dem Sinne dieses
'Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, 331.
2Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 162.
3Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 163
"Scbmidt-Rimpler, "Grundfragen einer Erneuerung des Vertragsrechts" in AcP 147 (1947),130sqq.
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Vertrages ergeben oder zur Wahrung der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit in bezug auf
diesen Vertrag unerlaêl ich sind. Damit verlangen wir, daf die Privatautonomie, selbst im
Faile einer Abanderung des Vertrages, insoweit gewahrt wird, als den Parteien nichts
aufgenëtigt werden darf, was nicht dem ursprilnglichen Sinne ihrer Abmachungen,
insbesondere ihrer eigenen Wertungsgrundlage, entspricht und durch die 'ausgleichende
Gerechtigkeit' gerade im Hinblick auf diesen Vertrag gefordert wird".1
Larenz calls the whole process "corrective contractual interpretation" korrigierende
Vertragsauslegung - because it is in its nature related to interpretation. Paragraph 157 and 242 BGB
have the same aim: to ensure a minimum of substantive justice in contracts. But he also stresses the
crucial difference: interpretation can only supplement, the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage goes further than that and corrects.'
The weight of opinion in Germany, apart from the Courts, appears to have followed Larenz' position
in principle.'
4. Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage and causa finalis
The first part of the thesis has highlighted the crucial role of purpose (causafinalis) for the essence
and understanding of law in general and contract in particular on a philosophical basis. It is submitted
that the development of the doctrines of clausula rebus sic stantibus and Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage reveals that they are based directly on this decisive element of contract. They are
emanations and concretisations of a general principle of frustration of the contractual purpose. This
connection has been emphasized by Larenz, as described in the preceding paragraph.
'Larenz, Geschafisgrundlage, 165, 166
2Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 166.
)Among these authors are: Wieacker, "Gemeinschaftlicher Irrtum der Vertragspartner und Clausuia rebus sic stantibus", in:
Festschrift fur Wilburg, 1965, pp. 229, 242 sqq.; Lehmann in: Lehmann/HUbner, BGB Allgemeiner Teil, § 35 A VII, 15th ed.
1966; Kohler, Unmoglichkeit und Geschaftsgrundlage bei Zweckstorungen im Schuldverhaltnis, 1971; Fikentscher, Die
Lehre von der Geschaftsgrundlage als Frage des Vertragsrisikos, 1971; Haarmann, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage bei
Dauerrechtsverháltnissen, 1979; Hasemeyer, "Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragsgerechtigkeit", in: Festschrift fur Hermann
Weitnauer, 1980, pp. 67 sqq.; Chiotellis, Rechtsfolgenbestimmung bei Geschaftsgrundtagenstorungen in Schuldvertragen,
1981; Horn in: Gutachten und Vorschlage zur Uberarbeitung des Schuldrechts, vol, I , 1981, p. 636; Teichmann in Soergel-
Teichmann, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, 11th ed., 1986, vol, 2/1, Schuldrecht, III, § 242, Rz 432; MUller in: Juristenzeitung
1981, pp. 337, 338; Kobler, Die clausula rebus sic stantibus als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz, 1991; Abas, Rebus sic
stantibus, 1993.
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Baldus had based the clausuia on the concept of causa finalis, on the Aristotelian-Thomistic
understanding that the essence of a thing is inter alia determined by its purpose, its being a means to a
particular end. The clausuIa declined in the same measure as its philosophical basis lost its
acceptance. But its connection with the notion of purpose was never completely lost, it even
influenced the codification of the Prussian General Land Law (§§ 378, 380, I, 5, ALR). Mainstream
legal science of the 19th and early 20th century neglected the role of purpose because it did not fit
into their positivistic concept of legal science and because of their fixation on a psychological
understanding of the will of the contracting parties. Consequently, they were compelled to resort to
imputations and fictions as soon as inevitable normative value-judgements had to be taken. Yet some
authors continued to emphasize the relevance of the contractual purpose (Stahl, Erich Kaufmann,
Locher). This position has been expressly confirmed and reinforced by several judicial statements in
the past. I
From the basis of a sound understanding and evaluation of the philosophical and methodological
implications of the problem of fundamental change of circumstances, Larenz consciously drew on
Aristotelian-Thomistic legal thinking and identified the contractual purpose with commutative justice.
Consequently, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage comes into effect in cases of frustration of equality in
exchange regarding either value or the fitness of the subject matter of the performance for a special
purpose. Larenz also distinguished the categories of supervening change of circumstances and
common mistake?
So placed, it is submitted that the German courts, when inquiring into the existence of a common
subjective basis of a transaction, are actually dealing with the question of the causa finalis of that
transaction. The application if the Unzumutbarkeit-criterion, furthermore, is, it is submitted, best
understood as involving the question when exactly the causafinalis is frustrated. Cases of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage can therefore, it is submitted, be categorised and analyzed on the basis of the
principle of frustration ofthe contractual purpose (causa finalisy.'
Because of the vast number of cases decided on the basis of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, it is not
possible to evaluate all of them within the confines of this thesis. But insofar as distinct case-groups
have emerged, they are presented below with illustrative cases.
IMentioned in §§ I and 2 are the "mill-cases" of the Reichsgericht from 1889 and 1898, Seufferts Archiv vol. 45, 114; RGl
42, 114; as well as BGHl 2, 188; BGH Jl 1978, 236.
2§ 3.2.
Jpart IV.
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4.1. Objective (supervening) change of circumstances
4.1.1. Frustration of equality of exchange (commutative justice) regarding value
4.1.1.1. Inflation
Some degree of inflation is to be expected in respect of monetary debts and is therefore a foreseeable
part of the normal economic risk which are to be borne by the party affected thereby. Exceptions were
traditionally only made when the inflation reached an extent which was totally unforeseeable, and if
the purpose of the transaction and the interests of the parties evidently demanded an adjustment.
Initially, the Reichsgericht rejected any revalorization of debts pertaining to paper money. It was only
after the total collapse of the Reichsmark at the end of 1923, when the value of the Mark was a mere
one trillionth of its value in 1914, that the courts felt compelled to step in. Arguing on the basis of
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, clausuia rebus sic stantibus and § 242 BGB, the Reichsgericht
obliged the owner of mortgaged property to pay the mortgagee a supplementary sum above the
nominal value of the mortgage in order to alleviate the devaluation of the paper money. I The court
stressed that because equality of exchange is of the essence of the contract and it may give rise to the
defence of changed circumstances:
"In RGZ Bd. 106, S.7 ist fiir langfristige Grundstiickskaufvertrage anerkannt, daf eine
infolge der Geldentwertung eingetretene erhebliche Verschiebung des Wertverhaltnisses
zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung den Einwand der veranderten Urnstande
rechtfertigen kann, weil infolge des Sturzes der Mark die Geldleistungen wirtschaftlich
nur noch einen geringen Bruchteil des Wertes darstellen ... Auch beim Darlehen besteht
seinem Wesen nach die Voraussetzung einer Gleichwertigkeit zwischen Leistung und
Gegen leistung. ,,2
In 1925, the legislator adopted this solution in the Aufwertungsgesetz (Revalorization statute).
In a case from 1933,3 the contracting parties had fixed the purchase price in pounds sterling. When
England unexpectedly abandoned the gold-standard in 1931, the disadvantaged vendor was allowed to
claim an increment towards the loss attributable to the devaluation. On the evidence of the case, it
was clear that the common purpose of choosing the pound as currency had been to have a fixed value
standard to protect the vendor from value depreciations." This purpose was frustrated when the pound
tRGZ 107, 86.
2At 90,91.
JRGZ 141, 212.
4214.
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became a free-floating currency and was devalued by 30 %. The court held that in terms of the
contract, the "new" pound represented a "totally different" currency. I The court also confirmed once
again, that equality of exchange was of the essence of the contract:
"Bei gegenseitigen Vertragen bildet mangels besonderer, dagegen sprechender Umstande
das Gleichgewicht zwischen Leistung und Gegenleistung die von den Beteiligten
stillschweigend angenommene Vertragsgrundlage. ,,2
After the Second World War, a similar development was under way prior to the currency reform in
1948, but any revalorization was soon prohibited by the so-called "a mark is a mark" statutes of the
allied authorities which aimed to secure the goals of the planned currency reform. Since then, the so-
called nominalist principle, holding that a money-debt entails only a claim for the fixed nominal sum
promised which allocates the risk of inflation to the creditor, has held sway in respect of monetary
debts. In consequence, § 3 Wahrungsesetz (currency statute) contains a far-reaching prohibition of
money-guarantee-clauses.' Because on this approach, the creditor has to bear the impacts of inflation
alone, this principle has, however, increasingly come under assault. Most authors nevertheless still
consider nominalism a better means of fighting inflation than the contrary principle of valorism, but
advocate a greater readiness to depart from the nominalist principle in individual cases by permitting
a re-evaluation of the extent of the debt have, however, in general remained committed to the
nominalist principle." In the potash-mining-cases.i for example, the fact that the purchasing power of
the currency had decreased by one-third was considered insufficient, and WegJall der
Geschaftsgrundlage was accordingly founded on other circumstances. Exceptions may, however, be
made if the devaluation has been so considerable that to leave the contract unaltered would amount to
intolerable hardship for the affected party and if the extent of the devaluation had been unforeseeable
at the time of the formation of the (usually long-term) contract.
4.1.1.2. Escalation-clauses
If contractual escalation clauses (not prohibited by § 3 WdhrG) turn out to be ineffective, the BGH
treats them in a somewhat contradictory manner." In one case the BGH established the rule that an
1215.
2216.
JRoth in Miinchener Kommentar, supra, § 242 Rn 606.
"for references see Roth in Miinchener Kommen/ar, supra, § 242 Rn 603.
51959,1960,1965, see below.
6Roth in Munchner Kommen/ar, supra, § 242 Rn 604.
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escalation clause indicates that the parties have foreseen the change and that the doctrine of Wegfall
der Geschaftsgrundlage is accordingly excluded:
"Der Senat hat ... ausgefuhrt, erne - von den Parteien nicht vorausgesehene -
Beeintrachtigung des Gleichgewichtsverhaltnisses von Leistung und Gegenleistung
kenne eine Abweichung vern Grundsatz der Vertragstreue nur bei derart grundlegenden
und einschneidenden Ariderungen der maJ3geblichen Umstande rechtfertigen, daf ein
weiteres Festhalten am urspri.inglichen Vertrag zu einem mit Recht und Gerechtigkeit
schlechthin nicht mehr vereinbaren Ergebnis fi.ihren wi.irde. Um eine von den
Vertragsparteien nicht vorausgesehene Beeintrachtigung handelt es sich aber hier ...
nicht'"
In another case, the court refrained from using the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage but
resorted to supplementary interpretation to declare that the existence of the escalation clause indicated
that the parties required an adjustment of the contract should the clause turn out to be ineffective?
Both of these views have plausibility. The basis for the differentiation between them is, however, not
so obvious.' Escalation clauses might, for instance, be excessive in effect, as when the agreed index
increases far more quickly than expected, and totally out of proportion to the contractual
performances. In such cases, the courts have granted relief because the purpose of the clause was to
protect the creditor from losses and not to give him the opportunity of additional gains." On the other
hand, relief was denied when the excessive increase due to the escalation clause was justified by a
purpose on which the parties had agreed and if interests which merit protection are involved.s The
limit of intolerability is set higher in such cases.
IBOH in WM 1973, 839.
2BGHZ 81, p. 135, the "rye-clause case". In this case it was contractually agreed that a heritable building right interest was to
be calculated on the basis of the price for a certain amount of rye. The purpose of protecting the interest from value
fluctuations was held frustrated by the court, when the price for rye was not anymore determined by the market after the
introduction of fixed prices in the European community.
3see Larenz' explanation in § 3.2.
4BOH LM (Bb) Nr. 69. The approach of the Court has been criticised as being inconsistent by Roth in Miinchener
Kommentar, supra, § 242, Rn 604. Larenz' explanation of the rye-clause case and the related index-clause cases does not
explain why the Bundesgerichtshofhas in the case BOH in WM 1973, p. 839 held that the very existence of an index-clause
excludes the doctrine because of foreseeability. This approach appears to be too inflexible and apodictic. The authority of
that case can probably be regarded as overruled by the rye-clause case BOHZ 81, p. 135, which adopts a more diferentiated
approach.
sSOH in WM 1965, 953; 1973~ 384. In this case a real estate was sold against a life-long rent. Therefore, the specific
purpose of maintenance came into play. Consequently, even if the index led to an increase of the rent that was out of
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4.1.1.3. The potash cases
When the quota-system of the German potash combine fell away after the war due to the combine's
dissolution upon the prohibition of restraints of trade, the court reduced the so-called "interim
payments" of the potash mining contracts on the basis of the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage' The amount of these payments was based on the bargaining power of the
former potash combine and when the combine was dissolved, the payments appeared to be
unreasonably high. The circumstances which had been the basis for the amount of the payments had
fallen away and the affected party would have never entered the contract under the new
circumstances.
In another of the potash cases, an increase of the haulage fee was sought because the prices for potash
had risen. The court held that equality of exchange is of the essence of the contract:
"Worauf es dem Berufungsrichter bei seiner Entscheidung ankam, lassen die
Ausfiihrungen liber den S inn des Vertrages als eines Austausches von - in den Augen der
Parteien - annahemd gleichwertigen Leistungen erkennen; dieser Sinn gehe verloren,
wenn sich das Aquivalenzverhaltnis derartig verschiebe, daf 'der eine Teil die Leistung
des anderen auch nicht annahemd mehr als ein Aquivalent fur seine Leistung betrachten'
kënne. Das ist rechtlich bedenkenfrei."
But in accordance with its jurisdiction concerning inflation, the court stressed that an increase of the
haulage fee could only be granted if the rise of prices for potash was due to an increase in its actual
value and not only to inflation.'
4.1.1.4. Maintenance contracts
This constitutes the one fundamental exception to the nominalist principle and the general judicial
reluctance to address the inflation phenomenon. In 1923 already, the Reichsgericht had made an
exception for maintenance agreements in family law by ruling that the clausu!a rebus sic stantibus to
proportion to the value of the real estate, this development was considered to be still covered by the maintenance purpose, as
long as the increase of the rent was in proportion with the necessaries of life of the recipient.
lBGH LM (Ba) § 242 Nr. 2.
2BGH LM (Bb) § 242 Nr. 39, 3.
lBGH LM(Bb) § 242 Nr. 39, 3.
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be implicit in these contracts.' A long period of rejection of this approach after the war was followed
in 1973 by a ruling of the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) that company pensions had to
be adjusted when the costs of living had increased more than 40% after the formation of the contract.'
The BGH adopted this approach and extended it to all contracts characterised by the purpose of
maintenance.' because of the special character and purpose of maintenance agreements, ie to secure a
person's reasonable subsistence. This purpose is frustrated if the amount of the pension is devaluated
to an extent that a reasonable subsistence is no longer possible, at least not in the way the parties had
originally envisaged:
"Auch hier liiJ3tsich das Ruhegehalt als ein Teil des Entgeits fur die Dienste auffassen,
die der Berechtigte bei Eintritt in den Ruhestand bereits geleistet ... hat. Das darin
begriindete, bei der Ubernahme der Pensionsverpflichtung vorausgesetzte Gleichgewicht
der Leistungen wird empfindlich gestort, wenn das Ruhegeld infolge der
Kaufkraftminderung ... seine vorgesehene Aufgabe, die Erhaltung des bisherigen
Lebensstandards ..., nicht mehr erftillen kann ... ,,4
The legislator has, once again, reacted to this jurisdiction and has introduced the new § 16 BetrAVG
(Betriebs-Altersversorgungs-Gesetz; company pension scheme statute) which requires the re-
evaluation of companies' pensions on a three yearly basis.
On the other hand, maintenance payments, especially those done by way of company pensions, can be
reduced on the basis of the doctrine of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage if the economic conditions of
the company have declined in a way as to threaten its very existence.Ï The same applies to pension
funds in general."
4.1.1.5. Rent
WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage is generally denied when the costs of renting a shop retrospectively
appear excessive as too high because an expected economic success was not achieved, even when this
was expected by both parties:
IRGZ 106, 235.
2BAG in WM 1973, 566.
3BGHZ61,31.
436.
sBGH LM(Bb) Nr. 6; BAG in ZIP 1988, p. 1348.
6BGH WM1973, 1311.
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"DaB insoweit ein gemeinsamer Irrtum der Vertragschlieêenden vorlag, reicht angesichts
der dem Vertrag innewohnenden typischen Risikoverteilung nicht zur Anwendung der
Grundsatze tiber das Fehlen der Geschaftsgrundlage aus." I
The success of an undertaking is regarded as a typical example of a normal economic risk.
Exceptions to the general rule are only made where the reason for the frustration of purpose falls
within the sphere of the landlord as well or when he shared that purpose because of a personal interest
in it.
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage was accordingly held to have occurred when rented shops in a
shopping mall were totally unprofitable because the landlord could not find tenants for the other shops
or because he had permitted a change of the surroundings which deterred people from corning.' The
landlord was held to share the risk of frustration because the attainment of the purpose was his risk as
well:
"Der von jeder Partei erstrebte wirtschaftliche Erfolg ... hing von der gemeinsamen
Erwartung ab, daf sich das I-Zentrum als funktionsfahig im Sinne der ursprtinglichen
Planung erweisen werde. Das aufserhalb der unmittelbaren Einfluêsphare beider Parteien
liegende Risiko der Funktionsunfahigkeit oder eines Funktionswandels dieses Zentrums
ist hiernach ... von beiden Parteien zu tragen .... Die derart zur Geschaftsgrundlage der
Betreibenspflicht gemachten Erwartungen der Parteien haben sich nicht erfullt."
When a contract for the lease of a machine imposed the duty to make repairs on one of the parties
only, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage was assumed when the machine was totally destroyed during
an air raid at the end of the Second World War, so that both parties were obliged to share the costs.'
The court held that the increased danger of air raids had frustrated the equality of exchange in respect
of the repair duty:
"Durch die steigende Verscharfung des Luftkriegesist jedenfalls die G leichwertigkeit der
beiderseitigen Vertragsleistungen der Parteien, die beim Vertragsschluf vorausgesetzt
wurde, grundlegend erheblich gestort worden."
IBGH NJW1970, 1313.
20LG Celie NJW 1978, 2510; OLGZ 1990, 88 sqq.
lBGH NJW 1957, 826; OLG Hamburg MDR 1948, 116.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
103
4.1.2. Frustration of equality of exchange regarding the fitness of the performance for a special
purpose
4.1.2.1. Sale
The purchaser normally bears the risk that what he bought can be uti 1ized to serve his purpose. There
is no Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage if the purchaser cannot do so because his business has to close
down, I because his landlord gave notice of cancellation.i if he could only resell the item at a loss
because of a decrease of the market price.' or if an acquired enterprise turns out to be unprofitable."
A typical case is that the purchaser of land acquired for building purposes always bears the risk that
building might later on be prohibited by the authorities. This kind of sale is regarded as speculative,
and speculative contracts imply that the parties assume a higher risk than usual.' But a building
prohibition can constitute a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage under special circumstances, e.g. if the
purchaser of a piece of prospective building land has promised to build upon the remaining real
estates of the vendor as counter-performance." When building was prohibited on both the sold and the
remaining land of the vendor, the purpose of the sale was frustrated.
In the case of a sale of land at a very low price because the seller expected many customers for his
adjacent restaurant from the minigolf course which the purchaser wanted to build on the site, Wegfall
der Geschaftsgrundlage was assumed when the authorities refused permission for the building
project.' The land had been sold for the purpose of the erection of the minigolf-course.
The outcome was similar where the purchasers of prefabricated wooden houses were, contrary to the
expectations of the parties, not permitted to erect them in a protect_ed landscape area." The houses had
been sold precisely for the purpose of being erected in that particular area.
IOLG Stuttgart NJW 1954, p. 233.
2BGH NJW 1985, 2693.
lBGH BB 1955, 205.
4BGH MDR 1978, 132.
5BGHZ 74,370.
6BGHZ 47, 51.
7BGH NJW 1975, 776.
8BGH WM 1966, 475.
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4.1.2.2. Rent
The tenant usually bears the risk that the rented item can be used as intended by him. Weg/all der
Geschaftsgrundlage has therefore been denied where a party could not run a profitable enterprise on
the rented piece of land! or if she lacked the means to build on the rented ground as planned.'
Similarly, the doctrine was not applied where rooms in a hotel had been rented because of an
exhibition which was later called ofe In all these cases the detrimental circumstances fell within the
sphere of the tenant and did not concern the landlord.
As has been already pointed out, exceptions to this general rule are only possible where the reason for
the frustration of purpose falls within the sphere of the landlord as well and when he shared that
purpose because of a personal interest in it. Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage accordingly occurred
when a landing-stage at a lake was rented for the common purpose of re-renting it to boat-owners but
no further boats were admitted on the lake by the authorities, thereby frustrating the possibility of re-
renting the landing-places on the stage." The landlord was held to share that risk because the rent
was calculated on the basis that a profitable re-renting of the individual landing-places would be
possible.
4.1.2.3. Interdependent contracts
Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage has also been assumed in respect of two transactions closely
connected through their common purpose where one of the contracts fell away for some or other
reason. A special example is that of the leasing contract, where a contract of sale IS
Geschaftsgrundlage for the leasing contract itself.' The hire-purchase transaction which used to
constitute a further example, is now provided for by § 9 VerbrKrG (Verbraucherkreditgesetz -
consumer credit statute).
4.2. Subjective change of circumstances (common mistake)
Common errors about present circumstances or disappointed common expectations concerning future
circumstances, did not form part of the clausuia rebus sic stantibus of the ius commune, but were
'BGH NJW 1970, 1313.
2BGH NJW 1974,1081.
JOLG Braunschweig NJW 1976, 571.
4BGH WM 1971, 1300.
sBGHZ68,118;BGHZ81,298.
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included under the doctrine of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage because of the subjective definition of
the basis of the transaction.
4.2.1. Frustration of equality of exchange regarding value (commutative justice)
4.2.l.l. Valuation error
In a number of cases the parties mutually erred about the value of the subject matter of their
performances. The most famous case is the "Rouble-case": 1 The recipient of a loan of 30000 Russian
Roubles obliged himself to pay back what was believed to be the equivalent value of 7500 German
Reichsmark, but the real value was only 300 Reichsmark. The Reichsgericht employed § 119 I BGB -
error about content - which was problematic since the parties did not err in speaking of Roubles and
Reichsmark. Paragraph 119 II BGB is excluded in the cases concerning value because the value of an
item is not considered to be one of its characteristics, but the result of all of its characteristics. The
court also had difficulties dealing with the consequence of § 119 I BGB, the duty of compensation
imposed on the avoiding party by § 122 BGB, which was clearly inappropriate in these cases. The
Bundesgerichtshof eventually preferred to employ WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage in these cases, for
example when the parties agreed to pay the "usual" fee which they mutually believed to be much
higher than it actually was.' One decisive reason for this was that WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage
gave the court the freedom to adjust the contract to the real value.
4.2.1.2. Calculation error
In these cases the parties make a mistake when calculating their prices or costs. The error can result
from a mistake in the calculation process or because the calculation proceeded on the wrong basis.
These errors must as always be distinguished from an irrelevant error in motive. The first step is to
distinguish the latent calculation error (verdeckter Kalkulationsirrtumï - of which the other party
knows nothing and which is therefore an irrelevant error in motive - and the patent calculation error
(offener Kalkulationsirrtumï when, for instance, one party tells the other in detail how she reached her
result. But even the patent calculation error will be usually irrelevant because the other party must be
able to rely on the agreed price. Only if it is clear that the other party would also have consented to
the other price or her refusal would amount to venire contra factum proprium, can the calculation
error be relevant. In other words, it depends on the extent to which the other party merits protection. '
1RGZ 105, 406, the decision is from 1922.
2BGHZ 46,273.
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A calculation error is usually part of every party's own risk. Only if the other party has taken part in
the calculation or is in some other way closely connected with it, may there be a Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage. The doctrine has for example been applied in the following cases:
When parties based the calculation of the rent of a pub on the amount of beer sales, the landlord is
obliged to reduce the rent paid by the tenant if the basis turns out to be unrealistic. J The same applies
if rent is calculated on the basis of a misapprehension regarding the area of the premises? If both
parties agree on the basis of the calculation, they are both obliged to bear the consequences if it turns
out to be wrong.
4.2.2. Frustration of equality of exchange regarding the fitness of the performance for a special
purpose
4.2.2.1. Interdependent contracts
A building owner had concluded both the contract of sale of land and the construction contract with
the vendor. When the construction contract was rescinded due to the misconduct of the vendor, the
court held that this constituted a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage for the contract of sale since the two
contracts had not been meant to exist independently from each other, but had been concluded in view
of one another.' The idea had ~een to obtain the plot and the construction of the building from the
same party.
Where both contracting parties are aware of the fact that each of them undertakes their obligations for
the sake of an act or forbearance of the other, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage may be assumed when
the other party does not conform to this expectation, even though that act or forbearance has not been
made a part of the contract."
4.2.2.2. Suretyship
Since it is the typical purpose of suretyship to protect the creditor against the financial difficulties of
the debtor, this risk is allocated to the surety. Similarly, a joint and several debtor bears the risk
1SOH WM 1990, 522.
2SayObLO NJW - RR 1991, 721.
3S0H WM 1970, 906.
4S0H WM 1971, 276.
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regarding the success of his claim of recourse, and a mortgagor for the debt of another bears the risk
of his recourse against the personal debtor.
But where a common expectation regarding the future course of events formed the basis of the
conclusion of the suretyship, and the risk that these events did not occur was not allocated to the
surety, the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage may apply:
"Da der BUrge schlechthin und uneingeschrankt das Risiko der Leistungsfahigkeit des
Schuldners tibernimmt, kann er sich in aller Regel nicht darauf berufen, er habe - dem
Glaubiger erkennbar - das Risiko unrichtig beurteilt und insoweit einen anderen
Geschehensverlauf erwartet. Damit wird aber nicht ausgeschlossen, daf die Parteien
Urnstande aul3erhalb des Btirgschaftsrisikos zur Geschaftsgrundlage gemacht haben. "I
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage was accordingly assumed when the parties had envisaged that the
debtor would be permitted to pay in instalments but the creditor subsequently did not agree to this.' In
another case, both parties had relied on an attempted reorganization of the indebted company.' In both
cases, the suretyship was unanimously concluded for the purpose of securing the abovementioned
measures. A suretyship cannot, on the other hand, be set aside if the expectations concern
circumstances within the surety's sphere of interest only which do not concern the creditor, even if he
knows about them. Such motives do not relate to the basis of the transaction with the creditor. For that
reason, for example, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage cannot be assumed on the basis of the surety's
divorce or his exit from a partnership, even if the wife or the partnership benefits from the suretyship."
'BGH LM (Bb) § 242, Nr. 49a, 2.
2supra.
3BGH WM 1977, 752.
4BGH NJW 1986, 252; 1987,1629.
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Part III: England
1. The development of the doctrine of frustration of contract and the treatment of common
mistake
1.1. The doctrine of frustration of contract
1.1.1. The evolution of the doctrine
The treatment of fundamental change of circumstances in the common law has developed on
pathways somewhat different from those on the continent due to the different sources and attitudes of
its contract doctrine. Nevertheless, as several studies have already pointed out, I there was a constant
influx of legal arguments from the continent, which accounted for the fact that - all in all - there is a
striking similarity as far as the argumentation in the cases and the results are concerned.
The common law of contracts developed from the law of torts (trespasses). The breach of a promise
was regarded as a private wrong which was remedied through the action of assumpsit by granting
compensatory damages.' This basic attitude that the non-fulfilment of a promise constitutes a
misconduct, which can only be remedied by the payment of damages has led to the perception that a
contract represents a kind of warranty: a man is absolutely bound to perform any obligation which he
has undertaken, and no supervening event can excuse him from doing so. If he had not intended to
perform under certain circumstances, he could have provided for such eventualities in the contract.
This harsh rule as to "absolute" contracts was laid down in the classic decision of Paradine v. Jane in
Paradine sued Jane for rent due upon a lease. Jane pleaded that he had been expelled and held away
from his possession by an alien army which had invaded the country, whereby he could not take the
profits. The Court held that this was no excuse:
"When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because
'e.g, Zimmermann, "Der europaische Charakter des englischen Rechts", ZEuP 1993, 4sqq.; "'Heard melodies are sweet, but
those unheard are sweeter .. .'- Condicio tacita, implied condition und die Fortbildung des europaischen Vertragsrechts" in
AcP 193 (1993),121 sqq.
2Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (1975) 199 sqq.
)Aleyn 26; 82 E.R. 897.
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he might have provided against it by his contract. And therefore if the lessee covenant to
repair a house, though it be burned by lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet he
ought to repair it." I
The first exception to this rule came as early as 1691 with the decision Brewster v. Kitchell2 for cases
of supervening illegality. The second exception made was that in contracts of personal services, the
death of the contractor served as an excuse because it renders performance impossible. Thus, in Hyde
v. The Dean of Windsor' the Court held:
"If an author undertakes to compose a work, and dies before completing it, his executors
are discharged from this contract: for the undertaking is merely personal in its nature,
and, by the intervention of the contractor's death, has become impossible to be
performed."
But it was only in 1863, that Blackburn J cut a decisive inroad into the rule as to absolute contracts in
his decision Taylor v. Caldwell.' which established impossibility as a general excuse from
performance and marked the beginning of a long line of cases which were to restrict the rule as to
absolute contracts in an ever-increasing manner.
The defendant agreed with the plaintiff to let him a music-hall for the purpose of entertainment.
Before the day of performance arrived, the music-hall was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages for breach of the contract which the defendant, through no fault of his own,
was unable to perform. Blackburn J first acknowledges the rule as to absolute contracts in principle,
but then provides a qualification:
"But this rule is only applicable when the contract is positive and absolute, and not
subject to any condition either express or implied: and there are authorities which, as we
think, establish the principle that where, from the nature of the contract, it appears that
the parties must from the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless when
the time for the fulfilment of the contract arrived some particular specified thing
continued to exist, so that, when entering into the contract, they must have contemplated
such continuing existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there, in the absence
lAt p. 27.
21 Salk. 198; Atkinson v. Ritchie (1809) 10 East 530, 534-535.
lCro.Eliz. 552, 553.
43 Best & Smith's Reports 826.
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of any express or implied warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be
construed as a positive contract, but as subject to an implied condition that the parties
shall be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the
perishing of the thing without default of the contractor.'"
Blackburn J then refers to the cases Hyde v. The Dean of Windsor and Hal! v. Wright and says:
"The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on
the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall
?excuse the performance. 11_
The argument of an implied condition, used by Blackburn J to wrestle down the rule as to absolute
contracts, was of particular importance for the development of contract law both on the continent and
in England.' Pothier was the source of the civilian influence on the common law, especially through
his treatises Traité des Obligations (1761) and Traité de Contrat de Vente. Both works were cited by
Blackburn J in his judgement to support his position. Blackburn himself was one of several famous
judges from Scotland, educated in the civil law as well, which have used civilian legal arguments to
give the common law new directions."
The clausuia rebus sic stantibus of the ius commune was, as demonstrated above, also seen as
founded on an implied condition.'
But even in cases of impossibility, as Blackburn J himself has pointed out, the rule as to absolute
contracts continued and continues to apply, where - with regard to the nature and circumstances of the
contract - the contract must be construed in a way that the contractor has assumed the risk of, and
thereby warranted, the existence of a particular thing." Only impossibility resulting from a failure of a
common assumption of both parties leads to discharge.'
'Law Journal Reports QB vol. 32 II N.S. (1863) 166.
2Law Journal Reports, supra, 168.
3see Zimmerman, "Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter .... ", in AcP 193 (1993), 139.
"see Zimmermann, "Der europaische Charakter des englischen Rechts" in ZEuP 1993 5 sqq., 37.
SPart II § 1. 1.
6The classic case of an implied warranty is The Mooreock [1889] 14 P.D. 64.
7Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th ed. 1999, 809.
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Although the rule of Taylor v. Caldwell was first introduced to cover situations where the physical
subject matter of the contract had perished, it was soon extended outside the sphere of literal
impossibility by combining it with the rules of maritime law concerning "frustration of the common
adventure". As early as 1831, 32 years before Taylor v. Caldwell was decided, in the case Freeman v.
Taylor', the purpose of a charterparty had been held to be frustrated by a delay.' In the decision
Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance CO.Ltd. (1874),3 the same situation and the same result was
explained by means of an implied condition. The plaintiffs ship had been chartered to proceed in
January to Newport and there load a cargo of iron rails to San Francisco. On the way to Newport she
ran aground and was not got off until over a month had elapsed. She was taken into Liverpool and
underwent lengthy repairs lasting until August. In the meantime the charterers had chartered another
ship. The plaintiff claimed from the defendant insurance company for a total loss, by perils of the sea,
of the freight to be earned under the charterparty. The question whether or not there had been such a
loss depended on whether or not the charterers had been justified in throwing up the contract instead
of waiting until the ship was repaired and then loading her. The jury found that the time necessary to
get the ship off and to repair her had been so long as to put an end in a commercial sense to the
speculation. Bramwell B. held that
"the voyage the parties contemplated had become impossible; that a voyage undertaken
after the ship was sufficiently repaired would have been a different voyage, not, indeed,
different as to the ports of loading and discharge, but different as a different adventure - a
voyage for which at the time of the charter the plaintiff had not in intention engaged the
ship, nor the charterers the cargo. ,,4
If the charterparty were read as a charter for a definite adventure, there was necessarily an implied
condition that the vessel should arrive at Newport on time. Not arriving on time put an end to the
contract and both parties were discharged.'
The rule in Taylor v. Caldwell and the notion of "frustration of the adventure" were thus seen to be of
the same nature." Later decisions confirmed this view:
110 L.J.C.P. 26, 28.
2Peter Hay, "Geschaftsgrundlage im anglo-amerikanischen Recht", in AcP 164 (1964), 236.
JLaw Reports, 10 Court of Common Pleas 125.
"Law Journal Reports, vol. 44 N.S. Court of Common Pleas, 28 ..
SBeatson, Anson's Law of Contract, 27th ed. 1998, p. 505.
6Beatson, Anson's Law of Contract, p. 506.
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"When this question arises in regard to commercial contracts, the principle is the same,
and the language as to 'frustration of the adventure' merely adapts it to the class of cases
in hand.":
"The doctrine of frustration is only a special case of the discharge of contract by an
impossibility of performance arising after the contract was made."}
The modern practice is to use the term "frustration" to cover cases of both classes.
After the combination of the rules of impossibility and frustration of the adventure in Jackson v.
Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., the next step was to extend the use of the notion of frustration of
purpose outside the commercial context (where the rule had originally developed). This happened in
the famous "coronation cases", prompted by the postponement of the coronation of King Edward VII.
at the 26th and 27th of June 1902, due to his sudden illness.
The most important of these cases was Krell v. Henry.' On June 17, 1902, the defendant noticed an
announcement in the windows of the plaintiffs flat at 56A Pall Mall to the effect that windows to
view the coronation procession were to be let. The defendant interviewed the housekeeper on the
subject, when it was pointed out to him what a good view of the procession could be obtained from
the premises and he agreed to take the suite for June 26 and 27, the days on which the coronation
processions were to take place. The writing did not mention the procession. The procession did not
take place and the defendant refused to pay. The plaintiff sued for the sum. Vaughan Williams LJ
delivered judgement:
" I do not think that the principle of the civil law as introduced into the English law is
limited to cases in which the event causing the impossibility of performance is the
destruction or non-existence of some thing which is the subject matter of the contract or
of some condition or state of things expressly specified as a condition of it. I think that
you first have to ascertain, not necessari ly from the terms of the contract, but, if required,
from necessary inferences, drawn from surrounding circumstances recognised by both
contracting parties, what is the substance of the contract, and then to ask the question
whether that substantial contract needs for its foundation the assumption of the existence
IF.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Ltd(l916), 2 A.C. 397, at p. 404, per Lord
Loreburn.
2Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd v. Imperial Smelting Corporation, Ltd(1942), A.C. 154, per Viscount Maugham
at p. 168.
3[1903] 2 KB 740.
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of a particular state of things. If it does, this will limit the operation of the general words,
and in such case, if the contract becomes impossible of performance by reason of the
non-existence of the state of things assumed by both contracting parties as the foundation
of the contract, there will be no breach of the contract thus limited ....
In my judgement the use of the rooms was let and taken for the purpose of seeing the
Royal procession. It was not a demise of the rooms, or even an agreement to let and take
the rooms. It is a licence to use rooms for a particular purpose and none other. And in my
judgement the taking place of those processions on the days proclaimed along the
proclaimed route, which passed 56A Pall Mall, was regarded by both contracting parties
as the foundation of the contract; .....
Each. case must be judged by its own circumstances. In each case one must ask oneself,
first, what, having regard to all the circumstances, was the foundation of the contract?
Secondly, was the performance of the contract prevented? Thirdly, was the event which
prevented the performance of the contract of such a character that it cannot reasonably be
said to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the date of the contract? If all
these questions are answered in the affirmative (as I think they should be in this case), I
think both parties are discharged from further performance of the contract." I
Realizing the crucial importance of the requirement that the particular state of things had to be the
foundation of the contract for both parties, their "common object", the Lord Justice emphasized:
"It was suggested in the course of the argument that.. ..it would follow that if a cabman
was engaged to take someone to Epsom on Derby Day at a suitable enhanced price for
such a journey, say £ 10, both parties to the contract would be discharged in the
contingency of the race of Epsom for some reason becoming impossible; but I do not
think this follows, for I do not think that in the cab case the happening of the race would
be the foundation of the contract. No doubt the purpose of the engager would be to go to
see the Derby, and the price would be proportionately high; but the cab had no special
qualifications for the purpose which led to the selection of the cab for this particular
occasion. Any other cab would have done as well .....Whereas in the case of the
coronation, there is not merely the purpose of the hirer to see the coronation procession
and the relative position of the rooms which is the basis of the contract as much for the
lessor as the hirer; ... ,,2
'Law Journal Reports (1903) KB vol, 72 NS, 797.
2Law Journal Reports, supra, 798.
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This crucial point is also illustrated by another of the coronation cases, Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v.
Hutton, I also decided by Vaughan Williams LJ, which is a kind of twin-brother to Krell v. Henry, and
the two always have to be regarded in conjunction in order to be assessed properly.
It had been publicly announced that the royal naval review at Spithead would be held on June 28,
1902. The defendant wished to charter a steamboat to take paying passengers to see the review, and he
entered into a contract with the plaintiffs, the owners of steamboat Cynthia, in these terms: "The
Cynthia to be at Mr. Hutton's disposal...on the morning of June 28 .... to take out a party ..... for the
purpose of viewing the naval review and for a day's cruise round the fleet; also on Sunday, June 29 for
similar purposes .... " On June 25, 1902, an official announcement cancelling the review was published.
The plaintiff thereupon wired to the defendant, "What about Cynthia? She ready to start six
tomorrow", but received no answer. The plaintiff then employed the ship on her ordinary sailings. On
the two days in question, although the review was cancelled, the fleet remained anchored at Spithead.
The plaintiffs sued. The defendant alleged that it was a condition of the agreement that the naval
review should take place on June 28, and that the consideration for the agreement wholly failed.
Vaughan Williams LJ held, briefly:
"I see nothing that makes this contract differ from a case where, for instance, a person
has engaged a brake to take himself and a party to Epsom to see the races there, but for
some reason or other, such as the spread of infectious disease, the races are postponed. In
such a case it could not be said that he could be relieved of his bargain. So in the present
case it is sufficient to say that the happening of the naval review was not the foundation
of the contract."
Romer LJ added:
"The ship (as a ship) had nothing particular to do with the review or the fleet except as a
convenient carrier of passengers to see it; and other ships suitable for carrying passengers
would have done equally as well. ,,2
Vaughan Williams LJ thus saw his counter-example from Krell v. Henry come true in this particular
case. He held that the naval review was not the common object of both parties but merely relevant to
1[1903]2 KB 683.
2Law Journal Reports, supra, 882.
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the one-sided motive of the defendant. I For the plaintiff, as for the cabman, it was business as usual
to rent his steamboat or cab and neither steamboat nor cab had, to the knowledge of the lessor, any
special qualifications, which would tie them to the purpose of the lessee. The cruise around the fleet
might have very well carried out, and Vaughan Williams LJ saw the danger of determining the object
of an ordinary contract of letting and hiring only with reference to the subjective purposes of the
lessee. Only where the particular subject matter of the contract was, to the knowledge of both parties
decisively connected to its intended use by the lessee, could it be said, as was held in Krell v. Henry,
that such use constituted the common object of both parties to the contract.
1.1.2. The juridical basis of the doctrine
By 1903, the doctrine of frustration of contract was firmly established. Its further development was
marked by criticism of the fictional character of the theory of implied terms, reflecting the general
crisis of the 19th century will-theory, and uncertainty as to its juridical basis. Various explanations of
the nature of frustration of contract inextricably entangled two related but basically distinct questions:
On the one hand, the question was as to the source of the Court's power to declare a contract
frustrated (why), and on the other, the question as to the precise test to be employed in cases of
frustration of contract (when)?
1.1.2.1. The implied term approach
The implied term theory exerted its influence until the Second World War. The speech of Lord
Loreburn in F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co.,Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co.,Ltd. 3 is
considered to be its classic exposition:
"A Court can and ought to examine the contract and the circumstances in which it was
made, not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether or not from the
nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on the footing that a particular thing
or state of things would continue to exist. And if they must have done so, then a term to
that effect will be implied, though it be not expressed in the contract.. ..Sometimes it is
put that performance has become impossible and that the party concerned did not
promise to perform an impossibility. Sometimes it is put that the parties contemplated a
'Beatson, Anson's Lawa/Contract, 507; Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung, 75.
2Atiyah, An introduction to the Law a/Contract, 5th ed. 1995, 239. Treitel, The Law a/Contract, 832.
3[1916]2 x.c. 397, 403.
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certain state of things which fell out otherwise. In most of the cases it is said that there
was an implied condition in the contract which operated to release the parties from
performing it, and in all of them I think that was at bottom the principle upon which the
Court proceeded."
The implied term theory was probably never understood in a purely subjective way, that is in the
sense that the Court merely gives effect to the actual intention of the parties at the time of contracting.
Lord Loreburn himself said:
"From the nature of the contract it cannot be supposed that the parties as reasonable men
intended it to be binding on them under such altered conditions ...."I
The criterion is therefore a more objective one: the hypothetical will of reasonable men 111 the
situation of the parties.'
Similarly, Lord Watson had said in Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co.:3
"The meaning of the contract must be taken to be, not what the parties did intend (for
they had neither thought nor intention regarding it), but that which the parties as fair and
sensible men, would presumably have agreed upon if, having such possibility in view,
they had made express provision as to their several rights and liabilities in the event of its
occurrence. "
1.1.2.2. Disappearance of the foundation of the contract
Lord Atkin said in the decision Russkoe Obschestvo D'!ia Izgstovlenia Shariadov l'voennick
Pripassov v. John Stirk & Sons, Ltd.: I
"There are many positive rules of law imposed upon contracting parties which govern the
whole creation, performance, and dissolution of a contract which are quite independent
of the intention of the parties. For my part I see no reason why, in a certain set of
circumstances which the Court finds must have been contemplated by both parties as
'[1916] 2 A.C. 397, 404.
2Treitel, supra 859; Beatson, Anson's, supra, 515.
3[1881] 6 App.Cas.38, 59.
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being of the essence of the contract and the continuance of which must have been
deemed to have been essential to the performance of the contract, the Court should not
say that when that set of circumstances ceases to exist, the contract ceases to operate."
In Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa ,2 Goddard J. based his decision on this argument:
"If the foundation of the contract goes, either by the destruction of the subject matter or
by reason of such long interruption or delay that the performance is really in effect that
of a different contract, and the parties have not provided what in that event is to happen,
the performance of the contract is to be regarded as frustrated."
This shifting of emphasis in the argumentation was the first move towards a more openly objective
approach, away from the fictional character of the implied terms under the influence of the will-
theory. The metaphor of "foundation" was, however, too vague to be very helpful in determining
when exactly the foundation fell away.' It remained more or less only an illustrative, objective epithet
for the implied term theory without any difference in substance, and was regularly employed
alongside the implied term - as Lord Loreburn had done in the Tamplin-cese? The notion of
foundation was also employed in the cases of common mistake.'
1.1.2.3. The just and reasonable solution
The counter-reaction against the will-theory and its subjectivism occasionally assumed much more
fundamental tones in attempts to describe the role of the Courts in respect of frustrated contracts
objectively.
Lord Sumner, in Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship CO.Ltd.,6 for instance, described the doctrine of
frustration as
1[1922]10 LI. L.R. 214, 217.
2[1939]1 K.B. 132, 139.
lTreitel, supra, 860.
4[1916]2 AC. 132,404.
5Bank Line, Ltd v. Capel & Co. [1919] AC. 435, per Lord Haldane at p. 445; Bell v. Lever Bros. [1932] A.C. 161, per Lord
Atkin at p. 226. Contrast Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd v. Imperial Smelting Corporation, Ltd [1942] AC. 154,
per Lord Wright 186; Bell v.Lever Bros. (supra), per Lord Thankerton 237.
6[1926] AC. 497 510.
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"a device by which the rule as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special
exception which justice demands."
Lord Wright took up this argument when he said:
"The truth is that the Court or jury as a judge of fact decides the question in accordance
with what seems to bejust and reasonable in its eyes."l
In British Movietonews, Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas, ua.? Lord Denning, referring to Lord
Wright's statements, re-asserted that the doctrine of frustration was based on a judicial power to
qualify the literal words of the contract when justice so required. The Court should not always
slavishly follow the literal meaning of the words in a contract, but must construe them in the
commercial context of the contract:
"Even if the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless if it is not absolute in intent, it
will not be held absolute in effect. The day is done when we can excuse an unforeseen
injustice by saying to the sufferer 'It is your own folly. You ought not to have passed that
form of words. You ought to have put in a clause to protect yourself.' We no longer credit
a party with the foresight of a prophet or his lawyer with the draftsmanship of a
Chalmers. We realize that they have their limitations and make allowances accordingly."
This decision was, however, reversed in the House of Lords, with the Court insisting on the literal
construction of the contract by reiterating the statement of Lord Loreburn that no Court has an
absolving power.'
Today, it is hard to conceive why so much objection was taken to it and the suspicion remains that
personal animosities explain the extreme tone of disapproval adopted by the House of Lords. The
assertions of the law lords about the nature of the judicial role in construction and frustration cases
appear today "outdated, and frankly absurd"." It was probably the mere boldness of Lord Denning's
formulation which sparked an instinctive resistance. That his assertions were not meant to be
understood that the courts can do what they think just whenever a change of circumstances causes
hardship to one party, and that the strict rules determining the scope of the doctrine were not to be
'Legal Essays and Adresses, 259; see also Denny, Matt & Dickson Ltd v. Fraser & Co.Ltd., [1944] A.C. 265, 274-6; Joseph
Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd., [1942] A.c. 154.
2[ 1951] 1. K.B. 190, 202.
J[1952] x.c 166, 148.
"Atiyah.t'Contract and Tort", in Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law, 1984, p. 50.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
119
superseded, I was demonstrated by Lord Denning's decision in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham
Urban District Councili which was upheld by the House of Lords and in which he denied
frustration.'
1.1.2.5. Failure of consideration
Failure of consideration is sometimes used to explain why both parties are excused from performance
although only the performance of one party has become impossible. This normally has no effect on
the obligation of the other party unless one asserts that he is discharged for failure of consideration
because he cannot receive the performance he had bargained for. This explanation is commonly given
in the United States." It is not surprising that this argument would at least sometimes be raised, since
the doctrine of consideration has developed from the causa-doctrine of the ius commune, which had
also influenced the doctrine of the clausuIa rebus sic stantibus? But in England such cases are
commonly explained in terms of frustration of the "common object" of the parties." Moreover, since
the current rules of consideration require the failure to be total, it cannot work for all cases of
frustration, since the doctrine also comprises cases of partial destruction and partial performance.'
This argument has for that reason been rejected in the House of Lords. 8
1.1.2.4. Radical change in the obligation
In Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council 9 Lord Radcliffe re-asserted the
juridical basis of the doctrine and formulated the test of frustration which has been acknowledged as
authoritative ever since.
Lord Radcliffe dismissed the implied-term theory and followed Lord Wright and Lord Denning's view
that frustration depends on the operation of a rule of law, rather than the intention of the parties:
'Treitel, supra, 859.
2[1955] 1 Q.B. 302 (C.A.).
3[1956] A.C. 696 (·H.L.).
"e.g, Earn Line Steamship Co. v. Suther/and Steamship Co.Ltd., 254 F. 126, 131 (1918); Corbin, Contracts, §§ 1320, 1322;
Restatement 2d, Contracts, Introductory Note to Chap. Il, p. 310.
ssee Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 554 sqq.
6Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SSCo.Ltd [1926] A.C. 497, 510.
"Freitel, p. 861.
gNationa/ Carriers Ltd v. Pana/pina (Northern) Ltd [1981] A.c. 675, 687,702.
9[1956] A.C. 696.
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"Lord Loreburn ascribes the dissolution to an implied term of the contract that was
actually made. This approach is in line with the tendency of English courts to refer all the
consequences of a contract to the will of those who made it. But there is something of a
logical difficulty in seeing how the parties could even impliedly have provided for
something which ex hypothesi they neither expected nor foresaw; and the ascription of
frustration to an implied term of the contract has been criticised as obscuring the true
action of the court which consists in applying an objective rule of the law of contract to
the contractual obligations that the parties have imposed upon themselves." I
But Lord Radcliffe went on to define a little more precisely when and how this rule of law would
operate:
"By this time it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far disembodied
spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there
rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair and
reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the anthropomorphic conception
of justice, is and must be the court itself. So perhaps it would be simpler to say at the
outset that frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically
different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. It
was not this that I promised to do .... .It is for that reason that special importance is
necessarily attached to the occurrence of any unexpected event that, as it were, changes
the face of things. But, even so, it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself
which calls the principle of frustration into play. There must be as well such a change in
the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a
different thing from that contracted for."
Lord Radcliffe thus placed the main requirement of the old "frustration of the adventure" doctrine of
maritime commercial law into the centre of the new doctrine of frustration, as it had already been
done in Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance CO.Ltd.
'supra, 728. .
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This approach was continually approved and re-affirmed in cases such as Tsakiroglu & Co.Ltd. v.
Noblee Thorl GmbH, I Ocean Tramp Tanker Corporation v. Va' Sovfracht (The Eugenia),z Palmeo
Shipping Inc. v. Continental Ore Cpn. 3 and National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) ua: In
the Eugenia-case, Lord Denning said:
"To see if the doctrine applies, you have first to construe the contract and see whether the
parties have themselves provided for the situation that has arisen. If they have provided
for it, the contract must govern. There is no frustration. If they have not provided for it,
then you have to compare the new situation with the situation for which they did provide.
Then you must see how different it is. The fact that it has become more onerous or more
expensive for one party than he thought is not sufficient to bring about a frustration. It
must be positively unjust to hold the parties bound. It is often difficult to draw the line.
But it must be done.!"
1.1.2.6. Construction
Since all approaches emphasize the crucial importance of the true construction of the contract, Treitel
appears to reduce the whole doctrine of frustration to a simple matter of interpretation: "It seems that
this is the most satisfactory explanation of the doctrine of frustration. ,,6
1.2. The treatment of common mistake
1.2.1. Common .mistake and doctrine offrustration
The close analogy between cases of common mistake and cases of frustration of contract has certainly
not gone unnoticed. It was already apparent at the time of the birth of the full-grown doctrine of
frustration in the coronation cases. In the case Griffith v. Brymer 7 the facts were the same as in Krell
v. Henry, the only difference being that the announcement of the postponement had already been
made at the time of contracting without the parties being aware thereof. The contract was held void
1[1961]2 W.L.R. 633.
2[1964]2 Q.S. 226.
3[1970]2 Lloyd's Rep. 21.
4[1981] x.c 675.
5[1964]1 All E. R. 166.
6Treitel, supra 860.
7[ 1903] 19 T.L.R. 434; see also Clark v. Lindsay [1903] 19 T.L.R. 202.
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for mistake. In some cases it is difficult to determine whether the event is more properly classified as
a pre-existing fact or as a subsequent event. In many borderline instances the result will be the same
irrespective whether the case is treated as one of common mistake or of frustration. Even where the
distinction is clear, cases of common mistake are often decided with the same or similar arguments
and criteria as in those of frustration. The same test of the radical difference of the subject matter of
the contract has been employed in both kinds of categories. I Furthermore, both legal categories were
originally dealt with by way of implied conditions: the condition precedent in the instance of common
mistake - which rendered the contract void ab initio - and the condition subsequent in the instance of
frustration - which discharged the contract ex nunc: This has lead Atiyah to treat both these situations
side by side in one category in his Introduction of the Law of Contract. He distinguishes two main
classes: cases of impossibility and those where performance is not exactly impossible but where the
enforcement would nevertheless be excessively hard on one of the parties. In both situations the
reasons for the impossibility or the excessive hardship can be either the ignorance of pre-existing facts
or subsequent events. The former is dealt with by common mistake and the latter by frustration.'
However, important differences have to be acknowledged. The crucial difference concerns the legal
consequences: in the case of a mistake, the contract is void ab initio; in the case of frustration, the
contract is discharged ex nunc. The effects of the two differ considerably at Common Law. Because
of its drastic proceeding consequences, courts are even more reluctant to hold contracts void on the
basis of a common mistake than on the basis of frustration. Apart from the fact that the Law Reform
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 applies only to discharge by supervening events, there are also
differences concerning the risk-allocation in these two areas of the law: Because parties can usually
be expected to be aware of existing risks when they contract, and future events are less easily
anticipated, risks arising from pre-existing facts are more easily allocated to the parties than are the
risks of frustrating events."
1.2.2. The evolution of common mistake
The English doctrine of mistake constituted a late importation into the common law. It was closely
related to the consensus doctrine of contract, received via Domat, Pothier, Chitty, Colebrooke and the
IBell v. Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] A.c. 161, per Lord Atkin; Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v. Credit du Nord SA [1988] 3
All E.R. 902, per Steyn 1.
2Zimmermann, "Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter. ..", supra 149-152.
)Atiyah, supra 219.
4Treitel, supra 862; H.G. Beale in Chitty on Contracts, General Principles, 27th ed. 1994,5-019.
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other treatise-writers from the civil law.' It has never fitted in very happily in the common law, and
has been overlaid by estoppel ideas and the "objective test" approach. It is often complex and
confusing, and the different types of mistake are perceived to have little or nothing in common.' The
matter is further complicated by the fact that mistake can be treated differently at law and in equity,
where its scope is wider, but the effect less drastic. Traditionally, the common law dealt with mistake
by way of an implied condition, justas in the case of the doctrine of frustration: the agreement was
taken to have included a condition to the effect that a certain state of affairs existed (ie a supposed
condition precedent in lieu of the condition subsequent resorted to in the case of frustration). If the
assumption proved to be unfounded, the contract was abortive, not because the parties had failed to
reach consensus, but because of their tacit agreement to that effect.' These two approaches led to
uncertainty about the juridical nature of mistake at a later stage."
1.2.3. The juridical nature of common mistake
The classic case of Couturier v. Hastie 5, dealing with initial impossibility, and more particularly
mistake as to the existence of the subject matter of the contract, adopted the implied term approach,
although the decision does not mention either the term "implied condition" or "mistake", but
portrayed the problem simply as one of construction. The wording was immediately understood in the
sense of an implied condition."
In the leading case concerning common mistake, Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. / Lord Atkin dealt with
the matter on both grounds - mistake as vitiating consent and an implied condition - and came to the
conclusion, that, because the case entailed a mistake as to quality or substance, the test was similar to
that in cases of frustration:
"This brings the discussion to the alternative mode of expressing the result of a mutual
mistake. It is said that in such a case as the present there is to be implied a stipulation in
IZimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 620;"Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter .."., 13 Isqq.
2Atiyah, supra 219.
lSimpson,"Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law", (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review, 268sq.
4Bell v. Lever Bros. [1932] A.c. 161; Associated Japanese Bank Ltd. v. Credit du Nord Sa [1988] 3 All E.R. 902, where both
approaches were employed side by side.
5[1856]5 H.L.C. 673.
6Zimmermann, "Heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter. .."., 149, with references, e.g. Pollock, Principles of
Contract, 9th ed. 1921, 327sq.
7[1932] A.c. 161.
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the contract that a condition of its efficacy is that the facts should be as understood by
both parties ... Nothing is more dangerous than to allow oneself liberty to construct for the
parties contracts which they have not in terms made, by importing implications which
would appear to make the contract more businesslike or more just. The implications to be
made are to be no more than are 'necessary' for giving business efficacy to the
transaction, and it appears to me that, both as to existing facts and future facts, a
condition would not be implied unless the new state of facts makes the contract
something different in kind from the contract in the original state of facts. Thus, in Krell
v. Henry, Vaughan Williams LJ finds that the subject of the contract was 'rooms to view
the procession': the postponement, therefore, made the rooms not rooms to view the
procession ... We therefore get a common standard for mutual mistake, and implied
conditions whether as to existing or as to future facts. Does the state of the new facts
destroy the identity of the subject matter as it was in the original state of facts? To apply
the principle to the infinite combinations of facts that arise in actual experience will
continue to be difficult, but if this case results in establishing order into what has been a
somewhat confused and difficult branch of the law it will have served a useful purpose.:"
Contrary to what might have been expected, Lord Atkin's statements didn't bring greater clarity into
the English doctrine of mistake, although, perhaps justifiably, it seems to have contributed to the
disintegration of the doctrine. The decision has been interpreted in various ways:
Firstly, it has been said that Bell's case established that there is no general doctrine of English law that
a fundamental common mistake makes a contract void.' Yet it was assumed by each of their Lordships
that mistakes of some kind will avoid a transaction.
A second view is that a contract will only be void for common mistake if a term can be implied that,
unless the facts are or are not of a particular nature, or unless an event has or has not happened, the
contract is not to take effect.3
Finally, the opinion has been put forward that the case lays down the rule that "a contract will be void
only if there is nothing to contract about, ...and the ground of such a nullity is not the mistake but the
absence of a res. ,,4 But th is appears to be too narrow a view.
'[1931] All E. R. 31,32.
2SIade (1954),70 Law Quarterly Review 385; Shatwell (1955) 33 Canadian Bar Review 164.
lSlade (1954), 70 Law Quarterly Review 385; Atiyah (1957), 73 Law Quarterly Review 340.
"Cheshireê.Fifoot, Law of Contract (Il th ed. 1986), 225.
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Lord Denning, in Salle v. Butcher, I sought to ensure substantive justice in the cases of mistake with a
resort to equity:
"A contract is also liable in equity to be set aside if the parties were under a common
misapprehension either as to facts or as to their relative and respective rights, provided
that the misapprehension was fundamental and that the party seeking to set it aside was
not himself at fault."
Lord Denning presumably saw the applicable test as to whether a mistake was sufficiently
fundamental as too narrow, and found the common-law allocation of risks excessively hard in certain
cases.' His view gained the support of the High Court of Australia," but otherwise the profession as a
whole seems to remain unconvinced of the existence of this equitable power to set contract aside for
mistake. It was a bold suggestion nevertheless, since the House of Lords does not usually overlook the
difference between common law and equity. Yet there is not a great deal of difference between
dealing with these mistake cases by means of implied conditions or as questions of construction, and
dealing with them on equitable grounds.'
In Associated Japanese Bank Ltd. v. Credit du Nord SA,6 Steyn J reaffirmed Lord Atkin's position
that a mistake might render a contract void provided it rendered the subject matter essentially and
radically different from what the parties believed it to be. Just like Lord Atkin had done, he first
established that there was an implied condition precedent in the contract, and then went on discussing
whether the contract was void for mistake, treating this as a different ground, by simply citing Lord
Atkin.
As in cases of frustration, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the main problem is the allocation of
risks.' The necessary test for the allocation of risk, as laid down by their Lordships Atkin and
Radcliffe, appears to be the essential change - or difference - of the original obligation, from that
which is sought to be enforced.
1[1950] I K.B. 671; [1949] 2 All E.R. 1107; further in Leafv. International Galleries [1950] 2 K.B. 86 and Magee v.
Pennine Insurance [1969]2 Q.B. 507, [1969]2 All E.R. 891.
2[1949]2 All E R 1120.
JAtiyah, supra 244.
4Taylor v. Johnson [1983] 45 A.L.R. 265.
5Atiyah,"Contract and Tort", in: Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law, 49,
6[1989]1 W.L.R. 255,266-267,268; [1988]3 All E.R. 902.
7H.G. Beale, Chitty on Contracts, 5-008; Atiyah, supra 229,241,242; Beatson, Anson's Law of Contracts, 298.
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The adoption of the frustration test makes the scope of operative common mistake rather narrow as
compared to the position on the continent, and especially in Germany. The test is narrowed even
more by certain policy considerations: because they could have been discovered beforehand, risks
regarding pre-existing facts are more readily allocated to parties than those pertaining to subsequent
events. Courts furthermore dislike holding apparent contracts to be inoperative ab initio, which is the
only possible consequence of an operative mistake. This must be regarded as one of the main reasons
for the very narrow scope of operative mistake in English law.
2. The approach of the Courts
2.1. First prerequisite: the change is not covered by the provisions of the contract
Lord Simon stated the general rule in Joseph Constantine Ss. Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp.
Ltd. :1
"There can be no discharge by supervening impossibility if the express terms of the
contract bind the parties to performance, notwithstanding that the supervening event may
occur."
A provision that excludes frustration may also be implied: for example, where the nature of the
contract makes it clear that the parties intended the risk of supervening events to lie where it falls. In
Larrinaga & Co. v, Société Franco-Américaine des Phosphates de Médulla2 a contract was made in
1913 for the carriage of six cargoes of phosphates between March 1918 and November 1920. After
the end of the First World War, the carriers argued that the contract was frustrated because of the
altered shipping conditions then prevailing. The argument was rejected by the House of Lords. A
contract of this kind, not to be performed for many years, was essentially speculative, since each party
had consciously taken the risk that conditions might alter. The speculative character of an agreement
also excludes Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany. An implied agreement to exclude
frustration may also be based on other characteristics of a transaction. In The Maira (No.2) agents had
undertaken to manage a ship which was subsequently lost. It was held that this did not frustrate the
management contract since the purpose of the contract was also to attend to such matters as the
repatriation of the crew and the settlement of claims arising out of the loss.
1[1942] x.c 154, 163.
2(1923) 92 LJ.K.B. 455.
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The general rule that frustration can be excluded by provision for the supervening event IS not
seriously disputed, but the rule is subject to a number of qualifications.
A clause may be literally wide enough to cover the event, but be held on its true construction not to
have this effect. In Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. I contractors agreed in July 1914 to
construct a reservoir in six years. In the event of delays "however occasioned," they were to be given
an extension of time. In February 1916, the contractors were required by a Government Order to stop
work, and to sell their plant. It was held that the contract was frustrated although the events which had
happened were literally within the delay clause. The purpose of that clause was meant to apply to
temporary difficulties, such as labour shortages, bad weather, or failure of supplies. Not covered by
the purpose of the clause is the case in which the interruption is of such a character and duration that
it vitally and fundamentally changes the conditions of the contract? A fortiori, an express provision in
a contract for some events which might otherwise frustrate it does not exclude the possibility of
frustration by other events.'
A clause may make some provision for the event which happens, but fail to make complete provision
for it. In Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co. 4 the charterer argued that frustration was excluded by
two clauses giving him, but not the owner, theoption to cancel when the ship was requisitioned by the
Government or if she was not delivered by a certain date. But the House of Lords held that the
charterparty was frustrated. The cancellation clauses entitled the charterer to cancel even if the
contract was not frustrated. He could escape liability in that event, but this did not justify the
conclusion that the ship owner should remain liable if requisition or delay did amount to frustration.
A contract may provide for discharge on the occurrence of specified events. The question when and
how such a "contractual frustration clause'" operates, depends only on its construction and not on the
rules of frustration developed by the general law.
This is reminiscent of the Bundesgerichtshofs treatment of an escalation-clause in the rye-clause case
(Roggenklauselfall), where the court held that the existence of the clause indicated that the parties
envisaged an adjustment of the contract even if the clause turned out to be ineffective or insufficient
due to a change of circumstances." The BGH saw this as a matter of supplementary interpretation,
1[1918] A.C. 119.
2 126.
J/ntertradex SA. v. Lesier-Torteaux SA.R.L. [1978]2 Lloyd's Rep. 509, 515.
4[1919] A.C. 435.
SBremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Vanden Avenne-Izegem P.VBA [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 109, 112.
6BGHZ 81, p. 135.
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thus excluding the doctrine of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage. In another case the existence of an
escalation-clause was held to exclude Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage because it indicated that the
change had been foreseeable.' The doctrine was employed both in cases where there was no index-
clause at all, or where the index-clause turned out to be excessive: the courts granted relief because
they saw this as an instance of frustration of purpose - the purpose of the clause was to protect a party
from losses and not to give him the opportunity of additional gains. The approach of the courts has
been criticised as being inconsistent/ but it seems clear that also individual clauses of a contract, not
only the whole contract as such, can be frustrated on their own (independently from the contract as a
whole).
In the case of common mistake, the contract will not be held void if it is interpreted to contain an
implied warranty. In the Associated Japanese Bank case.' the actual decision was based on the ground
that the guarantee contained an implied condition (condition precedent) in favour of the guarantor that
the machinery was in existence, and as the machinery did not in fact exist, the guarantor was not
liable." In Me Rae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission 5 the defendants sold to the plaintiffs the
wreck of an oil tanker, said to be lying on the Jourmand Reef, and to contain oil. The plaintiffs sent
out an expedition to salvage the tanker but found that there was not, and never had been any such
tanker. The High Court of Australia held that the defendants had impliedly guaranteed that there was
a tanker there; and that, being in breach of this guarantee, they were liable in damages.
IBGH WM 1973, p. 839.
2Roth in Munchener Kommentar, supra, § 242, Rn 604; but see the explanation given by Larenz in Part II § 3.2. Yet this
explanation does not explain why the BGH has in the case BGH WM 1973 839 held that the very existence of an escalation-
clause excludes the doctrine because of foreseeability. This approach appears to be too inflexible and apedietic. The authority
of that case can probably be regarded as overruled by the rye-clause case BGHZ 81, p. 135, which adopts a more
differentiated approach.
3[1989]1 W.L.R. 255.
"Steyn J. rejected the claim against the guarantor on both grounds: on construction (condition precedent) and alternatively on
mistake. This case shows that mistake and construction are not mutually exclusive processes. Construction only displaces
mistake (as a ground of invalidity) where it is clear from the words of the contract or from the surrounding circumstances that
one party or the other promised to undertake responsibility in any event.
5(1951) 84 CL.K 377.
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2.2. Second prerequisite: common object
As under German law, frustration will only come into effect if it concerns the "common object" I of
both parties. The change of circumstances remains irrelevant if it concerns only the sphere of one of
the parties. It must concern an object which is crucial for both parties or must at least from the nature
and the circumstances of the transaction be held to be crucial to both parties.
Supervening impossibility normally affects only one party's performance and this fact was at one time
thought to support the view that, e.g. a time charter, could not be frustrated by the unavailability of the
ship. But the argument was rejected on the ground that even the owner's object "is not only to get hire
but to afford services'i' The "common object" in such cases is the exchange of services or facilities to
be provided by one party for the payment to be made by the other. The court thus refers to the
contractual purpose of equality in exchange. The same reasoning applies to cases of frustration of
purpose (quasi-impossibility). In Krell v. Henry the common object of the parties was the provision of
facilities for seeing the coronation procession. Thus both parties are discharged even though the
supervening event only affects the performance of one.
2.3. Third prerequisite: radical change of the obligation
This criterion had first been formulated by Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham
Urban District Council3 and re-stated by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in National Carriers Ltd. v.
Panalpina (Northern) Ltd.:
"Frustration of a contract takes place when there supervenes an event (without default of
either party and for which the contract makes no sufficient provision) which so
significantly changes the nature (not merely the expense or onerosity) of the outstanding
contractual rights and/or obligations from what the parties could reasonably have
contemplated at the time of its execution that it would be unjust to hold them to the
literal sense of its stipulations in the new circumstances; in such case the law declares
both parties to be discharged from further perforrnance.:"
Lord Denning emphasized the relationship to interpretation in the Eugenia-case:
'Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SSCo.Ltd [1926] A.C. 497, 507.
2BankLine Ltd v. Arthur Capel & Co. [1991] AC. 435, 453.
3[1956] AC. 696.
4[1981] AC. 675.
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"To see if the doctrine applies, you have first to construe the contract and see whether the
parties have themselves provided for the situation that has arisen. If they have provided
for it, the contract must govern. There is no frustration. If they have not provided for it,
then you have to compare the new situation with the situation for which they did provide.
Then you must see how different it is. The fact that it has become more onerous or more
expensive for one party than he thought is not sufficient to bring about a frustration. It
must be positively unjust to hold the parties bound. It is often difficult to draw the line.
But it must be done."]
2.4. Limitations
The doctrine of frustration of contract knows the same general limitations as the doctrine of Wegfall
der Geschaftsgrundlage:
2.4.1. Speculative transactions
The essentially speculative character of a transaction is usually established by interpretation and has
therefore already been mentioned above when dealing with the case Larrinaga & Co. v. Société
Franco-Américaine des Phosphates de Médulla_2
2.4.2.Self-induced frustration
A party cannot rely on frustration due to his own conduct or to the conduct of those for whom he is
responsible. This conduct may consist of a breach of contract' (by either party or by both") or any
1[1964]1 All E.R. 166.
2(1923) 92 L.J.K.B. 455.
lFor example a charterer consciously orders a ship into a war-zone where she is detained; see The Eugenia [1964] 2 Q.B.
226; The Lucille [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 244; Mertens v. Home Freeholds Co. [1921] 2 K.B. 526.
"e.g.where both breaches contribute to a an allegedly frustrating delay: The Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1A.c. 854.
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deliberate act or forbearance' that leads to frustration, even though the act is not itself a breach of
contract.' But the other party may be able to rely on it for the purpose of discharging the contract.'
It is not authoritatively decided whether negligence generally excludes frustration. It probably will
since it would be unjust to let the other party bear the loss caused by negligent conduct.4 "Negligence"
in this context is not restricted to "breach of an actionable legal duty", it includes
"an event which the party relying on it had means and opportunity to prevent but
nevertheless caused or permitted to come about. ,,5
2.4.3. Foreseeability
When the risk of a supervening event interfering with performance was foreseeable for the parties,
they are usually taken to have contracted with reference to that risk. Having thus allocated the risk,
the contract should not be held frustrated if the event indeed occurs." As Vaughan Williams L.J. had
said in Krell v. Henry 7:
"The test seems to be whether the event which causes the impossibility was or might
have been anticipated ...".
Nevertheless, this proposition is also subject to a number of qualifications' The inference that the
parties contracted with reference to the supervening event can only be drawn if the event was either
actually foreseen or if the degree of foreseeability was a very high one. It is not sufficient that a delay
or some interference with performance can be foreseen if the delay or interference which occurs is
wholly different in extent. A party can therefore only be held to have accepted the risk of events to the
le.g. failure to take any steps to obtain planning permission: Amalgamated Investment & Property CO.Ltd. v. John Walker &
Sons Ltd. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 164.
2Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. [1969] I Q.B. 699; Black Clauson International Ltd.
v.Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G. [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 446, 457.
JThus where an employee has been prevented from performing the agreed work because he has been imprisoned for a
criminal offence, the employer can rely on this circumstance as a ground of frustration, and he can do this even though the
offence had no connection with the employment: Harrington v. Kent CC [1980]1.R.L.R. 353; FiC. Shepherd & Co. Ltd. v.
Jerrom [1987] Q.B. 301; Hare v. Murphy Bros. [1974]1.C.R. 603, 607.
"Treitel, p. 844.
sTile Super Servant Two [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. p. 10.
6See Comptoir Commercial Anversois v. Power, Son & Co. [1920]1 K.B. 868, 895, 901.
7[1903]2 K.B. 740, 752.
8Treitel, supra, 840.
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extent as they were actually foreseeable in a somehow concrete manner.' The inference that the
parties have assumed the risk of foreseen or foreseeable events can be excluded by evidence of the
contrary intention, especially when the interpretation of the contract suggests another allocation of
risk (in this respect the instances of foreseeability and contractual provisions excluding frustration
coincide}.' The parties may foresee an event and intend, if it occurs, to consciously leave the
consequences to the Court,' or they may actually provide that if the event occurs they will then
determine how it is to affect the contract." If the parties cannot reach agreement, the contract may then
be frustrated even though the event was foreseen.
2.5. Legal consequences
Frustration terminates a contract automatically at the time of the frustrating event.' The common law
starts with the principle that frustration discharges the parties only from duties of "future
perforrnance"." Rights accrued before frustration therefore remain enforceable while those which
would, but for the frustrating event, have accrued after the time of discharge do not become due.
Hardship resulting from these rules has been mitigated by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
of1943.
Section 1(2) of the Act lays down three rules:
All sums payable under the contract before the time of discharge cease to be payable on frustration.
All sums actually paid in pursuance of the contract before the time of discharge are recoverable from
the payee "as money received by him for the use of the" payor. As the subsection does not refer to a
total failure of consideration, this statutory right 'to recover money arises even where the failure is
only partial. If the contract contains a stipulation for prepayment and the party to whom sums were
paid or payable in pursuance of the contract has, before the time of discharge, incurred expenses in or
for the purpose of the performance of the contract, the court has a discretion to allow him to retain or
recover the whole or any part of the sums so paid or payable. The upper limit of recovery is the
1See Treitel, supra 840, 841 for illustrations.
2Treitel, supra, 842.
JThe Eugenia [1964]2 Q.B. at p. 234.
4Autry v. Republic Productions 180 P. 2d. 888 (1947).
5Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS CO.Ltd [1926] A.c. 497, 505; EP. Exploration (Libya) Ltd v. Hunt [1979] I W.L.R. 783,
809; The Super Servant Two [1990]1 Lloyd's Rep. 1,8,9,14. Frustration therefore can be invoked by either party. This often
enables a party to actually profit from frustration. Treitel, supra, 848 criticises that possible effect and would prefer to give an
option to terminate the contract only to the prejudiced party. He draws support from the cases relating to self-induced
frustration.
"Joseph Constantine case [1942] x.c. 154, 187; The Super Servant Two [1990] I Lloyd's Rep. I, 18.
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amount of expenses actually incurred or the amount of the stipulated prepayment. In the exercise of its
discretion the court can split the loss in such proportions as it thinks just.
Section 1(3) of the Act states:
"Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any other party
thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable
benefit (other than a payment of money to which [section 1(2)] applies) before the time
of discharge, there shall be recoverable from him by the said other party such sum (if
any), not exceeding the value of the said benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court
considers just, having regard to all the circumstances of the case"
and in particular to (a) the amount of any expenses incurred by the benefited party before
the time of discharge, and (b)
"the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circumstances givmg rise to the
frustration of the contract."
Section 2(4) of the Act provides that if parts of a contract which have been wholly performed can
properly be severed from the remainder, they are to be treated as separate contracts, and that the
provisions of section 1 shall apply to the remainder of the contract. I
According to section 2(3) of the Act the provisions of the Act can be excluded by contrary agreement.
Whether a term has that effect depends on its interpretation.
Section 2(5) of the Act exempts certain kinds of contracts from application: voyage charterparties and
other contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, insurance contracts, and exceptions regarding the Sale
of Goods Act 1979.
3. Frustration of contract and causa finalis
The English cases of frustration of contract, it is submitted, can be categorised and analyzed on the
basis of the principle of frustration of the contractual purpose (causa finalis) the same way as it has
been done with the German cases of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage:
'See Treitel, supra, 854 for illustrations.
2Part II § 4.
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Cases of absolute impossibility, covered by the doctrine of frustration but not by the doctrine of
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, are not considered here since they are of less interest for a
comparison with German and South African contract law. However, cases of what has been termed
below in paragraph 4. absolute and relative impossibility can hardly be clearly separated since English
law never adhered to a narrow literal understanding of impossibility. This observation is also
important to understand the South African contract law regarding impossibility.
3.1. Objective (supervening) change of circumstances
3.1.1. Frustration of equality of exchange regarding value (commutative justice)
3.1.1.1. Increase in prices and cost
Because "impossibility" is in itself a relative term and may depend partly on the current state of
technology and partly on the amount of trouble and expense to which one is prepared to go to achieve
it, a trend has developed in the United States to abandon the very word "impossibility" and to use
instead the term "impracticability", 1 which includes extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense,
injury or loss to one of the parties.' The caveat is that "Increased cost alone does not excuse
performance ...',3- but it is suggested that a price increase "well beyond the normal range'" could lead
to discharge.
English law, however, is stricter and adheres as closely as possible to the idea of impossibility.
Although dicta saying that a contract may be discharged if its performance becomes "impracticable"
are occasionally found in the cases,' the weight of English authority rejects this view. Thus it has been
said in the House of Lords that "a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices'" would not affect the
bargain, and that
IU.C.C.s.2-615, Restatement 2d, Contracts, § 261.
2Restatement, Contracts, § 454; Restatement 2d, Contracts, § 261 Comment d.
lsupra.
"Restatement 2d, Contracts, § 261 Comment d.
'se. Horloek v. Beal [1916) A.C. 486, 492; The Furness Bridge [1977) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 367, 377; Nile Co. for the Export of
Agricultural Crops v. H.&.J.M.Bennett (Commodities) Ltd. [1986)1 Lloyd's Rep. 555, 581; Moss v. Smith (1859) 9 C.B. 94,
103; Robert H. Dahl v. Nelson Donkin (1881) 6 App.Cas. 38, 52; The Badagry [1985) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 395, 399.
6British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas [1952) A.C. 166, 185.
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"The argument that a man can be excused from performance of his contract when it
becomes 'commercially' impossible seems to me a dangerous contention which ought not
to be admitted unless the parties have plainly contracted to that effect.,,1
In Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham UD.C2 contractors agreed to build 78 houses for a local
authority in eight months for £94,000. Because of labour shortages, the work took 22 months and cost
the contractors £ 115,000. They claimed that the contract had been frustrated and that they were
entitled to extra remuneration. The House of Lords rejected the claim however, as the events which
caused the delays were within the ordinary range of commercial probability and had not brought about
a fundamental change of circumstances. Lord Radcliffe said:
"It is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the principle of
frustration into play. There must be as well such a change in the significance of the
obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that
contracted for. ,,3
The Suez cases similarly reject the argument that the greater expense caused to the party prejudiced
by the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and again in 1967 was a ground of frustration. In
Tsakiroglou & Co.Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH 4 a contract was made for the sale of Sudanese
groundnuts at an inclusive price to cover the cost of the goods, insurance and carriage to Hamburg.
When the contract was made both parties expected that shipment would be via Suez, but the contract
did not so provide. It was held that the contract was not frustrated by the closure of the Suez Canal, so
that the seller ought to have shipped the goods via the Cape of Good Hope. Although this would have
taken two and a half times as long as shipment via Suez and would have doubled the cost of carriage,
..
the difference between the two methods of performance was held not to be sufficiently fundamental to
frustrate the contract. It was also suggested that the contract would not have been frustrated even if it
had provided for shipment via Suez.' The same view is supported by a number of other cases."
Accordingly, in cases dealing with the consequences of inflation, the English authorities generally
reject the view that inflation constitutes a ground of frustration.
'Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v. CS Wilson & Co.Ltd [1917] AC. 495, 510.
2[1956] A.C. 696.
3[1956] AC. at p. 729.
4[1962] AC. 93.
5supra, 112.
"e.g. The Captain George K [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21; The Washington Trader [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 463.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
136
In Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. I a hospital had ceded
its right to take water from a well to a Waterworks Company in 1919, and the Company had in return
promised "at all times hereafter" to supply water to the hospital at a fixed price. In 1975 the cost for
the company of supplying the hospital had risen to over 18 times the contract price and the Company
gave seven months' notice to terminate the agreement. It was held that this notice was effective. Lord
Denning M.R. regarded the contract as frustrated by the change of circumstances which had occurred
between 1919 and 1975:
"So placed we have to ask ourselves: what were the circumstances in which the contract
was made? Does it apply in the least to the new situation which has developed? If events
occur for which they have made no provision - and which were outside the realm of their
speculations altogether - or of any reasonable persons sitting in their shoes - then the
court itself must take a hand and hold that the contract ceases to bind. ,,2
But the majority of the court, on the other hand, held that it was only a question of interpretation: the
contract was intended to be of indefinite, but not perpetual, duration. Thus the case fell within the
general principle under which, in commercial agreements of indefinite duration, a term is implied
entitling either party to terminate by reasonable notice. Treitel says that "at all times hereafter" was
"obviously" not to be taken literally, but meant "at all times hereafter during the subsistence of the
agreement";' This appears to be a rather arbitrary construction since the literal meaning of the words
points into the opposite direction." It seems clear that the decisive reason for holding the notice
effective was the vast increase in costs due to inflation, and the fact that the contract had become
totally unreasonable for the Company. The strained construction of the crucial words "at all times
hereafter" serves only to obscure the matter. Lord Denning's view is therefore preferable because it
states the reasons for the decision in a clear and honest manner. His approach has been criticised
because the reasoning was based on his statements in the British Movietonews case which had been
rejected by the House of Lords.
In the British Movietonews case "a sudden depreciation of currency" is listed as one of the
uncontemplated turns of events which do not frustrate a contract.' Again, in Wates Ltd. v. G.L. C. 6 a
1[1978]1 W.L.R. 1387.
2 1395.
) 795, footnote 71.
4That was also the opinion of the lower court which was overruled by the Court of Appeal.
5[1952] x.c. 166,185.
6( 1983) 25 Build.L.R. I.
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building contract to some extent protected the builder against inflation, by means of a price-escalation
clause; and it was said that the fact that
"inflation increased not [at] a trot or at a canter but at a gallop ... was not so radical a
difference from the inflation contemplated and provided for as to frustrate the contract." I
But, in English law also, it is admitted that
"the possibility that extreme (as opposed to merely severe) inflation may be capable of
frustrating a contract cannot be wholly ruled OUt.,,2
This statement, as well as the Staffordshire Waterworks case affirms the perception that whether
circumstances such as inflation might serve as a ground for frustration, depends on the extent of the
distortion of equality in exchange resulting therefrom.
Concerning the instance of inflation especially, the difference between the German and the English
doctrine is obvious. Although the German doctrine equally stresses the fact that inflation in principle
is not a ground for Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage, and courts are reluctant to accept it as frustrating
the contract in special cases, there are by far more cases in which inflation was in fact held to amount
to a frustration - Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage. The reason is probably the fact that on the one hand
Germany has had more drastic experiences with inflation and that on the other hand, the German
doctrine focuses more on the individual situation of the affected party, measuring it against the
standard of good faith and equity (bonafides) by means of the notion of Unzumutbarkeit . Thus, above
all, maintenance agreements have become il general exception of the nominalist principle, and
exceptions have also been made in other extreme cases. In fact, in the Staffordshire Waterworks case,
Lord Denning had urged that it was time "to revise our views about the principle of nominalism. ,,3
3.1.1.2. Delay and interruption
A contract may be frustrated if its subject matter, or a thing or person essential for the purpose of its
performance, though not ceasing to exist or suffering permanent incapacity, becomes temporarily
Isupra, 34.
2Treitel, supra, 823, referring to a statement of Lord Roskill in National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., where he
mentioned "inflation" as one of the "circumstances in which the doctrine has been invoked, sometimes with success,
sometimes without."
Jat p. 1398.
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unavailable for that purpose, even though no fixed time has expressly been specified for performance
and time is not otherwise of the essence of the contract. Thus charterparties have been frustrated
where the ship was seized, detained! or requisitioned.i where the goods themselves were
requisitioned' and where a cargo was unavailable because of a strike at the ports of loading."
Contracts for personal services have been frustrated where one of the parties fell ills or was interned
. d 6or conscnpte .
In Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance CO.,7 a charterparty was made in November 1871 for the
carriage of rails from Newport to San Francisco. On her way to Newport, the ship went aground in
January 1872 and was not repaired until the following August. The contract was held to have been
frustrated by the length of the delay, in consequence of which the voyage which the ship was still
capable of making was substantially different from that envisaged in the contract. Contracts in cases
of this kind are frustrated because performance at the end of the delay is no longer of any use to the
party to whom it was to be rendered. The purpose of the contract has been defeated.
The contract may also be frustrated for the reason that, after the delay, performance would be
significantly more onerous for the party who was to render it. In Acetylene Co. of Great Britain v.
Canada Carbide Co. 8the shipment of goods under a contract of sale was delayed for three years by
war-time requisitioning of all the available shipping space. When performance again became
physically possible, it was held that the seller was no longer bound to deliver because market
conditions had radically changed.
If performance for some balance of the contract period remains, or is likely to remain, possible after
the delay or interruption, the outcome of claims relating to that period depends on the ratio which the
interruption bears, or is likely to bear, to the contract period: the higher the ratio is, the more likely it
is that the contract will be frustrated. In The Nema.' a charterparty for six or seven voyages to be
made from April to December was frustrated when, after the first voyage, a long strike at the loading
port made it impossible to accomplish more than a further two voyages within the contract period. On
le.g in the Gulf War cases, and in The Adelia [1988]2 Lloyd's Rep.466.
2eg Sank Line Ltd v. Arthur Capel & Co. [1919] A.c. 435.
Je.g Re Shipton, Anderson& Co.[1915]3 K.B. 676.
4The Nema [1982] A.C. 724.
'e.s. Hart v. A.R. Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd [1977]1 W.L.R. 1067.
's« Morgan v. Manser [1948]1 K.B. 184.
7(1874) L.R. 10 c.r 125.
8(1922) 8 Lloyd's Law Rep. 456.
9[ 1982] A.C. 724.
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the other hand, in Tamplin SS.Co.Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co.' the war-time requisition of a
ship in February 1915 did not frustrate a five year charter which was not due to end until December
1917. The majority of the House of Lords speculated that the war would not last until the end of the
contract period?
3.1.2. Frustration of equality in exchange (commutative justice) regarding the fitness of the
performance for a special purpose
This category of cases was inaugurated by Krell v. Henry, as interpreted in the light of Herne Bay
Steamboat Co. v. Hutton. Krell v Henry has attracted much criticism.3 The obvious danger of such a
rule is that it can all too easily be invoked by a party for whom a contract has simply become a bad
bargain.
Normally, a contract is not frustrated merely because supervening events have prevented one party
from using the subject matter according to his intention, even though that use was also contemplated
by the other. A contract by which a gas company agreed with a local authority to "provide, maintain
and light" street lamps was not frustrated when war-time black-out regulations prohibited the lighting
of such lamps, since the purpose of the contract extended also to the maintenance of the lamps, which
remained possible." A contract for the sale of goods is not frustrated merely because the buyer's
purpose to export the goods from, or to import them into, a particular country is defeated by export or
import restrictions.' In Amalgamated Investment & Property Co.Ltd. v. John Walker & Son ua.: it
was held that a contract for the purchase of property for redevelopment was not frustrated when the
1[1916]2 x.c. 397.
2[1916]2 A.C. at p. 405.
3Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v. T.W.Allen & Sons Ltd. [1918] 1 K.S. 540, 542; Larrinaga v. Société Franco-Américaine des
Phosphates de Medulla (1923) 92 L.J.K.S. 455, 459; Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd. [1935] A.c. 524,
528; Scanlan's New Neon Ltd. v. Toohey's Ltd. (1943) 67 C.L.R. 169, 191-194; Corbin on Contracts, § 1355 at pp. 464-465;
Landon, 52 L.Q.R. 168.
4Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell UD.C [1916] 2 K.S. 428; for contrasting decisions on the effect of black-out
regulations on contracts for the hire of electric advertising signs, see Scanlan's New Neon Ltd. v. Toohey's Ltd, supra
(contract not discharged), and 20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 149 P.2d. 88 (1944) (contract discharged).
5eg. D.McMaster & Co. v. Cox McEwen & Co.[1921] S.c. (H.L.) 1; Congimex S.A.RL (Lisbon) v. Continental Grain
Export Corp. (New York) [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 346; Congimex Companhia Geral, etc. S.A.RL v. Tradax Export S.A.
[1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 250.
6[1977]1 W.L.R. 164.
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buildings on the land were listed as being of special architectural or historic interest, so that
redevelopment became more difficult or impossible and the property lost most of its value.
While these cases make it difficult to establish the defence of frustration of purpose, they do not make
it impossible. In Denny, Matt & Dickson v. James B. Fraser & Co.Ltd. I a contract for the lease of a
timber yard was made for the purpose of enabling the parties to carry out a contract between them for
the sale of timber. When performance of the contract of sale was prohibited by war-time regulations,
the House of Lords held that the agreement for the lease of the yard was also frustrated.
The situation in Germany is quite similar. As a rule, it is not sufficient if one party is simply aware of
the other party's purpose. In order for that purpose to form a common object, each party has to have
adopted the purpose and has to have a personal interest in the attainment of that purpose. That rule is
based, as in England, on the idea of reliance, or venire contra factum proprium. Because of the
speculative character of such contracts, such as that in the Amalgamated Investment case the
purchaser of prospective building land in Germany also bears the risk that building might be
prohibited by the authorities later on. All in all, however, German courts appear to be more willing to
assume WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage if the reason for the frustration does not only fall into the
sphere of one party, but also into that of the other and when both shared the purpose and had a
personal interest in its attainment.
In the case of a lease of land it was held in earlier English decisions that the subject matter of the
contract was limited to giving the tenant the right to exclusive possession for the specified time. This
subject matter survived even if where subsequent events prevented the tenant from making any use of
the premises. The commercial reality, however, is that the tenant generally bargains for use and
occupation and not merely for a legal right of possession. In National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina
(Northern) Ltd. ,2 the House of Lords held that the doctrine of frustration could therefore also apply to
leases of land, but emphasized that the frustration of a lease will be a very rare event.' A tenant had
claimed that a ten-year lease of a warehouse had been frustrated when, four and a half years before
the end of the term, the only access road to the premises had been closed by the local authority and
had remained closed for 20 months. The claim was rejected on the ground that the interruption was
not sufficiently serious to bring about frustration. In the given case of a lease for a long period of
years the contract is in its nature a long-term speculation since the parties must contemplate that
circumstances may change radically during its currency, and so to a large extent take the risk of
1[1944] A.C. 265.
2[1981] x.c. 675.
) 692, 697.
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supervening events. In the case of an interruption of the possession, the reason for that interruption
will in most cases of long-term-Ieases not be sufficient to frustrate the contract. The doctrine of
frustration is therefore most likely to apply where the lease is a short-term one for a particular
purpose: e.g. where a holiday cottage which has been rented for a month is burnt down without the
fault of either party. In Scotland the lease of a salmon fishery was held to be frustrated when
construction of a nearby bombing range prevented the tenant from using the fishery.'
The doctrine of frustration also applies to contracts for the sale of land," but its operation is restricted
by the rule that risk of loss passes - unless otherwise agreed - as soon as the contract is made.
Consequently, there is no frustration if the house or buildings on the land (for the sake of which the
land was bought) are destroyed or seriously damaged between contract and completion.' The rule that
risk passes on contract is therefore commonly varied by contract: for example, by provisions leaving
the risk with the seller until completion, and giving a right to rescind the contract either to the
purchaser if the property has become unusable for its purpose at the date of the contract, or to the
vendor if the property has been destroyed and he cannot get planning permission to rebuilt it.4
3.2. Subjective change of circumstances (common mistake)
Cases of relative impossibility and quasi-impossibility concerning frustration of equality in exchange
regarding value or the fitness of the subject matter of the performance for a special purpose, are
intertwined in the English doctrine of mistake under the heading of mistake as to quality. A mistake as
to quality can relate either to the value or to the utility of the subject matter for the parties' purpose.'
In Griffith v. Brymer" a contract was made for the hire of a room on June 26, 1902, the day fixed for
the coronation of King Edward VII, for the purpose of viewing the coronation procession. The
contract was held void because, when it was made, the decision to postpone the coronation had -
unknown to the parties - already been taken.
ITay Salmon Fisheries Co. v. Speedie, 1929 S.c. 593.
2Amalgamated Investment and Property Co.Ltd. v, John Walker & CoLtd. [1977] I W,L.R, 164,
3Paine v, Meller (180 I) 6 Ves, 349,
"Law Society's Standard Conditions of Sale (1992) Conditions 5,1.1 to 5,1.4,
5Treitel, supra, 264,
6( 1903) 19 T,L.R, 434,
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In Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Royal Mail Co. I the plaintiff had bought shares in a company on the faith
of an untrue statement (made by innocent misrepresentation) that the company had secured a contract
to carry mail for the New Zealand Government. The decision was that the resulting contract was
valid. In reaching this conclusion Blackburn J. referred to the Roman doctrine of error in substantia,
by which mistakes as to quality may make a contract void if they relate to the "substance" of the
subject matter. He held that the plaintiff had obtained the very shares he bargained for, and that his
mistake did not affect the substance of the transaction. The equality in exchange was not frustrated
because the acquisition of shares was of a speculative character because of the natural tendency of
shares in a company to fluctuate in value.
In Bell v. Lever Bros.: Bell and Snelling had agreed with Lever Bros. to serve for five years as
chairman and vice-chairman of a company controlled by Lever Bros. Before the end of this period,
Lever Bros. wished to terminate these service contracts and the parties entered into compensation
agreements under which Bell and Snelling received between them £50,000 for loss of office. Lever
Bros. then discovered that Bell and Snelling had broken their service contracts in a way that would
have justified their summary dismissal without compensation. It was found that Bell and Snelling had
forgotten about these breaches of the service contracts when the compensation agreements were
made, so that they were not guilty of fraudulent concealment, nor were they under any duty to
disclose their breaches of duty. The remaining issue was whether the compensation agreements were
void for mistake, so that Lever Bros. could recover back the £50,000 which they had paid to get rid of
Bell and Snelling while they might have got rid of them for nothing. The Court of Appeal held that the
compensation agreements were void as Lever Bros. had made them under a fundamental mistake. The
House of Lords however, by a narrow majority, reversed this decision. The mistake related only to a
quality of the service contracts and was not fundamental. Lord Atkin said:
"The contract released is the identical contract in both cases [whether the service
contracts were valid or voidable] and the party paying for release gets exactly what he
bargained for.,,3
Lord Atkin said that mistake as to quality
1(1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 580.
2[1932] A.C: 161.
J 223.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
143
"will not affect assent unless it is the mistake of both parties and is as to the existence of
some quality which makes the thing without the quality essentially different from the
thing as it was believed to be.,,1
There was nothing to show that Bell and Snelling had regarded the validity of the service contracts as
vital, only Lever Bros. had done so. The common purpose of the compensation agreement had been
attained. Lever Bros. got rid of Bell and Snelling in return for compensation. The fact that they could
have gotten rid of them without compensation was part of their unilateral risk. In the absence of any
responsibility on the side of Bell and Snelling for Lever Bros.' mistake, they could not be held to share
that risk.
4. Assessment and comparison with Germany
The comparison of the doctrines of English law described here with the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany reveals a striking similarity in the details of development and
argumentation, but also a significant difference in the general approach.
In Germany as in England, the crisis of the will-theory resulted in a shift from a subjective to a more
objective approach to the problem of fundamental change of circumstances. Because of the perils for
the principle of pacta sunt servanda, furthermore, the respective doctrines serve as an ultima ratio, a
last resort, "not lightly to be invoked,,2 in both countries.
The obvious difference between the English and the German doctrine is that Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage does not include cases of impossibility. This, of course, is due to the fact that
impossibility was already provided for in the Code when the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage was developed as case-law to complement the Code in cases where there was not
a literal impossibility but a situation somewhat related to the situation of impossibility. In England,
the notion of impossibility was the natural point of departure for the doctrine of frustration. The
English doctrine therefore illustrates perfectly the close relationship between Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage / frustration of contract and impossibility.
Lacking acknowledged objective legal norms, the only way for the further development of the law
(Rechtsfortbildung) in England involved reasoning from case to case by way of supplementary
interpretation of the contract at hand, guided by the nature and the circumstances of the individual
1218.
2J Lauritzen A. S v. WIjsmuller B. V (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd's Report 1, p.S, per Bingham LJ.
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contract, its reasonable meaning and the presumed intentions of the parties. The very fact that
impossibility was not from the very beginning a ground for relief contributed to a flexible approach in
cases falling short of impossibility in the literal sense.' Through the influence of maritime commercial
law (the rule as to "frustration of the adventure") and the steady influence of commercial standards
(merchants were always more willing to treat something as impossible which might theoretically still
have been possible), England gained a more flexible concept of impossibility than on the continent.
Notions like "performance in a business sense" and "merchantable character" in the cases give
evidence of that fact.
Initially, the development in Germany followed the same path. First, there were the two "mill-
decisions" of the Reichsgericht in 1889 and 1898 where the court argued that although there was no
real impossibility, the circumstances had changed in such an unforeseeable manner as to impair and
thwart the original purpose of the transaction, and thus to change the content given to it by the parties
- in other words making it a different obligation, an aliud.2 In a case from 1920, after the First World
War, the Reichsgericht drew an analogy to § 325 BGB (impossibility) and spoke of an "economic
impossibility", connecting it with a revival of the idea of the clausuia rebus sic stantibus?
Since the Davis Contractors-case and Lord Radcliffe's formulation of the test of a radical change of
the obligation, it has become generally accepted in English law that in order for the doctrine of
frustration to operate, there must always be a situation somewhat analogous to impossibility:
impossibility in the common law sense of relating not just to the object of performance itself but to
the content of the contract as a whole, the obligation as such. The concept of impossibility remains the
reference point of the doctrine of frustration (and common mistake).
The criteria to determine whether the obligation is radically different after the change of
circumstances are basically similar to those employed by the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage. Frustration of purpose (causa finalis) in the sense of equality in exchange
especially, appears to be the basic constellation in which the doctrine, under certain limitations, can
be invoked - just as in the case of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. Frustration of purpose is the basic
idea. It generally renders a contract objectionable. But whether it will actually invalidate it depends of
the nature of the contract and the circumstances.
'Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage und Vertragserfullung, 67, 68.
2Seuffert's Archiv 45, p. 114; RGZ 42, p. 42.
JRGZ 100, p. 129.
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Impossibility is nothing else but the most obvious case offrustration of purpose. The cases which deal
with an impossibility in the literal, narrow sense of the word, can be comprised in the category of
absolute impossibility. A disruption of equality of exchange is at least an indicator for frustration of
purpose. It can result out of an unforeseen material or personal hardship of one party for which that
party is not accountable. Whether it amounts to a total frustration of purpose or not depends largely
on the extent of the disruption. Both in England and in Germany it is considered insufficient that the
contract merely turns out to be a bad bargain. The cases dealing with a disruption of equality in
exchange amounting to frustration of purpose regarding value can be comprised in the category of
relative impossibility.
Then there can be other cases of frustration of purpose which do not necessarily concern the value of
the subject matter of performance, but where a certain fact or state of things is attributed such a
crucial importance by both parties that its disappearance or change renders the contract unreasonable
and virtually pointless. This kind of case can be comprised in a category which might be called quasi-
impossibility,' These are naturally borderline cases which must be and are kept within very narrow
confines.
The German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, seen from an English perspective, deals
with the categories of relative impossibility and quasi-impossibility.
In both England and Germany it is recognized that such categories can only serve as a general
guideline, the question in the end always depends of the nature of the contract and the circumstances
in the individual case. This lies in the nature of things since the possible combinations of facts that
can bring about a frustration of purpose are infinite.
In both countries the problem is recognized to be primarily one of risk-allocation and the importance
and priority of the construction of the contract is acknowledged and emphasized.
Both countries know an objective and a subjective basis of the contract. Objective in the sense of
supervening change of circumstances (frustration) and subjective in the sense of common mistake.
Also in Germany there were voices which wanted to deal with the subjective basis in the context of
'Atiyah uses a similar structure in his Introduction to the Law of Contract. He treats cases of absolute and relative
impossibility (" ...not necessarily impossible, but yet in which it would seem excessively hard on one of the parties ...", 219)
under the heading of "Frustration through impossibility of performance" (231 sq.), and cases of quasi-impossibility under the
heading of "Frustration of the common venture" ( 232 sqq.).
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the doctrine of mistake, I but the perception has gained ground that these cases concern the exact same
problems and are treated with the exact same means and criteria as in the cases of the objective basis
and therefore should be dealt with as two sides of the same coin? In England the statements of Lord
Atkin in Bell v. Lever Bros. and Steyn J. in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd. v. Credit du Nord SA point
in the same direction.
Finally, both countries employ identical limitations to the doctrine in order to narrow its scope. The
most important of these limitations is the requirement of a common subjective basis, or common
object (purpose) shared by both parties. This is evident in the cases of common mistake but also
applies to the cases of the objective basis. In these cases too, the purpose of the contract can only be
frustrated if it was shared by both parties and regarded as essential by both. The other common
limitations are foreseeability, fault (or self-induced frustration) and speculative transactions.
Yet there is a significant difference in the approach in German law.
The development in Germany took a different direction after the "mill-cases" and the "commercial
impossibility"-jurisdiction of the Reichsgericht. The court did not think it fit to extend freely the
meaning of impossibility because it interpreted §§ 275, 325 BGB as referring only to impossibility in
its literal sense (absolute impossibility). In the famous decision of the 3rd February 19223, in which
the Reichsgericht accepted Oertmann's formula of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage, it founded its
absolving power directly on § 242 BGB, the principle of good faith and equity (bona fides) and
developed in this context the criterion of Unzumutbarkeit as the authoritative test. It is quite obvious
that this move was motivated by the fact that § 242 BGB did not entail a strict legal consequence. It
'Wieacker in Festschrift fur Wilburg. 1965, pp. 242-247; Stotter, "Versuch zur Prazisierung des Begriffs der mangelhaften
Geschaftsgrundlage'', in AcP 166 (1966), 149, 173-178.
2The doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage has in German law served as a convenient escape route from the
disadvantages and shortcomings of the doctrine of mistake. Especially because the result of common mistake namely that the
contract void ab initio with a duty to pay compensation is highly inconvenient and unequitable, there is a tendency to rather
assume Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage when ever possible because of the more flexible and equitable results. Furthermore,
where an error in motive is regarded as fundamental to the contract, but cannot be portrayed as relating to a characterisic of
the subject-matter, the courts often apply the doctrine of Wegfal! der Geschaftsgrundlage isubjekiive Geschaftsgrundlage'; to
make it legally relevant. One reason for that is that where both parties share the error, neither party merits special protection
and they can be expected to share the risk. This development is an indication that, in Germany as well, the doctrine of
mistake has not solved the problem of the disappointed expectations of the parties' in a convincing way. It appears that the
aspect of mistake should be de-emphasized, for it is never of decisi ve importance. The decisive criteria are found in elements
such as frustration of purpose, reliance and allocation of risk, which should be accorded pride of place in dogmatic analysis.
JRGZ 103, pp. 329, 332.
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was since long accepted that the principle of bona fides gave the power to intervene into existing
contractual relationships which did not comply with its standards, but it did not state precisely how
this is to be done and therefore gave the court a considerable discretion in adjusting the contract
according to what it regarded as fit for the individual case. The court clearly wanted to evade the
drastic legal consequences of assuming an impossibility which it did not see as appropriate in the
cases concerned.
The criterion of Unzumutbarkeit obviously focuses on the affected party and its subjective condition.
The underlying idea is to ensure substantive justice in the individual case and justice, in the end, is
directed towards individuals.
The English criterion of the radical difference of the obligation focuses only on the contract itself. It
measures everything against the idea of impossibility, while the criterion of Unzumutbarkeit measures
everything against the idea of good faith and equity.
The obvious reason for this difference is that the English law does not know such a powerful legal
tool that in itself combines ius strictum and ius aequum. Therefore there is also not much choice as to
the legal consequences: the contract is always put aside, which often creates unjust results. Even after
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act of 1943, the result is frequently an all-or-nething
situation. I In this particular aspect the common law, often envied for its flexibility, is more rigid and
inflexible than its continental counterpart. This is a major reason why the English doctrine appears to
be, on the whole, much narrower than the German doctrine and much more reluctant to actually
acknowledge a frustration or an operative common mistake. The German doctrine is more liberal for
the simple reason that the consequences are far less drastic and Weg/all der Geschaftsgrundlage
actually sometimes acts as a convenient means of adapting a contract to a new situation.
A comparable approach in English law has been promoted by Lord Denning, who tried to oust
common mistake as far as possible from the field of the common law and deal with it in terms of
equity, where the focus is also on the individual, and there is greater flexibility concerning the legal
consequences because the primary aim is to ensure substantive justice in the individual case.
Comparing the two approaches, the English test at first sight appears to be more precise and clear-cut
and therefore better fit to ensure legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit). Yet that might still to some extent
be open to question, since the notion of "radical difference of the obligation" is not a completely
unambiguous concept and subject to the complex nature of the problem with its infinite possible
'see the statements of Lord Simon ofGlaisdale in National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina, supra a.bb.(d).
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constellations. I Evaluative judgements (Wertungen) are inevitably involved here, too, albeit maybe to
a lesser extent than in the case of Unzumutbarkeit.
lIn order to specify (konkretisieren) the notion of "radical difference in the obligation" it might also be helpful to look for
orientation in the Aristotelian philosophy of essences linked to ends (causafinalis) as it is promoted by James Gordley (see
Part A eh.I). A theory of causa finalis appears to be useful both in the German and the English doctrine. Both the German
and the English doctrine and the high prominence of frustration of purpose in both inevitably brings us back to the question
as to what constitutes the essence of an obligation and thus to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.
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Part IV: The principle of causa {inalis
The description of the historical development, the application in the case law and the dogmatic
treatment of the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany and frustration of contract
in England has illustrated the importance of purpose for the inescapable need for evaluative
judgments in both civil and common law. The treatment of purpose in both legal systems corresponds
strikingly to that in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and in the legal works of their adherents,
especially in so far as the notion of causafinalis is concerned.
The need to approach dogmatic problems in this area from a broad perspective seems beyond dispute.
What the law requires is a coherent general theory. Legal dogmatics should not be conducted in an
aimless and fragmentary manner, its results should not resemble a legal patchwork.
The confusion which surrounds the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of
contract, is an immediate consequence of a doctrinal crisis in private law concerning its theory of
contract. This crisis is accordingly not of purely theoretical interest, it affects all aspects of legal
dogmatics, right down to the level of everyday problems of practical relevance. The doctrinal crisis is
- in the long run - of crucial practical relevance. The binding character of the law, which depends on
its acceptance among its subjects, turns in the final analysis on its inherent persuasiveness. If there is
no coherent concept behind the individual legal rules they will seem arbitrary, and their persuasive
character will be lost. A coherent legal theory presupposes a sound philosophical and methodological
basis. Methodology links philosophy to legal doctrine and practice, it puts philosophy into action,
enabling the jurist to ask what justice is, and how it can be realised. Viewed in this light, the claim
that the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of purpose can be reduced to
mere problems of interpretation, is too simplistic to be maintained without more. Interpretation is not
a simple legal tool, it entails a general legal technique involving the concretisation of precepts, the
filling in of gaps in the law and its further development. The acknowledged or unacknowledged aim
of interpretation is the pursuit of justice. Interpretation is such a broad phenomenon that it may well
be equated with legal methodology itself. Interpretation is nothing else than the means whereby, in the
sense of Arthur Kaufmann, the Is may be assimilated to the Ought. I
Any reference to interpretation therefore, requires elucidation. Larenz did so when he differentiated
purely subjective interpretation (based on the will of the parties alone), supplementary interpretation
(entailing a mixed subjective-normative approach) and corrective interpretation (predominantly
'see Part I § 12.
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normative, based on the idea of good faith, and only based on the subjective will of the parties as far
as the parties can be held to expect good-faith-conduct complying with the basic principles of contract
law). Larenz emphasized that "corrective" interpretation transcends interpretation in the original sense
since it consciously intervenes into the contract under specific, restricted circumstances. It is
nevertheless related to interpretation in so far as it is the logical next step when the "normal"
interpretation does not lead to a solution. Larenz sees the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage
as an instance of "corrective" interpretation.'
The basic problem of the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract - the
classic dichotomy between the aim of legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit) and the aim of substantive
justice in the individual case (equity - Einzelfallgerechtigkeit) - was described by Aristotle when
speaking about the relationship between justice and equity in his Nicomachean Ethics (book
V,chapter 10):
"What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a
correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it
is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then,
in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law
takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the
less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the
thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law
speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal
statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to
correct the omission - to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been
present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just -
not better than absolute justice, but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness
of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is
defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not
determined by law, viz. that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that
a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the
leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of
the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts. ,,2
ILarenz, Geschiiftsgrund/age und Vertragserfullung, 3rd.ed. 1963; "Erganzende Vertragsauslegung und Ruckgriff auf die
Geschaftsgrundlage", in: 25 Jahre Karlsruher Forum, 1983, 156sqq.; Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Burgerlichen Rechts,
7th ed., 1989, 544sqq.
20xford's World's Classics edition, 133.
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The interest in the role of purpose in the law has never waned since Ihering, and has led to a renewed
interest in the causa finalis of the old ius commune which is likely to increase in the future. Its affinity
to Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is not a handicap anymore, since it can once again be related to
the conclusions of modern legal philosophy, especially phenomenology and hermeneutics.' From a
German point of view, the writings of Karl Larenz and Arthur Kaufmann appear to be the most fertile
in this respect.i I am confident that similar developments have taken place in the other countries of the
western hemisphere because philosophy, and legal philosophy in particular, is no longer conducted in
national isolation anymore. It is no longer illegitimate to look to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas for
orientation and to seek to establish their influence on legal thought.
The principle of causa finalis contributes to answering the neglected question why the law has the
content that it does.' As such it is the antithesis to legal formalism which, although its handicap in the
past, may be its advantage in the future. The explanation for this put forward by James Gordley is:
"One is committed to some ideal of human welfare that makes some changes better than
others, even if one does not conceive of the good in the same way as Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas."
"One has to explain why the law does not place the same value on all commitments. This
was the task once performed by the Aristotelian virtues of fidelity, liberality and
commutative justice. Moreover one has to explain what it is to which the parties are
committed and what that commitment entails. One cannot do so by simply looking to the
thoughts and expectations of the parties themselves, which are ambiguous and usually
different. This was the task once performed by the idea that the essence of an action can
be defined in terms of its end .. ,. The definitions will be arbitrary unless there is some
pre-existing relationship independent of the will of the definer, that links together the
elements of the definition and the consequences extracted from it."!
"Modern theorists tend to set in opposition on the one hand the will of the parties, and on
the other any attempt by a court or legislature to judge the fairness of the contract. For
the late scholastics and the natural lawyers there was no such radical opposition .... The
'Part I §§ 9, 10.
2PartI§§ 11,12.
Jpart I §§ II, 12.
"Gordley, "Enforcing promises", California Law Review 1995, 576.
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parties could set aside the terms natural to their contract by express provision.
Nevertheless, they could not do so in a way opposed to the nature of the contract itself."2
"[The 19th century jurists] had to explain rules that were in force in order to serve human
purposes by a definition that abstracted from those purposes. It was like trying to explain
a machine without regard to its function .... The will-theorists could not have explained
the differences in treatment without speaking, not merely of the will of the parties, but of
the reasons why the will should be respected.:"
The principle of causa finalis is concerned with the content and effect, the aim, the end of the
contract. It therefore aims directly at the crucial problem of evaluative judgment in the law and
contractual fairness for which Aristotle's concept of virtue had originally provided the standard. It is
thus directly relevant for the justification and persuasiveness of the binding character of the law. The
principle of causa finalis poses the question of the binding character of a contract (the why) in an
objective-normative way.
Causa finalis describes a means-to-ends relationship. In its relational character, the principle reflects
and corresponds to the basic nature of the law as analyzed by Arthur Kaufmann.4 The law is
relational, contract is relational-reciprocal and causafinalis is the basis of this characteristic trait. The
principle of causa finalis is thus a crucial part of the essence of a contract.
The problem was that the 19th century jurists did not find a good way of distinguishing the causa
finalis of a contract from the other ends or motives of the contracting parties'. They had purged the
law of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of virtue - but the courts bent the rules to enforce contracts
made with virtuous intentions.
Three authors deal specifically with the relevance of the principle of causa finalis for the modern
private law. One is James Gordley, who figures already rather prominently in this thesis, the other two
are Harm-Peter Westermann? and Jan Smits.' Westermann, Gordley and Smits each try to shed light
'Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 244,245.
2Gordley, supra, 109,110,111.
lGordley, supra, p. 164.
"Part I § 12.
5Die Causa im Deutschen und Franzosischen Zivilrecht, diss. Kain 1964. Westermann analyzes and emphasizes the role and
continuing relevance of causa in both the Code Civil and the BGB, where this is less obvious, since the concept of causa has
not specifically been made part of the codification.
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on the nature of the principle. All three emphasize that the principle does not describe a tautology:
causa and will are not identical as it was supposed in the 19th century, the causa finalis is not
arbitrary but specific and makes sense in that it is a useful tool to explain the law and its
consequences.
Every investigation of the principle of causa finalis has to follow four crucial questions as guidelines:
1. Can there be something like "the" purpose, or "essential" purpose of an act or a contract?
2. How does one determine, what is that essential purpose?
In other words: how does one separate the legally relevant from irrelevant purposes?
3. When exactly is the frustration of that essential purpose operative?
4. What are, or can be the legal consequences of such an operative frustration of purpose?
1. As to the first question:
The first question can be answered in the affirmative with reference to modern legal philosophers like
Arthur Kaufmann and Karl Larenz?
2. As to the second question:
The second question is the main topic of the discussion by Westermann, Gordley and Smits. The
results of the three authors in defining the content of the principle of causa finalis do not lie far from
each other. Above all, they all emphasize the relational character of the principle, their respective key-
elements of causa finalis all illustrate a specific relationship. They all, furthermore, point out that the
causa finalis has an essentially normative character. The difference between them lies mainly in how
far they want to go, in their aim in dealing with the principle.
Gordley identifies the Aristotelian virtues of commutative justice or liberality as the causa finalis of
every contract. 3 Westermann relates the causa finalis to the contractual synallagma (genetical and
functional), that is, reciprocity." Smits takes up this thread and identifies causa with reciprocity.' The
notion of synallagma (reciprocity) describes why, and to what end parties enter into contracts.
'Het vertrouwensbeginsel en de contractuele gebondenheid, proefschrift Leiden, 1995. Smits dismisses the reliance principle
as dogmatically unuseful and boldly postulates the causa finalis as the cornerstone of the theory of contract.
2Part I §§ 11, 12.
lGord1ey, Philosophical Origins, supra, 232, 240 sq., 244.
"Westermann, Die Causa, supra, 95 sqq.
5Smits, Van wil, causa en verrijking, supra, Steil LR (1997) 287, 295.
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Consequently, Smits understands "reciprocity" and "contractual performance" in the broadest sense.
The "performances" which the parties exchange do not only refer to the specific items of performance
but to the whole content of the contract as such. The concept of reciprocity, in tum, is connected with
the topic of equality in exchange ie commutative justice. Smits distinguishes "normal" and
"abnormal" cases: the first category comprises contracts with "normal" counter-performances - these
are standard situations of contractual exchange in which the justification of the exchange can be
assumed if there are no indicators to the contrary, the second category comprises cases with abnormal
counter-performances which need an additional justification from the circumstances of the individual
contract. In both categories, the criterion to find out whether a contract has been formed, is whether, if
no contract would be recognised, any unjust enrichment would arise. The idea of unjustified
enrichment is closely linked to the concept of reciprocity:
"De overeenkomst dient ertoe een uitwisseling van goederen te bewerkstelligen en men is
over het algemeen slechts bereid tot een dergelijke uitwisseling omdat men meent dat,
om welke reden dan ook, die uitwisseling gunstig is. Dit betekent dat de causa voor de
gebondenheid doorgaans zal kunnen worden aangenomen omdat de verrichte of beloofde
prestatie in het voordeel van de handelende persoon wordt geacht te zijn. Dat is 'normaal'.
Praktisch komt dit daar op neer dat slechts dan een tot gebondenheid aanleiding gevende
samenhang bestaat waar het voordeel dat de ene persoon verkrijgt, niet in een
wanverhouding staat met het nadeel dat de andere partij lijdt. ...
De theoretische grondslag van de causa werd vervolgens ingevuld aan de hand van het
ethisch gedachtengoed dat ook tot uitdrukking komt in bijvoorbeeld de ius tum pretium-
leer.'"
Here we are back with Gordiey's Aristotelian virtues.
Westermann classified the German cases into categories In a way similar to those of Smits. He
distinguished contracts with a "typical" causa (where the just causa is assumed) and others, where the
causa needs a special agreement of the parties:
"Causa ist em vom Recht auf Grund emer Parteivereinbarung oder wegen sernes
typischen Vorkommens beachteter, auf diese Weise aus der Reihe der Motive
herausgehobener Zweck einer Vermëgenszuwendung. Die beiden Formen der causa
'Smits, "Van wil, causa en verrijking: over een alternatieve route naar de contractuele gebondenheid", Stellenbosch Law
Review 1997,292,295.
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unterscheiden sich dadurch, daf die typische causa einer Zuwendung regelmabig
zusammen mit der Einigung tiber diese zustandekommt; eine dartiberhinausgehende
causa bedarf einer von der Einigung tiber die Zuwendung geschiedenen Vereinbarung.
Der typische Zweck wirkt also als Vermutung fiir den im Rahmen der Vertragsfreiheit
grundsatzlich mal3gebenden vereinbarten Zweck. ,,I
Although Westermann wants to keep closer to the parties' actual agreement, it seems clear that in
"untypical" cases, the necessary "extra causa" must be extracted from the contract as a whole, not
necessarily from the expressed words of the parties only, but also from the accompanying
circumstances. It will not be difficult to see a thus identified causa as part of the contract and part of
the parties' agreement. The difference between Westermann and Smits in this respect seems to be
more a matter of formulation.
Westermann, however, seems to differ from Smits and Gordley In that he regards material
equivalence, that is, equality in exchange, as of no significance:
"Subjektiv geni.igt es also, wenn die Parteien ihre Leistungen fiir austauschwtirdig, nicht
etwa fur gleichwertig halten. Es kommt ferner nicht auf das objektive Wertverhaltnis von
Leistung und Gegenleistung an. ,,2
Yet Westermann does not seem to differentiate the subject matter of performance and the contractual
performance as a whole. Equality of exchange in the sense of Gordley and Smits refers rather to the
whole of the contract as such: advantages and disadvantages of the parties should be in a relative
equilibrium and not totally disproportionate. Several circumstances of the contract can playa role in
determining whether that is the case or not.'
IWestermann, supra, pp. 63,64.
2Westermann, supra, p. 96.
lThis very brief and selective sketch of the three authors' position may suffice for the purposes of this thesis.
Because all three have different aims, they do differ in important points when dealing with causa finalis. The main difference
between Westermann and the other two is that Westermann merely wants to analyse the situation of the relevance of causa
for the Code Civil and the BGB as it is (or was 1964). The projects of Gordley and Smits go further. They do not simply want
to describe the law as it is, want to develop it further. Smits is the boldest in attempting to base the whole theory of contract
on the causa finalis and his far-reaching consequences from this is not persuasive in all respects. According to Smits, the
very question whether a contract has come into existence depends on whether the requirement of causa finalis is satisfied or
not (Smits, Het vertrouwensbeginsel, supra, p. 236). Westermann emphasizes that the requirement of causa finalis has
consequences for the question whether a contract retains its binding character, and not whether the contract comes into
existence at all. lts significance is therefore more that ofa defence (Westermann, supra, pp. 60,61). In my view, Smits turns
the relation between form and substance in the law into the opposite of the traditionally held view: in the past the formal
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In view of the foregoing, the principle of causafinalis could also be formulated as follows:
The causafinalis (end or purpose) of a contract (seen as afirst step just abstractly, without regard to
its individual content) is a balanced, and therefore just, equivalence of interests of the parties. In
contracts of exchange, therefore, the causa finalis of the contract entails equality in exchange
(commutative justice) in view of all the obligations of a contract as a whole. Equality in exchange
may regard the value or the fitness of the subject matter of the performance(s) for a special purpose.
In the case of unilateral contracts (like donation) the causa finalis of the contract is - in accord with
the Aristotelian- Thomistic tradition - liberality. I
Advantages and disadvantages of the parties must 10 the terminology of Arthur Kaufmann be
"comparable", or "assimilated". Equivalence - assimilation (analogy) is the essence of justice? This is
only another formulation for commutative justice, and it is a guideline and measure for the allocation
of risk, which plays such a prominent role in modern jurisprudence. The law only bestows binding
force on a contract when the parties reach agreement and when each of the parties shows
consideration for the interests of the other party. And this reciprocal consideration must last for the
duration of the contractual transaction. That is the essence of the principle of good faith. This already
leads us to the conclusion, that causa finalis and good faith are concepts that complement each other
because they both aim at content and are both value-orientated. Larenz actually identifies the principle
of good faith with commutative justice (and not simply equity);'
3. As to the third question:
The third questior. - when exactly is a frustration of purpose operative - is, of course, the decisive one
and the most difficult to answer. The difficulties lie in the nature of the problem. It does not seem
possible that there could be something like a general pattern of how and when the purpose of a
contract can be frustrated.
aspect of the law was overemphasized, Smits runs the risk of doing the opposite when he wants to decide all relevant
questions about the content of a contract under the rubric whether the contract has actually come into existence. It appears to
be more realistic to acknowledge in certain circumstances that a contract has been formed, but that it may be dissolved if its
content does not meet the necessary requirements. Smits is eventually forced to split up the contract into a formal and a
substantial agreement in an artificial way (Smits, Het vertrouwensbeginsel, supra, p. 284).
'Part I § I, Gordley, Philiosophical Origins, 17 sqq. and 49 sqq.
2Part I § 12.
3Part II, § 3.2.
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To apply the principle of causafinalis, one has - as it is advocated by Larenz -, in the first instance to
assess the balance of exchange (interests) of the individual contract, as agreed by the parties, which
determines the allocation of risk, and secondly to evaluate whether the change of circumstances has
led to a total defeat of that balance of exchange and thus to a frustration of equality in exchange. I
This is the task performed by the doctrines of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of
contract as emanations and concretisations of the underlying informing principle of causafinalis.
Since the causa finalis of a contract of exchange is equality in exchange, the individual contract must
be scrutinized to assess the elements vital to both parties which form the individual balance of
exchange on which the parties are ad idem, and the realization of which is the common purpose of
their contract. The absence or unattainability of one or more of these elements is required to result in
a situation so different from originally envisaged that the obligation changes its whole character and
the realization of the balance of exchange becomes impossible, that is frustrated.
The essence - which is, with respect to the relational nature of the contract, determined mainly by the
purpose - of an individual contract must be determined with reference to the balance of interests
typical of that class of contract. The same applies for atypical contracts, although it is more difficult
to establish the contractual purpose in the absence of a well-known contractual standard situation for
purposes of orientation.'
One has in each case to scrutinise closely the circumstances of the contract to identify the relevant
elements of the exchange and how the balance was designed by the parties. If the fundamental change
of circumstances does not affect an element which was vital for that balance, the risk remains in the
sphere of the affected party. The causa finalis or purpose of the contract must be common to all
parties in order to be binding for them. It is determined in a mixed objective-subjective approach.
Its determination depends on the one hand, and primarily, on the common intention of the parties
regarding the contract - meaning the point where their different intentions and motives met (Larenz)
and were thus brought into coherence (or assimilation).' According to Larenz, it is justified to speak
of a common purpose of the parties since they would not have concluded the contract, if their
individual purposes had not met at a certain point and insofar been objectivied." This depends of
'Part II § 3.2. at the end, Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, 331.
2The terminology of "typical" and "atypical" contracts has been introduced by Westermann and Smits, see above.
Jpart I § 12.
"Part II § 3.2.; Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 104 sqq.
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course on the evidence that can be gathered from the surrounding circumstances at the time of the
conclusion of the contract.
On the other hand the causa finalis decisively depends on the normative character of the obligation.
Whether it is still justified to speak of a just balance of interests after the change of circumstances is,
as pointed out, a normative question requiring a normative answer with reference to the principles of
good faith and commutative justice. The law is not and cannot be blind towards the purposes of the
parties. The law does not simply sanctify the will of the parties without due regard to its content - as
the will-theory sometimes seems to suppose. The law makes distinct value-judgements regarding
purposes. It favours the "good cause" - the cause that is good in the eyes of the law. Law is always
guided by - and aiming at - values. These values change but that does not make the law arbitrary. It
should be conscious about its underlying values and the continuing change in these values. That
would make the whole process more transparent and controllable. The subjective purposes of the
parties and the objective purposes of the law thus have to be brought into coherence (assimilation).'
Only then will the law sanction the agreement of the parties.
If the essential purpose of the contract is or becomes unattainable, that is, frustrated, that has
consequences for the binding character of the contract. The purpose of the contract is frustrated when
there is in actual fact no equivalence anymore between the interests of the parties; when the contract
no longer complies with the requirements of commutative justice and the disruption of equality in
exchange amounts to a frustration of purpose. The borderline is certainly difficult to draw, but it is
equally certain that a borderline has to exist beyond which the binding character of the contract must
come into question. The value-orientation of the law, its focus on justice, demands such a borderline.
As Lord Denning said in the Eugenia-case:
''It must be positively unj ust to hold the parties bound. It is often difficult to draw the
line. But it must be done."
To regard the inability of the principle of causa finalis to provide a clear-cut solution for every
individual case as a failure, would mean to miss its real significance and its nature as an informing
principle, which is in providing the contract law with a cornerstone for a coherent theory as regards its
dogmatic clarification and orientation. It explains the need to intervene into some contracts and not in
others and why, in order to attain his objectives, the promisor must be bound under some
IKaufmann, see Part I § 12.
2Smith & Thomas, 533
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circumstances and why other circumstances lie outside his commitment. For practical reasons, all
central principles often cannot be directly applied, but that alone does not question its merits. Causa
finalis as an informing principle cannot possibly provide a single clear-cut solution for all cases of
frustration of purpose, but it makes clear what the really decisive point is.
The possibilities of how a frustration may occur are endless. Similarly, the issue as to the threshold
beyond which the purpose of the contract is to be regarded as frustrated also depends on the
individual contract and the surrounding circumstances.
It has been said above that it might be possible to identify certain typical situations or typical kinds of
contracts in which there are similar patterns of how and when the contract becomes frustrated. I
Nevertheless it will never be possible to describe a general pattern for all kinds of frustration of
purpose, but it might be possible to describe sub-patterns for specific kinds of frustration of purpose,
and to lay down abstract rules for such cases. The most obvious examples are to be found 10
established rules of law or provisions of the Code which, although the concept of frustration of
purpose is not employed, nevertheless amount to manifestations of this basic phenomenon. The rules
of the Code governing impossibility afford but one example since impossibility is one of the most
obvious instances of frustration of purpose. It comprises a class of recurring cases, and can therefore
be encapsulated in abstract rules. Such instances can be called "typical" situations of frustration of
purpose. They are dealt with by the abstract rules of law or provisions of the Code.
But there will always be situations and instances of frustration of purpose that fall through the net of
"normal" or "typical" situations provided for in the Code, due to the endless possibilities of frustration
of purpose. These "atypical" cases cannot be dealt with by abstract rules of law or provisions, and
must therefore be left to judicial decision. This is confirmed by Aristotle's words about equity cited at
the beginning of this part of the thesis:
"...for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, ....
When the law speaks universally then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-
simplicity, to correct the omission ... In fact this is the reason that all things are not
determined by law, viz. that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that
a decree is needed .... the [Lesbian] rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not
rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts."
'Westermann, Smits, supra.
2Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford's World's Classics Edition, 133.
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For these cases, only the general principle can be formulated or codified in the abstract, with the
treatment of particular cases depending on the circumstances of the individual contract. These are the
situations for which the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract (at
least concerning the instances of relative and quasi-impossibility) have been developed by the
judiciary. The ultima-ratio-character of these doctrines has often been emphasized.
In both cases, the crucial criterion for the courts, be it the "Unzumutbarkeit" or the "radical difference
of the subject matter of the obligation", only states a general guideline which echoes the principle of
causafinalis. Both criteria are efforts to circumscribe when exactly there is an operative frustration of
the contractual purpose of commutative justice, the common law criterion from an objective, the civil
law criterion from a subjective point of view. In the statements of the Bundesgerichtshof and of
Larenz, this connection comes to the fore clearly:
"Bei gegenseitigen Vertragen ist in der Regel die Vorstellung von der Gleichwertigkeit
von Leistung und Gegenleistung Geschaftsgrundlage .... die Berufung auf eine Anderung
ader einen Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage [ist] nur zulassig, wenn das zur Vermeidung
eines untragbaren, mit Recht und Gerechtigkeit nicht zu vereinbarenden und damit der
betroffenen Partei nicht zumutbaren Ergebnisses unabweislich erscheint."l
"Nur solche Urnstande kannen daher als Geschaftsgrundlage in Betracht kommen, die
gerade dieses konkrete Vertragsverhaltnis betreffen, seinen Inhalt und Charakter zu
andern vermogen. Und nur solche Folgen durfen aus dem Fehlen ader Wegfall der
Geschafts-grundlage gezogen werden, die sich aus dem Sinn dieses Vertrages ergeben
ader zur Wahrung der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit in bezug auf diesen Vertrag
unerlaêlich sind. ,,2
Even though the English courts are reluctant to speak openly of equality of exchange, and emphasize
that increase of expense or hardship is not in itself a ground for frustration, it is clear from
authoritative statements that the term "radical difference of the obligation" relates to the extent of the
disruption of equality in exchange that is required and does not relate to a different category
altogether:
IBGHJZ 1978, 236.
2Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage, 166.
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"But, even so, it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the
principle of frustration into play. There must be as wel! such a change in the significance
of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from
that contracted for." 1
"Frustration of contract takes place when there supervenes an event ... which so
significantly changes the nature (not merely the expense or onerosity) of the outstanding
contractual rights and/or obligations ... that it would be unjust to hold them to the literal
sense of its stipulation in the new circumstances"
It would in any case be difficult to imagine cases in which a radical change of the nature of the
obligation would leave the equality of exchange - understood in the broad sense advocated here -
untouched.
The Radcliffe-test makes it clear that a frustration of equality of exchange can only be assumed
beyond a certain threshold, that is, when the obligation has totally changed in character through the
change of circumstances and now represents a totally different contract altogether compared to what
was originally agreed. This objective formulation can probably be regarded as more accurate and
useful for practical purposes than the notion of Unzumutbarkeit.
Both doctrines are emanations of the basic principle of causa finalis, which also influences other
areas of the law.' Both legal systems employ similar requirements (frustration of common purpose or
causafinalis) and restrictions (foreseeability, fault, express provision).
Consequently, Piet Abas, on the basis of his comparative study Rebus sic stantibus, encompassing the
law of almost all European countries on this topic, follows Larenz' teleological position, and
IDavis Contractors Ltd. Y. Fareham Urban District Council [1956] A.C. 696, per Lord Radcliffe,
2National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] AC. 675,per Lord Simon.
lWestermann denies an identity between causa finalis and Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage (Westermann, supra, pp,
123sqq,). Westermann acknowledges many parallels between the two doctrines but denies any real relationship, which seems
inconsistent to me, Of course, causa finalis and Wegfall del' Geschaftsgrundlage cannot be simply identified, but a
relationship between the two is evident and suggests itself. They are of the same essence, They are simply situated on two
different dogmatic levels and their relationship is that of principle to concretisation, Westermann's anxiety to keep the two
doctrines apart appears artificial, and is motivated by the fact that his aim is not to break new ground in the law, He only
wants to describe the situation as it is, and to integrate the causa finalis into the BGB: hence the assertion that all possible
cases of frustration of purpose have been dealt with by the provisions of the Code and that outside these provisions, an
operative frustration of purpose cannot be accepted (Westermann, supra, pp, 134,135),
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advocates a combination of the German and the English approaches. He states the following as
requirements for a successful defence based on fundamental change of circumstances:
"1. der Umstand ist nach Vertragsschlufi eingetreten;
2. das Eintreten des Umstandes ist redlicherweise nicht vorhersehbar gewesen;
3. dieser Umstand macht die Erfullung nachtraglich unzumutbar: davon ist auszugehen,
wenn die Leistung jetzt wesentlich anders ist, als die ursprunglich vereinbarte war, und
zwar in dem Sinne, daf die Erfullung einer neuen Leistung zu einem derrnaben grollen
Nachteil fiihrte, daf die Gegenleistung in keiner Weise als gleichwertig bezeichnet
werden kann;
4. der Umstand ist nicht demjenigen vorzuwerfen, der sich zu seiner Befreiung auf sie
beruft;
5. der Umstand fallt nicht in die Risikosphare desjenigen, der sich zu seiner Befreiung
darauf beruft; daf ist der Fall, wenn der U mstand die Partei persënlich angeht;
6. derjenige, der sich zu seiner Befreiung auf den Urn stand beruft, darf sich selbst nicht
im Verzug befinden.,,1
4. As to the fourth question:
No single or uniform consequence can be imposed in respect of the fourth question, namely that as
rigid legal consequence would not serve the interests of the parties, it would be too harsh. This is part
of the problem in the common law doctrine of frustration of contract.
Uniform legal consequences can only be laid down for the "typical", "normal" situations of frustration
of purpose mentioned above, as has been done by means of the provisions of the Code.' This is
possible because these typical cases of frustration of purpose have a common pattern. The atypical
cases of frustration of purpose, our cases of Wegjall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of
contract, do not reveal such common patterns, and a uniform legal consequence is accordingly
inappropriate. This is the difficulty posed by the doctrine of frustration of contract, and the main
reason for its very restricted application. German private law is in a better situation because of the
possibility to fall back on § 242 BGB to devise legal consequences which suit best the interests of the
parties and which gives judges a rather unrestricted hand to adjust the contract to the new
circumstances. This is actually most appropriate for these cases and shows again, how causa finalis
and good faith complement each other, for the adjustment of the contract follows from the nature of
'Piet Abas, Rebus sic stantibus, 1993,309, 310.
2Weslermann, supra, 108.
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the principles of causafinalis and good faith. In the cases of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, causa
finalis had been there from the outset, but has been frustrated due to change of circumstances. Causa
finalis of a contract is a just equivalence of the parties' interests, an equivalence of both parties'
advantages and disadvantages. If this equivalence is destroyed, the natural consequence is that
commutative justice demands the restoration of the equivalence, if that is possible. This is the
consequence that is of most interest to the disadvantaged party. The duty for the advantaged party to
restore, or participate in the restoration of the equivalence and thus adjust the contract to the new
circumstances, in turn follows from the principle of good faith. The duty to act according to good
faith is a natural incidence of all contracts and it demands that both parties have to do what can be
expected of them to attain the causa finalis of the contract. Th is shows that the notion of contractual
adjustment, although not very precise, is actually very appropriate. Its flexibility corresponds to the
character of the principle of causafinalis.
Both causa finalis and good faith operate on the same level - that of contractual principles. Both can
be employed by way of defence. Neither questions the validity of the contract, they relate instead to
its enforceability. The presence of a causa finalis at the formation of the contract can be presumed,
but its frustration, be it due to the fact that it has become unattainable afterwards or has been
unattainable from the very beginning, can be established as a defence. Both principles are concerned
with values, with the content of the law, as opposed to the form. They both are material principles of
the law, designed to ensure that the law stays true to the idea of the law, which is the pursuit of
justice.
On this basis, the principle of causafinalis is also perfectly reconcilable with the traditional approach
to contracts which takes the will-theory as its point of departure. The principle merely reminds us that
will cannot be treated divorced from its aim or purpose. The will of the parties will always be the
basis of a contract but the law is not and never was blind to the aim of that will. What seems to have
been sometimes forgotten in theory - though not in practice, as the cases show - is that how the
contract is treated by the law depends in fact more of the aim of the will rather than the pure empirical
fact that something has been willed with the intention of being bound.
This outline may suffice to sketch the major traits of the principle of causa finalis and its relationship
to the doctrines of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract for the purposes of this
thesis. The result corresponds to the position of Karl Larenz vis-á-vis the doctrine of Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage as laid down 111 his classic monograph Geschaftsgrundlage und
Vertragserfullung' This position is, of course, only tenable if one adopts a teleological understanding
IPart II § 3.2.
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of the concept of contract, as it is the case with Karl Larenz, Arthur Kaufmann and the adherents of
the Wertungsjurisprudenz, and not a purely systematic understanding of contract like that of Flume,
and before him Savigny.'
Many studies probably remain to be done to work out the implications of the principle of causafinalis
in all fields of private law - be it civil law or common law. The principle could thereby also serve as a
bridge between civil law and common law. James Gordley has already made a great contribution in
that respect and continues to do so. It will be interesting to see whether or not the future will bring a
higher prominence of the principle of causa finalis in legal dogmatics.
To quote Gordley once more:
"Aristotle was constantly defending his principles by pointing out that they could
explain the actions of people who acted in accordance with these principles but could
not formulate them abstractly. One can imagine him pointing to the American case law
as a vindication of his ideas of liberality and commutative justice. ,,2
This applies to the laws of the whole western hemisphere, that is, all countries which have been
influenced by Aristotle's philosophy.
'Part II § 3.1.
2Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 614.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
165
Part V: South Africa
1. Introduction
No legal system can ignore the basic problem of change of circumstances and the fundamental
questions about the law which it entails.
At a first glance, South African law does not accommodate a doctrine similar to frustration in the
common law, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in German law or clausuIa rebus sic stantibus of the
ius commune. There are judicial statements which expressly assume that the English doctrine of
frustration is not part of South African law. In Algoa Milling Co v ArkelI & Douglas, I Maasdorp JA
said:
"If we put aside for the moment the condition contained in the marginal note, then in fact,
if it is a fact, that the plaintiffs could not find available space during the month of July,
and that it was impossible for them to ship during July, will be no excuse for their failure
to ship during July. Nowhere in our law is it laid down that an impossibility arising from
changed circumstances after a contract has been entered Into would excuse a party from
performing the conditions of the contract. ... As a matter of fact none of our legal text-
books deal specifically with the effect upon a contract of an impossibility arising from
changed circumstances after a contract has been concluded. ,,2
In Beretta v Rhodesia Railways ua', Tredgold JA said:
"Two possible views have been advanced: (a) That, when one party is disabled from
performing his obligation for an unreasonably extended period, this gives the other party
the right to cancel the contract; (b) that such disability when prolonged beyond a
reasonable period has the effect of automatically terminating the contract as from the
time when the disability originated. The latter view has been accepted in England .... But
the English law on this point is complicated by the development of a somewhat artificial
doctrine described as 'frustration', a development which has no parallel in our law. A
consideration of this view reveals the artificial ity to which I have referred and further the
difficulties which it involves. It is postulated that the contract is not at once discharged.
11918AD 145,170.
2Supervening impossibility was recognized as an excuse in Peters. Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427.
319472 SA 1075 (SR) 1078, 1081.
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But after the passage of an unspecified time, which must vary greatly with the
circumstances of each contract, a situation arises which has retroactive effect and
discharges the contract as from a prior date. It is not, as Mr. Greenfield ingeniously
suggested, a case of time revealing the evidence of a prior occurrence. For the contract
continues for a period as a matter of substantive law and later, as the situation develops,
is discharged in respect of the same period. The correct method of dealing with any rights
which may have vested during this period remains an enigma. The former view presents
no such difficulties." I
The most recent and elaborate statement on this subject is to be found in Techni-Pak Sales (Pty)Ltd v
Hall, I by Colman J:
"What the plaintiff is seeking to invoke here is the English doctrine of frustration of
contracts. That is a doctrine under which further performance of a contract is excused
when something which is found to have been the basis of the transaction has fallen away
or failed to come into existence. The limitations of the doctrine and its jurisprudential
basis are somewhat obscure. That it extends to cases falling outside the ambit of the rules
relating to impossibility of performance, is clear. But what is not clear is whether it is
anything different from an application of the rules relating to implied terms. Some
eminent English Judges would answer the last question in the negative (see, e.g. the
remarks of Viscount Simon in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Limited v. Imperial
Smelting Corporation Limited, (1941) 2 All E.R. at p. 171, and the cases referred to). But
other no less eminent authorities like Lord Sumner in the Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue
Steamship Company case (1926) A.C. 507, stoutly resist that theory and hold that the
doctrine is an equitable device whereby the rules as to contracts are reconciled with a
special exception which justice demands. On the latter approach it would seem the Court
may give relief even when the requirements for the implication of a term are not
satisfied. If the Courts are to interfere on the grounds of equity alone in commercial
bargains, where does the process end? Some of the dicta seem to suggest tha. we have
here the thin end of a wedge whose exact shape and full dimensions remain undefined. A
few more taps, maybe, and the granite concept of sanctity of contract will be shattered.
But I do not think that I am called upon to pursue that interesting possibility. In our own
IWith reference to the case Schlengemann v Meyer, Bridgens & Co, Ltd 1920 ePD 494, a parallel case which could suggest
the application of the doctrine of frustration in South African law, he argued: "Only English cases were quoted in the
judgement and the differences between our own law and the English law in regard to impossibility of performance ... were
given no account."
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Courts the doctrine of frustration has upon occasion been referred to by that name, but it
is not clear to me that it has ever been applied to a situation which was not covered also
by one or other of our more familiar rules relating to implied terms or impossibility of
performance. Counsel have not been able to refer me to any case in which one of our
Courts has assumed the type of broad equitable jurisdiction which the Courts of England
are said to have in respect of frustration."
It should be noted that in all these cases, the rejection of the doctrine of frustration was not the
decisive reasoning on which the judgement rested.'
'1
The dicta in the cases cited above reflect the difficulties with which the English doctrine of frustration
had to grapple, especially the discussion around its juridical basis. They also voice the fundamental
concern that is always connected with the doctrine: sanctity of contracts and legal certainty.
Yet it is submitted that these dicta only serve to obscure the matter. A closer look at the relevant cases
reveals that once again the distinctive hybrid of common and civil law that is the South African law'
proves to be more complex and multi-faceted than it appears to be at the surface. I would like to argue
that the doctrine of frustration has - in a typically South African way - become part and parcel of the
South African law regarding supervening impossibility.
In § 2 below, selected cases relating to the areas of supervening impossibility, supposition, implied
terms and common error are analysed from the perspective which has been developed in the earlier
parts of this thesis, in order to demonstrate that the formal position on frustration apparent from the
dicta cited above present an inaccurate picture, and furthermore investigate whether there might even
be support in South African case law for the submission that the principle of causa finalis is the
decisive criterion in cases of fundamental change of circumstances.
2. Fundamental change of circumstances and frustration of purpose in South African law
2.1. Supervening impossibility and supposition
11968 3 238 (W).
2Beretta v Rhodesia Railways Ltd, supra, 1081; Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall, supra, 239.
3Zimmermann and Visser "Introduction > South African law as a mixed legal system" in: Zimmerman and Visser (eds)
Southern Cross (1996) 1 seqq,
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A particularly illustrative case concerrnng the relation of both superverung impossibility and
supposition to the topic of frustration of purpose is Kok v Osborne.'
The facts were the following: The plaintiff sought a declaratory order that she was entitled to the
receipt of the purchase price (R 47000) of a plot allegedly sold to her by the first defendant. The
seller, at the time the registered owner of the plot, had in May 1991 entered into a written agreement
with one Hobson-Jones in terms of which he had sold it to the latter for R 47000. The agreement had
stipulated that the purchase price had been paid in full on the date of the sale. In fact, Hobson-Jones
had given the seller three post-dated cheques in payment. In the meantime the plaintiff, who had lent
Hobson-Jones certain moneys for which he had given her a post-dated cheque that had bounced,
found out about the purchase and insisted that, failing immediate repayment of the loan, she be
substituted as purchaser of the land. Hobson-Jones proceeded to tell the seller that he, Hobson-Jones,
had purchased the plot together with the plaintiff in a joint venture and that they intended developing
it together and sharing the proceeds. The agreement was to be concluded in the plaintiffs name but
the payment (by the three post-dated cheques) was to stand. The seller did not object: as far as he was
concerned he was now contracting with Hobson-Jones and plaintiff as participants in a joint venture
using plaintiffs name. The original deed of sale was cancelled and a fresh one prepared and signed by
all three parties. The new agreement provided that the purchase price had already been paid 'in cash'.
In reality the Joint venture' was a fabrication of Hobson-Jones, but the seller believed what he had
told him. The plaintiff believed Hobson-Jones when he told her the purchase price had been paid in
cash in full. A few days after the signature of the new agreement, Hobson-Jones told the seller that the
joint venture between himself and the plaintiff had fallen through, and that there were therefore no
funds to meet the cheques, and the seller agreed not to present the cheques and to cancel the sale. The
plaintiff knew nothing about this. The seller subsequently resold the plot to the second defendant.
When the plaintiff heard about this she obtained an interim interdict to prevent transfer pending the
outcome of the instant action. The plaintiff relied on the prior sale to her and argued that she was not
bound by Hobson-Jones' purported cancellation of the sale to her, because he had not been authorised
to cancel it on her behalf. The main defence raised by the seller was that the agreement was invalid
for lack of consensus because of fundamental mistake relating to the identity of the party or parties
with whom he was contracting.
The court held that the defendant was entitled to retain the proceeds of the sale and based the decision
on two grounds: first, that the contract was void for mistake and, secondly, that the contract between
the litigants hinged on the assumption that Hobson-Jones had indeed paid the defendant, which in fact
never came to pass, and that the contract thus failed due to supervening impossibility of performance.
11993 4 SA 788 (SECLO).
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The reasoning of the court, given per Jones J, regarding the second ground of the decision, serves as
a thorough statement on the subject to what extent the doctrine of frustration is in line with - and in
fact part of - South African law.' The judge first established from the facts of the case that the
payment to Osborne by Hobson-Jones was the fundamental reason for entering into the contract for
both Mrs. Kok and Osborne. To Mrs. Kok, the money paid to Osborne should originally have been
used to repay her and although she did not want the property, her substitution as purchaser was the
only safe way of getting some of her money back. Osborne, on the other hand, only agreed to the
substitution in order to make sure that Hobson-Jones' cheques would be met:
"In the light of the above, the issue can simply and conveniently be resolved by applying
the rule in Peters, Flamman and Co v. Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427 and African
Realty Trust v. Holmes 1922 AD 389. The rule is variously stated. Indeed, it is the
subject of different approaches by writers on the law of contracts, most of whom warn
against the danger of undue reliance on the principles of the English doctrine of
frustration. I prefer the formulation of the rule by Kerr The Principles of the Law of
Contract 4th ed at 403. It is precisely and appropriately worded. The author puts it as
follows:
'The basic rule is that if during the currency of a contract the conditions necessary for its
operation cease to exist, the change not being due to the fault of either party or to a factor
for which either party bears the risk, the contract ceases to exist.'
Usually, vis major or some other supervening physical or legal act occurs which makes
the contract impossible of performance and brings it to an end, such as destruction of the
subject matter of a sale, or the outbreak of war, or an Act of Parliament prohibiting
conduct which was formerly permissible. But this is not always the case. Literal
impossibility is not a prerequisite. The law recognises that the realities of the world of
business demand that provision be made for a situation where unforeseen contingencies
prevent the attainment of the commercial purpose which the parties had in mind when
they contracted. That, too, can amount to legal impossibility."
Jones J then proceeds to review the authorities for support of his judgement. He relies on South
African cases which, in dealing with impossibility of performance, cite with approval typical English
frustration cases.' In African Realty Trust v Holmes,' De Villiers AJA had referred to the Coronation
lAt 80ID-805A.
2Kok v Osborne, supra, 80lJ-802E.
1Kok v Osborne, supra, 802E-804G.
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Cases as being in accord with South African law. In Bischojberger v Van Eyk,l Boshoff JP cites the
decisive passage from the English case of Morgan v Manser3 with approval, saying that although
worded differently, it does not seem to be at variance with South African law. The same applies to
Rossouw v Haumann.' where Herbstein J cites Lord Sumner in the Hirji Mulji cases with approval.
Jones J also refers to Williams v Evans.' where the term basis of the contract was employed in relation
to common supposition, and to Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staallndustriele
Korporasie Bpk.' He concludes:
"I am of the view that these authorities support the conclusion that the rule of Peters,
Flamman and Co v. Kokstad Municipality and African Realty Trust v. Holmes is
applicable to the situation which arises in this case. The common object of the parties is
frustrated because Hobson-Jones fraudulently induced Osborne not to present the
cheques. Further, on the evidence of Mrs. Opperman, the cheques would not have been
met even if they had been presented. The basis of the agreement, namely payment by
Hobson-Jones, has accordingly failed and therefore the contract fails. Whether the parties
had in mind the substitution of only one buyer or two joint buyers for the original buyers
in a valid and binding contract of sale, their object fails completely because the common
supposition or assumption of payment fails. The result is an entirely different contract
from that intended by the parties."
The decision in Kok v Osborne was criticised by Pretorius and Floyd9 for following Kerr's exposition
of the law while the majority of South African writers maintain that commercial impossibility or
frustration of the common purpose is not part of South African law.lo They also reproach Jones J for
equating the instances of a contractual assumption or supposition with supervening impossibility of
performance. While they concede that the courts have indeed dealt with assumptions under the mantle
of supervening impossibility in cases such as Bischojberger v Van Eyk and Rossouw v Haumann, they
11922 AD 389, 400.
219812 SA 607 (W) 610H-611H.
3[1947]2 All ER 666,670.
41949 4 SA 796 (C) 799, 800.
sHir)i Mulji and others v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd 1926 AC 497,507.
61978 1 SA 1170 (C).
719872 SA 932 (A).
sKok v Osborne, supra, 804H-J.
9Pretorius and Floyd, "Mistake and Supervening Impossibility of Performance" 1994 THRHR 325 328-329.
IOThe authors refer to Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases materials and commentary 1988, 773-774;
Christie, The law of Contract in South Africa (1991) 563-565; Ramsden Supervening impossibility of performance in the
South African law of contract (1985) 68-75.
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insist that this was incorrect because of the different legal consequences (voidness ab initio as
opposed to extinction ex nunc). The court should for that reason have restricted itself to the concept of
supposition. The authors concede that the concept of supposition, especially when relating to the
future as in the two cases mentioned, is unclear in South African law.
The argument that supervening impossibility and supposition should not be confounded because their
legal consequences differ, does not go very far. Common supposition is largely congruent with
common error.' Jones's J equation of supervening impossibility (as he understands it) with supposition
only reiterates the perception of the close analogy between cases of common error and cases of
frustration of contract that has gained ground in England, which has lead Atiyah to deal with both
kinds of cases side by side in one category in his Introduction of the Law of Contract/ The close
relation between common error, assumption and the identical test to be employed in cases of common
error and frustration - which is evidence of the same underlying principle - is best illustrated by the
famous case Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. 1932 AC 161, where Lord Atkin said:
"Sir John Simon formulated for the assistance of your Lordships a proposition which
should be recorded: 'Whenever it is to be inferred from the terms of the contract or its
surrounding circumstances that the consensus has been reached upon the basis of a
particular contractual assumption, and that assumption is not true, the contract is
avoided: that is, it is void ab initio if the assumption is of present fact and it ceases to
bind [ex nunc] if the assumption is of future fact.' I think few would demur to this
statement, but its value depends upon the meaning of 'a contractual assumption,' and also
upon the true meaning to be attached to 'basis,' a metaphor which may mislead .... We
therefore get a common standard for mutual mistake and implied conditions whether as
to existing or as to future facts. Does the state of the new facts destroy the identity of the
subject matter as it was in the original state of facts? To apply the principle to the infinite
combinations of facts that arise in actual experience will continue to be difficult, but if
this case results in establishing order into what has been a somewhat confused and
difficult branch of the law it will have served a useful purpose.t"
'Van der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe, Lotz; Contract - General Principles (1993) 203, note 209; De Wet &
Van Wyk Kontraktereg, 5th ed (1992), 27-28, 155; Hoffmann 1935 SALJ 432-434; Bamford 1955 SALJ 289-294; Palley
1961 RNLJ 196, 201-203; Hunt 1964 SALJ 153, 156; see also De Groot De jure belli ac pacis 2 II 6.
2Atiyah, Introduction of the Law of Contract, 5th ed (1995) Chapter 12 §§ 2 and 3.
lSmith & Thomas, A Casebook on Contract, 9th ed. (1992) 490-494.
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The two legal consequences can be reconciled under the same principle: Frustration of purpose is
there from the beginning in cases of common error or supposition and thus the contract is discharged
ab initio, or the contract is discharged from the moment of supervening frustration of purpose.
The use of the term "commercial impossibility" is misleading and not helpful because it tries to retain
the concept of impossibility while trying to relativise it. In reality, impossibility - and especially
commercial impossibility - is only the most obvious case of the underlying principle of frustration of
purpose, the need for a kind of "commercial impossibility" only demonstrates this fact.
As to the question whether there can be no supposition in futuro, I cannot see any logical or other
compelling reason for why a supposition should be possible regarding past or present but not the
future. I The case of Bell v. Lever Brothers, above, also suggests that there is no decisive difference.
The decisive reason for the efforts to avoid a supposition in futuro are made clear by Christie:2
"Attempts were made to resurrect [Williams v. Evans], but it is better left dead. If
litigants are obliged to plead, as Sonarep and Hare's Briekfields oblige them, that their
contract contained a tacit term or was subject to a tacit suspensive or resolutive condition
we know where we are because those concepts are well known to the law. But if they are
allowed to plead, as Williams v. Evans would allow them, that their contract was entered
into on the basis of a common assumption as to a future state of affairs we do not know
where we are. The limits of the concept would have to be defined. If they turned out to be
the same as the limits of a tacit condition the whole exercise would have been an
expensive waste of time. If they turned out to be different, the difference would have to
be justified, and no such justification is apparent."
IDe Wet & VanWyk, Kontraktereg, 156 deny the viability of a supposition in futuro, and so does Christie, Contract, 400-
40 I. De Vas Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (1987) 11-12, and 1976 TSAR 82, Kerr 1987 SAU 550
and Van der Merwe & Van Huyssteen 1985 THRHR 469, on the other hand, are of the view that it is possible. In Williams v.
Evans 1978 I SA 1170 (C) 1174-1175 it was accepted that a supposition in futuro is of the same nature as a supposition
about the past or present, while in Osman v. Standard Bank National Credit Corporation Ltd 19852 SA 378 (C) 386 the
court, citing Williams v. Evans, remarked that 'if a contract is entered into on the basis of a common assumption as to a past,
present or future state of affairs, and that assumption turns out to be unfounded, the contract will be void'. The court,
however, did not specifically consider the viability of a supposition in futuro. In Sonarep SA (Pty) Ltd v. Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd
1981 I SA 889 (N) 901-902 the court apparently took the view that a supposition in futuro could not occur, and in Hare's
Briekfields Ltd v. Cape Town City Council 1985 I SA 769 (C) the court expressly held that Williams v. Evans was wrong in
apparently accepting that a supposition in futuro could result in 'failure' of the contract 'if the supposition fails'. For a
criticism of that decision see Van der Merwe & Van Huyssteen 1985 THRHR 469, with whom I respectfully agree.
2Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa, 3 ed (1996) 369.
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This kind of legal conservatism is not the most forceful of arguments. It correctly points to the
difficulties and irritations in the broad field of the interrelated concepts of tacit and implied terms,
conditions, suppositions and irrelevant motives, reminiscent of the criticism against Windscheid's
Voraussetzungslehre' A complex field indeed. But that makes it all the more necessary to closely
investigate this area of the law. On the basis of what has been worked out in the earlier parts of this
thesis, the solution appears to lie not in the identification of more and more kinds of contractual terms
and mental reservations which have to be imputed into the parties' minds and from there into the
contract, but in a more objective approach under consideration of the teleological nature of the
contract as advocated by Larenz or Kerr in South Africa. Such an approach can be based on more
general norms such as public policy and good faith.i Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen incline in
this direction when they observe that in the case of assumption or supposition - as opposed to the case
of a condition - the reason for the failure of the contract is not so much an awareness of an
uncertainty surrounding particular facts but rather the high degree of certainty in the minds of the
parties about the factual basis of their contract.' Consequently, the general criticism vis-a-vis implied
terms applies: if the parties never doubted the correctness of their assumption, it cannot be inferred
that the parties intended to provide for the case that the assumption was wrong, lest such a tacit term
is actually based on objective considerations which go beyond actual consensus." This is the direction
which has to be pursued and which is advocated in this thesis.
Lubbe and Murray argue against Kok v Osborne that the instance of frustration of purpose goes
beyond the limits of the South African doctrine of impossibility of performance which requires some
performance under the contract becoming impossible.' This view is shared by Christie, opting for
sanctity of contracts to prevail over an unforeseen change of circumstances." These authors contend
that the dictum of De Villiers JA in African Realty Trust v. Holmes provides little support for Kerr's
position as approved by Jones Lin Kok v. Osborne, since the judge himself had stressed that
ISee above Part II § 1.1.
2Van der Merwe et al, Contract p. 387, note 183; Van der Merwe & Van Huyssteen, 1990 Stell LR 244; Lubbe and Murray,
Contract, 773-774.
lSchalk van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, "Hare's Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town City Council 1985 1 SA 769 (C)" 1985
THRHR 469 471.
"Van der Merwe et al, Contract, 203 note 210.
sLubbe and Murray, Contract, 773, relying on MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 1924 AD
573. Yet in this case Solomon JA approved of the doctrine of frustration of contract as expounded by Lord Loreburn in
Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-American Petroleum Co and frustration of purpose was denied on the ground that the transaction was
of a speculative character, which is one of the classic limitations of the doctrine, MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg
Consolidated Investment Co Ltd, supra, 603 607. The case is cited below in §2.4 in "Cases illustrative of the general
limitations".
6Christie, Contract, 465.
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"we are after all not concerned with the motives which actuated the parties in entering
into the contract, except in so far as they were expressly made part and parcel of the
contract or are part of the contract by clear implication.:"
It is correct that De Villiers lA's statements in African Realty Trust were obiter since the decision
finally rested on an express term of the contract in question. Yet, it is submitted that the Judge would
not have gone at such length on the matter if he had not regarded this approach as a possible solution
had the contract contained no provision for the problem in question. If these dicta are of no authority
because they were made obiter, they are at least evidence that such an approach would not be
untenable in South African law. The statement cited above merely concerns the crucial distinction
between the common contractual purpose as understood by the doctrine of causafinalis and a legally
irrelevant motive, and does not constitute an argument against the idea of frustration of purpose.
It is interesting in this respect to note the dissenting judgement of Solomon JA, whose approach tends
into the same direction as De Villiers' JA obiter dicta:
"In my epimen the real question to be determined is whether the substitution of a
concrete for a rock-fill dam is an alteration of the works within the meaning of the
agreement, as was found by the learned Judge-President. And the conclusion to which I
have come is that it is not, and that for two reasons. The first is, that the construction of
Lewis' concrete dam is something entirely different ... And the second is, that even if the
substitution of the one for the other can be regarded as an alteration, it is not such an
alteration as was intended in the agreement between the parties.:"
"I am not concerned to enquire whether the irrigation board was justified in abandoning
Kanthaek's dam and substituting Lewis'. Granted that they were right in doing so on the
ground that the former would not have been safe, the fact remains that the contract
between the parties makes no provision for such a substitution. The whole basis,
therefore, of the agreement falls away, and the result is that the agreement itself lapses
and is of no effect. ,,3
'A: 402,403.
2At 409, my italics.
JAt 410, my italics.
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"But I cannot conceive that they ever contemplated an alteration of so radical a nature as
to double the original estimate of the cost."!
Here again, the crucial elements of frustration of purpose return. What was later to become Lord
Radcliffe's frustration-test is employed and is linked to the idea of equality in exchange.
The African Realty Trust case is in any event not the only case from which support for Kerr's and
Jones' J position can be drawn, and in which the decision of Krell v. Henri and other typical English
frustration cases are cited with approval.
First of all, it should be noted that Peters, Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality only stated the
general principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio without elaborating on the details thereof. Solomon
ACJ observed that the English law and the Civil law are different on this subject, but did not declare
the English law as being generally misleading in this respect. In fact, he found
"that although the English law looks at the subject from a different point of view from
ours, in the result the difference between the two systems is not very great. ,,3
Thus it was only stated that the law of the two systems was not the same on the subject, but the way
was still open to look to English cases for guidance when the implications of the doctrine of
impossibility were not evident. The case of Krell v Henry had already been cited with approval and
decided upon by Bristowe J in Witwatersrand Township Estate and Finance Corporation Ltd v Rand
Water Board.4 One year after Peters, Flamman and Co., the influence of English decisions on
frustration of purpose on the doctrine of impossibility is again apparent in Schlengemann v Meyer,
Bridgens & Co ua: Meyer, Bridgens and Schlengernann had formed a company and each acted as
Managing Director. When war broke out with the German Empire, Schlengemann was interned as an
enemy subject in 1915. After his release in 1919 he sued for reinstatement as Managing Director.
Gardiner Jobserved:
"The difficulty which arises is in finding what is impossibility of performance and what
is suspension of performance. No authorities have been cited on our law to show how
this distinction is to be drawn. The English cases and principles, it seems to me, must
lAt 411.
2[1903]2 KB 740.
JAt 437.
41907 TS 241.
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apply to this matter, for they are principles not specially applicable to English law, but
principles which must be at the root of any contract. I would refer to the remarks of
Earl Loreburn in the case of F A Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd v Anglo-Mexican
Petroleum Products Co Ltd (115 L.T., 31). He says:
'A Court can and ought to examine the contract and circumstances in which it was
made, not, of course, to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether or not from
the nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on thefooting that a particular
thing or state of things would continue to exist. And if they must have done so, then a
term to that effect will be implied, though it need not be expressed in the contract. In
applying this rule it is manifest that such a term can rarely be implied except where the
discontinuance is such as to upset altogether the purpose of the contract. Some delay
and some change is very commori in all human affairs, and it cannot be supposed that
any bargain has been made in the tacit condition that such a thing will not happen in
any degree.?"
In applying the reasoning of the cited frustration case to the facts of the case at hand, Gardiner J
concluded:
"That shows that the absence of Mr. Schlengemann necessitated or caused a radical
change in the carrying on of the business of the company. It seems to me that the contract
was made on the footing that he should give his continuous personal service to the
company. When he was interned the possibility of continuous service had gone. The
possibility of any service within a reasonable time had also gone. ,,3
Again, it is apparent that the notion of impossibility was stretched beyond its strict sense, on account
of the court's conscious investigation whether the contractual purpose had been frustrated along the
lines of what was later to become the test for frustration.
In Benjamin v Myers' Herbstein Al employed Lord Sumner's statement about frustration in Hirji
Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co,s but held that the case at hand was one of self-induced frustration.
'1920 CPO 500 at 503.
2Schlengemann v Meyers, Bridgens & Co Ltd, supra 501, my italics.
3Schlengemann v Meyers, Bridgens & Co Ltd, supra 503, my italics.
41946 CPO 662 663.
51926 AC 497 507.
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He confirmed his approval of Lord Sumner's exposition of the law in Rossouw v Haumann, I cited by
Jones J in Kok v Osborne:
"If then this agreement has become impossible of performance, what are the
consequences? These have been stated by Lord Sumner in the case of Hirji Mulji and
Others v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd 1926 AC 497 at 507 in these words:
'An event occurs, not contemplated by the parties and therefore not expressly dealt with
in their contract, which, when it happens, frustrates their object. Evidently it is their
common object that has to be frustrated, not merely the individual advantage which one
party or the other might have gained from the contract. If so, what the law provides must
be a common relief from this common disappointment and an immediate termination of
the obligations as regards future performance. This is necessary, because otherwise the
parties would be bound to a contract, which is one that they did not really make. If it
were not so, a doctrine designed to avert unintended burdens would operate to enable one
party to profit by the event and to hold the other, if he so chose, to a new obligation.'
This was followed in Benjamin v. Meyers 1946 CPO 655."
Jones J had also cited Bischofberger v Van Eyk, where Boshoff J had approved the frustration
principle, citing another typical English frustration case.i
"On this latter point the position is stated differently in English law but it does not seem
to be at variance with the position in our law. It is stated as follows:
'If there is an event or change of circumstances which is so fundamental as to be regarded
by the law as striking at the root of the contract as a whole and beyond what was
contemplated by the parties and such that to hold the parties to the contract would be to
bind them to something to which they would not have agreed had they contemplated that
event or those circumstances, the contract is frustrated by that event immediately and
irrespective of the volition or the intention or the knowledge of the parties as to the
particular event, and even though they have continued for a time to treat the contract as
still subsisting:' Morgan v.Mauser [1947] 2 All ER 666 at 670.
On the facts of the instant case the parties contracted on the basis that the money in
respect of the sale of the Hyperfin Ltd properties was available to the respondent and
would be ceded to the applicant within a reasonable time. When that sale fell through and
the guarantee was withdrawn there was a change of circumstances which was within the
119494 SA 796 (C) 799.
21981 2 SA 607 (W) 611.
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contemplation of neither the applicant nor the respondent which made performance In
terms of the agreement impossible.
In the circumstances the obligations under the agreement fell away and the agreement
ceased to exist."
All these cases bear witness to the fact that the English doctrine of frustration of contract is in the
process of infiltrating South African law on account of its being approved and applied by some South
African courts under the mantle of the doctrine of impossibility. Because, however, impossibility of
performance is only the most obvious manifestation of the broader notion of frustration, and in view
of the fact that the distinction between absolute, relative and quasi-impossibility is always difficult, if
not impossible to draw precisely, this process can be expected to continue.
Jones J in Kok v. Osborne also pointed to another line of cases classified as supervening impossibility,
where frustration of purpose has been dealt with without reference to English frustration cases. These
cases deal with the frustration of the purpose for which an item was let, which, as is apparent from the
discussion of the German and English cases, represents a typical instance for the application of the
frustration doctrine.' It has been stressed that the principle laid down in these cases is not a special
rule only applicable to leases, but that these cases are only illustrations of the general principle
applicable in instances of supervening impossibility of perforrnance.i
The first case is Kopelowitz v. Hansen, Schrader & Co.3 The defendants were, on the outbreak of the
Boer War, the assignees of a lease which expired on the 30th of June, 1901. The lease was in respect
of certain premises in Johannesburg, which were let for the purpose of being sub-let as bars, shops,
bedrooms, and offices. It was proved that the defendants remained in possession for the whole period;
that when the war threatened the defendant's sub-tenants, who were practically all British subjects,
left the country, and that the Government of the South African Republic closed all bars.
The court held that the defendants were, as to the bar, entitled to a total remission of rent for the
period during which it was closed by order of the Government; and that as to the bedrooms, shops,
and offices, they were entitled to a total remission of rent in respect of the period during which they
were, owing to the departure of tenants, unable to sub-let their apartments. Although the effect of the
war as vis maior or an act of state was only indirect this was considered sufficient to constitute
ISee above Part II § 4.1.2.2., Part III § 3.1.2.
2Kope/owitz v. Hansen, Schrader & Co. 1903 TH 143, 144; Bayley v. Harwood 1954 3 SA 498 (A) at 505; Ramsden,
Supervening impossibility of performance in the South African law of contract, 1985, 71.
31903 TH 143, 144.
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impossibility of performance if the purpose to sub-let the premises was nearly totally frustrated (the
possibility of letting to Afrikaners seems, apparently, not to have been taken into account).
In his judgement, Mason J relied on the authority of French civilian writers, namely Pothier and
Troplong:
"In a later section (234) Troplong [Droits civils, Louage] refers to another aspect of the
same matter, namely, where the act of vis major, while leaving untouched the property
hired, destroys or very materially affects the objects or purpose for which the premises
are used. If these objects or purposes, he says, were selected by the lessee, then no
remission of rent is claimable; but if the purposes for which the premises were destined
are contemplated between the parties, and formed the determining element in the contract
of lease, then the tenant is entitled to relief. ... The law which is referred to by these
authorities appears in the writings of many commentators, and has been accepted in many
cases decided under our system of jurisprudence."]
These dicta emphasize that the contractual purpose must be common to the parties in order to qualify
for remedy.
In the case of Bayley v. Harwood.' cited by Kerr in support for his treatment of the topic,' there was
again no real impossibility, because the leased premise could have been used for the contemplated
purpose under a certain condition, imposed by legislation, which the court considered as unreasonable
(unconscionable or unzumutbar) for the affected party under the circumstances.
In April 1950, the appellant had leased from the respondent; from 1 May 1950 to 31 December 1951,
certain premises which the lessor had been using as a health and pleasure resort and which the lessees
contemplated using for the same purpose. The lessor undertook to transfer all trading licenses held by
him in respect of the premises and the lessee undertook to retransfer them at the expiration of the
lease. In February 1951, the licensing board had refused the lessee's application for licenses for that
year unless certain substantial structural alterations and additions, as required by the Peri-Urban Areas
Health Board in terms of its bye-laws promulgated in February 1951, were made. As the lessor had
refused to carry these out, the lessee vacated the premises tendering rent up to the date of vacation.
Schreiner JA held:
'Kopelowitz v Hansen, Schrader & Co, supra, 143, my italics.
21954 3 SA 498 (A).
lKerr, supra, 225, 491.
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"In the present case the change in the law created a barrier to beneficial enjoyment which
was direct and immediate, though it was not irremediable. The use of the premises for the
purpose for which it was let was wholly prohibited unless something was done to correct
the position. In such a case it seems clear that one must look at the thing that has to be
done to avoid the effect of the prohibition, and at the provisions of the lease. If the lessee
is under obligation to do what is required cadit quaestio. If it is something that he is not
obliged to do but which he could reasonably be expected to do I assume that the same
result would follow, namely, that no remission could be claimed. For then it could,
perhaps, be said that the loss of enjoyment was occasioned by the lessee's own fault ....
The lessee could, on this view, reasonably be expected, I think, to incur some increased
expenditure in respect of the use of the premises occasioned by new legislation. Increases
in licence fees and the cost of newly required medical inspections, at least if not
disproportionate to the ordinary benefits from the lease, would presumably not entitle
the lessee to remission. But, if what has tb be done to ward off the prohibitory effect of
the change in the law is something that the lessee could not reasonably be expected to do,
there seems to me to be no principle upon which it can be held that he has no right of
remission."}
This statement illustrates particularly well the fact that there is always a threshold beyond which
commutative justice, the contractual equivalence, is totally destroyed so that, in consequence, the
causa finalis of the contract is frustrated. Schreiner JA speaks of "unreasonableness" where the
German doctrine would speak of Unzumutbarkeit.
In Kok v Osborne, 2 Jones J had also referred to Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en
Staallndustriele Korporasie Bpk.3 Although the case was decided on the basis of a material breach of
contract which justified cancellation, Botha JA, with whom the other judges concurred, based his
approach on an analogy to the situation in which the commodus usus is frustrated by vis major or
casus fortuitus.
In terms of a contract of lease between the respondent as landlord and the appellant as tenant, the
respondent leased certain land to the appellant for a period of 20 years. A hotel had been erected on
the leased land by a previous tenant. In the lease the leased premises were described as a 'hotel site'
'At 507, my italics.
2Kok v Osborne, supra, 804B.
J 19872 SA 932 (A).
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and a portion of the rental consisted of a small percentage of the gross proceeds of the liquor sales of
the hotel. The respondent conducted certain mining operations in the surrounding district and, in order
to ensure that hotel accommodation of a high standard was available for visiting officials, the
respondent included in the lease certain provisions obliging the appellant to conduct its business
according to certain high standards. The hotel was situated next to the national road between
Kuruman and Upington and, because of its situation, attracted considerable custom. About six to
seven years after the conclusion of the lease, the respondent decided to extend its mining operations in
the district which necessitated the diversion of the route of the national road. The Provincial
Administration granted the respondent's application for the diversion of the national road and eight
years after the conclusion of the lease the diversion of the road was completed. As a result of the
diversion of the national road the appellant's hotel attracted much less custom than previously with the
result that the appellant's profits declined and the hotel business was eventually conducted at a loss.
The hotel was closed down about eleven years after the conclusion of the lease. The appellant
instituted an action against the respondent for payment of damages for breach of contract. The court
held that the respondent had leased the premises to the appellant with the specific object of enabling
the appellant to conduct a hotel business thereon and make a profit from it. It held further that
although the diversion of the national road, procured by the respondent, had no direct physical effect
on the leased premises, nevertheless indirectly hampered the appellant's commodus usus by restricting
the flow of custom to the hotel, and that the hotel premises after the closure of the road were no
longer the same as they were at the commencement of the lease:'
"Inderdaad kan die inhoud en omvang van 'n huurder se commodus usus in enige gegewe
geval nie bepaal word anders as met verwysing na die doel waarvoor die saak verhuur is
ingevolge die huurkontrak nie. In ons regspraak word die begrip commodus usus ook
vasgekoppel aan die doel waarvoor die huursaak verhuur is (... vglook Bayley v.
Harwood (supra op 502-3)). Dit is eintlik 'n vanselfsprekende gedagte, maar een wat van
belang is in die huidige saak."
Botha JA cites Pothier's treatise Letting and Hiring, paragraph 152, where he - most appropriately -
gives the example of a hotel along a road which was closed. This text had already been cited in
Kopelowitz v. Hansen, Schrader & Co. at p. 142. The learned judge continues:
"Pothier tref hier 'n onderskeid tussen die gebruik van die gebou as sodanig, en die
voordelige benutting daarvan vir die doel waarvoor dit gehuur is, nl om te gebruik as 'n
ISishen Hotel v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staal, supra, 953A 954CF.
2At 952H.
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herberg. Die teenstelling is treffend, met die oog op die betoog namens die respondent in
die huidige saak, soos vroeër aangedui, dat die appellant na die sluiting van die pad nog
steeds die vrye en ongesteurde gebruik van die hotelperseel self gehad het, dat die
ingange tot die hotelperseel dieselfde gebly het en dat die hotelbesigheid nog voortgesit
kon word. Dit lyk amper asof Pothier se teks spesifiek ontwerp was om 'n pertinente
antwoord op hierdie betoog te verskaf."!
But the judge equally emphasizes that the crossing of a certain threshold is required:
"Uit die gevalle wat ek vroeër by wyse van voorbeeld uit Voet aangehaal het, blyk dit dat
die huurder slegs in vry drastiese omstandighede die reg gegun word om die huurperseel
te ontruim en aanspraak te maak op 'n kwytskelding van die huurgeld.:"
This decision again may be taken as evidence that impossibility is not understood in the strict sense
since this case was only concerned with the diminution of profits.' It is clear that commutative justice,
or contractual equivalence is the crucial issue. In the final analysis, Botha lA's statements bear out
that the common contractual purpose is of the essence of the parties' contractual duties (in this case
the lessor's duty to give beneficial use and occupation) and that this purpose can be frustrated when
the subject matter of the obligation cannot be regarded as being the same any more - which means that
the same test as in the English frustration cases is employed. Kerr comments on this case:"
"It follows that the Sishen Hotel case needs to be considered whenever impossibility of
performance is in issue. It provides a good illustration of the point that 'impossibility of
performance' is a misnomer - what the principle is concerned with is a change in
circumstances of such an extent that performance is either impossible or is possible but
the circumstances are so different from those in which the contract was intended to
operate that the performance which is possible is vitally different from what should
reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties."
ISishen Hotel v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staal, supra, 955B.
2 At 958B.
lThis is pointed out by Kerr, "Impairment of profitability of premises let; implied contractual provisions; standing of Pothier"
1987 SALJ 550.
4Kerr 1987 SALJ 552, my italics.
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Before closing the section on supervening impossibility, Ramsden's position should be mentioned. I
Ramsden proposes a flexible concept of impossibility that would permit a solution of the problem of
frustration by recourse to the ordinary rules of interpretation:
"One must scrutinize the contract entered into between the parties to ascertain exactly
what was promised, and if it has become impossible then the rules of supervening
impossibility apply. Hence in the so-called 'Coronation' cases in England what was
promised was not a room, but in fact a vantage point from which the coronation
procession could be viewed. When that became impossible of fulfilment, the contract
was at an end ....
It might not be necessary to imply a term in any contract in order to find that it has been
terminated by supervening impossibility of performance if one were only to look at
precisely what was promised by each party to the other. By this I do not mean that a term
may not be implied in an appropriate case, provided that the implication of such a term
follows the ordinary rules of interpretation of contract and does not become instead a
legal fiction, as it would if the approach of the 'Coronation' cases or the approach of
Windscheid is adopted in our law.:"
Ramsden's position vis-a-vis the English doctrine of frustration and the whole problem of change of
circumstances is entirely determined by his rejection of the implied-term approach. This view appears
to be somewhat narrow since the implied-term approach is in the process of being abandoned in
England in view of the persuasive restatement of the basis of the doctrine of frustration in Davis
Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council? The argument that the problem of change of
circumstances is merely a matter of interpretation, has been dealt with in the discussion of Larenz'
position and the section on causa finalis.' While interpretation is intimately involved in this issue, it
represents only the starting point, and not the complete answer to the search for solutions in this area.
Ramsden's statements also reveal the dilemma which arises from the failure to recognise that
impossibility is only the most obvious manifestation of frustration of purpose or causa finalis: the
notion of impossibility becomes increasingly indefinite because its limits are difficult, if not
impossible to draw, so that it in the end becomes a purely normative aspect of a more or less fictitious
character:
'Ramsden, Supervening impossibility of performance in the South African law of contract, 1985.
2Ramsden, supra, 72 73.
3Part III § 1.1.2.5.
4Part II § 3.2., Part IV.
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"I have already considered (a) above and put forward the view that our law does not
allow undue hardship to be used as excuse for non-performance of a contractual
obligation which it is not absolutely impossible to perform; though, in considering
whether performance is absolutely impossible, regard may be had to the contract read in
the light of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether what is required could
properly be said to fal! within the ambit of the contract." I
It is, however, inconsistent to speak of absolute impossibility with such a proviso. With the approach
of Ramsden, the notion of impossibility becomes as fictitious as the implied-term approach which he
criticises precisely on this score.
2.2. Implied terms
In M Leviseur & Co v Friedman2 Leviseur had endeavoured to obtain a loading authority from the
Railway Department for the transport of maize which he had purchased from Friedman. Owing to
unforeseen delay on the part of the Railway Department, which has a discretion in issuing loading
authority, no authority was available to enable Friedman to load the maize within the period allowed
under the contract, time being admittedly of the essence of the contract. The court held that the
contract was discharged and that Leviseur was not liable for the purchase price of the maize because
of an implied condition, that the loading authority would be furnished in time. McGregor J based the
decision on the doctrine of frustration of contract:
"I am disposed to hold that the present case' falls under the principles laid down by the
courts in cases like Nickol! v. Ashton (1901, 2 K.B. 126, 84 L.T.R. 804), and very
possibly in what has been termed the 'Coronation Cases', of which the case of Krell v.
Henry (1903,2 K.B. 740, 89 L.T.R. 328) is an exarnple.I"
After evaluating the abovementioned cases, the judge concluded:
"Now seeing that the English doctrine was initially derived from the Roman Law and
thereafter developed to meet fresh conditions, there seems no reason why a similar
development should not obtain with liS also - bearing in mind the Roman maxim
'Ramsden, supra, 74, my italics.
21922 OPO 182.
JLeviseur v Friedman, supra, 192.
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'impossibilium nulla obligatio est' (D. 50.17.185) .... Thus in the recent case of Tamplin
s.s. Co. (1916,2 A.C. 397, 115 L.T.R. 315), it was observed by Lord Haldane that 'when
people enter into a contract which is dependent for the possibility of its performance on
the continued availability of a specific thing, and that availability comes to an end by
reason of circumstances beyond the control of the parties, the contract is prima facie
regarded as dissolved. The contingency which has arisen is treated, in the absence of a
contrary intention made plain, as being one about which no bargain at all was made.' ...
All this may, not unreasonably, be regarded as a liberal and equitable extension of the
principle stated by Pothier (Dblig., s. 149): 'Where a person who was obliged to do any
act, is prevented by accident or force ... from doing it ... there is no ground for subjecting
him to damages.''' I
Here again there was no case of literal impossibility. Unreasonable delay is one of the typical
instances for the application of the doctrine of frustration of contract, and it is accordingly not
surprising that the court looked for orientation to the typical frustration cases of Krell v Henry and
Tamplin SS Co.2 The contract mentioned no specific delivery date, and the parties had not anticipated
that the delay occasioned by the Railway Department would render performance useless: upon the
eventual arrival of the mealies at Algoa Bay, the ships on which Leviseur had intended exporting the
maize had already left and there was no adequate storage available. The court therefore had to imply a
term and stretch the notion of impossibility in order to reach the only appropriate result. Me Gregor J
approved of the principle laid down in Krell v. Henri and found it to be reconcilable with Peters,
Flamman v. Kokstad Municipality" This case indicates again the fact that impossibility is only the
most obvious case of frustration of purpose and that it can hardly be distinguished from other
instances of frustration of purpose.
McGregor J had emphasized that the fact that the contract became more onerous due to a fall in prices
during the delay, was not material for the decision of the case.' That this statement is only partly
correct, and that much depends of the degree of onerosity, is illustrated by the similar case of
Lanificio Varam SA v Masurel Fils (Pty) ua: A contract for the sale of wool to a Brazilian company
provided that the latter should apply to the Brazilian authorities for an import licence and transmit it
to the seller to enable it to ship the wool. The contract made no mention of the time for obtaining the
ILeviseur v Friedman, supra, 194.
2 [1903]2 KB 740; [1916]2 AC 397.
1 [1903]2 KB 740.
41919 AD 427.
5 Leviseur v Friedman, supra, 195.
619524 SA 655 (A).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
186
licence. The sale was concluded on the 19 October 1949. On the 15 December 1949, the defendant
repudiated the contract on the ground that the import licence had not been tendered within a
reasonable time. On the Il February 1950, the plaintiff tendered the licence to the defendant and,
upon refusal of performance by the defendant, instituted an action to recover the difference between
the contract price and the market price of the wool.
The court held that a term could be implied that, should such licence not be granted within reasonable
time, the contract would be discharged and further, that in determining the length of the period of
reasonable time, the Court would have to take into account the nature and extent of the fluctuations in
the value of wool. Also relevant was the contemplation of the parties as to the time within which the
Brazilian authorities would be likely to grant an import licence. The judgement was given per Hoexter
JA:
"Finally, the trial Court might reasonably hold that the parties must have intended that
the contract should be discharged if, owing to the delay of the Brazilian authorities, it
would not be performed within a reasonable time, because neither party could be held
responsible for such a delay .... In determining the length of the period of reasonable time
that Court will certainly have to take into account the nature and extent of the
fluctuations in the value of wool and the time, contemplated by the parties, within which
the Brazilian Authorities would be likely to grant an import licence.,,1
This reasoning may well be understood in the sense that beyond a certain threshold of onerosity, the
contractual equivalence is disturbed to such a degree (practically nonexistent) that the purpose or
causa finalis of the contract (commutative justice) is frustrated.
Another interesting case is Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd. v. Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd? The respondent had
leased certain immovable property to appellant for seven and a half years as from 1 February 1971. In
addition to a provision for an increase of monthly rental twice during the currency of the lease, clause
27 thereof read:
"Should the Rand, the official currency of the Republic of South Africa, be devalued in
terms of sterling or US dollars at any time from the act of signature hereof, then the
monthly rental payable from the first day of the month following such devaluation shall
I Lanificio Varam SA v Masurel Fils (Pty) Ltd supra, 661A H.
21981 1 SA 889 (N).
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be increased to the extent that it becomes equal to what the monthly rental was prior to
the devaluation of the currency in terms of which the Rand was devalued."
A dispute arose as to the validity of, and construction to be placed upon this clause (and hence the
rental payable) after the Bretton Woods Agreement, in terms of which currencies of participating
countries were fixed in terms of a specified mass of gold, had come to an end. The court held that the
contract stood, and that there was no implied term or supposition to the effect that if the Bretton
Woods Agreement came to an end, the clause would not apply. The decisive reason for this
conclusion was formulated by Kumleben J in the following manner:'
"I doubt whether the parties, 111 reply to the appropriate question from the mythical
bystander, would have said 'Of course, it was obvious that clause 27 would be a dead
letter should the Bretton Woods Agreement come to an end'. The lessor may well have
replied 'I have no idea under what monetary system South Africa will then operate or to
what extent official acts will then be a realistic adjustment of 'real rent', but any such
increases will still serve my interests and the provision is therefore to stand'. The lessee,
on the other hand, might have answered: 'Since I have no particular interest in how
realistic the criterion is, and am in any event committed to an unpredictable basis oj
adjustment, I assume that the provision will continue to apply until the end of the lease'.
In seeking to imply such a term Mr. Knight laid great stress on those words in clause 27
following 'increased' and submitted that the purpose oj the adjustments was to 'equalise'
the rental. Accepting that broadly speaking this was the reason for its inclusion ..., in the
context of the clause as a whole it is to my mind not the dominant object and it ought not
to be given preference over the express term to which it gave rise. Just as error in motive
does not affect the validity of a contract ..., so a change in the circumstances which gave
rise to the inclusion of an express and unambiguous term ought not necessarily to prevent
such a term remaining operative throughout the subsistence of an agreement."
It is submitted that the basic reason for this decision was the fact that the common purpose of clause
27 of the contract was not really entirely frustrated by the lapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
Even after this change in the circumstances, the clause still provided a means to adjust the rental to
value-fluctuations of the currency, which was its main purpose. In any case, the existing clause served
the common purpose better than the contract without the relevant provision. The provision was not
working contrary to the common purpose after the change of circumstances, although its application
had become less obvious. But as the common purpose was clear, it could still be interpreted with
I Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd, supra, 901 D-H, my italics.
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reference to that purpose in order to serve that purpose and thus make it comply with that purpose. It
is clear that simply regarding clause 27 as invalid would have been contrary to the common purpose.
It has been stressed in Part I of this thesis that there can be no frustration if the contract can be made
to comply with the common purpose by means of the rules of interpretation.
2.3. Common mistake
In Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v Oberholzer! the defendant (appellant) sold a Plymouth car to the
plaintiffs (respondent on appeal's) son under a hire-purchase agreement and received an
acknowledgment of debt from the son for the amount owing. The defendant later took judgement
against the son for the amount owing; a warrant of execution was issued and served on the son. A
nulla bona return was made, and it was recorded that the son had stated that this car was on his
father's, the plaintiffs, farm. This statement was false as far as the identity of the car was concerned in
that the son had in the meantime purchased another Plymouth from a third party (A Motors) and
exchanged it for a Hudson car belonging to his father. The son then sold this car and the first
Plymouth to certain garages. The messenger, still acting under the judgement obtained by the
defendant, attached the second Plymouth which was in plaintiffs possession on his farm. The plaintiff
had allowed the messenger to take the car away and was told that he could have the car back if he paid
an amount of £257. Efforts by the plaintiff to obtain the return of his Hudson car from his son having
failed, some time later he wrote to the defendant asking whether the Plymouth which had been
attached had been sold, and if not, whether the offer to let him have it was still open for acceptance by
him. The reply was that if he paid in cash the amount outstanding on the car - approximately £291 -
he could call and collect it, which he did, the hire-purchase agreement relating to the first Plymouth
being cancelled on the signature of the plaintiff and a representative of the defendant. As a result of a
judgement obtained by A Motors, a representative of this firm went with the messenger and removed
the second Plymouth from the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon instituted an action
to recover the £291 paid to the defendant. He pleaded that he paid this amount, which was not owing
by him to the defendant, in error. The defendant averred that this amount had been paid in payment of
the amount owed by plaintiffs son. It was admitted that the sum was not owing by the plaintiff and
that when the amount was paid, the plaintiff knew this. The trial Court had given judgement for the
plaintiff. On appeal, Schreiner JA held:
"For once it is clear, as it undoubtedly is, that the plaintiff, to the defendant's
knowledge, was only interested in obtaining the car and not in paying his son's debts
except as a means of obtaining the car, the identity of the car at Vereeniging as the one
I 1952 I SA 443 (A).
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that A.G. Oberholzer had bought from the defendant was of vital importance .... The
£291 was paid under a common mistake in regard to a matter which was vital to the
transaction and if either of them had been aware of the true position the transaction
would not have gone through. In Huddersfield Banking Company Ltd. v.Henry Lister &
Son Ltd. 1895 (2) Cho273, Lindley L.J. states the proposition,
'that an agreement founded upon a common mistake, which mistake is impliedly treated
as a condition which must exist in order to bring the agreement into operation, can be
set aside, formally if necessary, or treated as set aside and as invalid without any
process or proceedings to do so.'
This seems to me to express in clear language a principle which IS inherent In all
developed systems of law." I
The formulation used would be exactly the same whether the case would be treated under the head of
implied term, supposition or common mistake, and it is submitted that the decisive consideration was
that the common purpose of both parties, was not the payment of the son's debt, but rather the
purchase of a car, and that this had been frustrated because of the common error about the identity of
the car.
The fact that it is often arbitrary which legal tool is employed to give effect to the underlying
principle, is also apparent from Volkskas Bpk v Geyserf which lies on the border between common
mistake, innocent misrepresentation and rectification. The defendant had bound himself to the
plaintiff as surety and co-debtor for one J in an amount of £300. When J had failed to pay the amount,
it was claimed from the defendant. In his plea, the defendant denied that the copy of the deed of
suretyship, which was annexed to the declaration, was a true record of the terms arrived at between
. the parties. He pleaded that at the time the deed of suretyship was signed, he had orally agreed with
the manager of a branch of the plaintiff that he would, for a period of six months, or until J's existing
harvest was reaped and sold, guarantee as surety and co-debtor J's deficiency in respect of his existing
overdraft and obligations which he would incur before his existing harvest was reaped. At the request
of the manager he had signed a guarantee without reading it, and without having any knowledge of its
contents and before it was all completed. He had throughout acted under the bonafide impression that
the printed portion of the deed contained nothing which was in conflict with the oral agreement. The
court held, that the plea was based on a defence that as the result of a common error and/or
misrepresentation of the manager, the deed of suretyship did not reflect the true agreement of the
I Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v Oberholzer, supra, 450A-E, my italics.
219604 SA 412 (T).
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parties, and that it was unnecessary for the defendant to claim rectification specifically. The
judgement was given per Steyn J:
"Na my mening, egter, berus die pleit nie op 'n bewering van eensydige dwaling aan die
kant van verweerder nie maar, indien dit wel die geval mag wees, is daardie dwaling,
volgens die pleit, veroorsaak duer die wanvoorstelling (hetsy skuldige of onskuldige) van
die bestuurder Swart dat die borgakte voltooi sou word ooreenkomstig die voorafgaande
mondelinge ooreenkoms en nie in stryd daarmee nie. Andersinds, en na my mening,
berus die pleit op die verweer, alhoewel nie in soveel woorde uitgedruk nie, dat as gevolg
van gemeenskaplike dwaling en/of wanvoorstelling deur die bestuurder, die borgakte nie
die ware ooreenkoms tussen die partye weergee nie. In beide bovermelde gevalle sou die
feit dat die verweer op bewerings berus wat strydig is met die terme van die borgakte nie
ter sake wees nie daar getuienis in hierdie verband en onder hierdie omstandighede
toelaatbar sou wees om daardie verweer te staaf." I
Another particularly interesting case is Diedericks vMinister of Lands,2 the South African counterpart
to Bell v Lever Bros.3 It illustrates again, that it may from a practical perspective be arbitrary under
which legal category the case is resolved - be it common error, assumption or implied term - albeit the
decisive principle may be obscured by the legal point of departure. Diedericks' case reiterates that it is
not common error itself which discharges the contract, but the question whether or not the error
makes the subject matter of the contract essentially different compared to what had originally been
contemplated by the parties (frustration-test).
In 1953 the plaintiff had under a written agreement been allotted farm properties under Act 12 of
19 I.2, as amended. The agreement provided for the lease of the properties subject to a right to
purchase them at a fixed price payable in a series of annual instalments. The agreement contained a
clause entitling the defendant to resume possession should such properties be required for irrigation
purposes, and for the payment of compensation in a determined manner. In 1961 the defendant
required a portion of one of the farms to be released from the operation of the lease and informed the
plaintiff accordingly. In a letter dated 14 March 1962, signed by a regional representative in the
Department of Lands, the plaintiff was offered an amount of R 2477 subject to him notifying the
defendant within 30 days of the acceptance of this offer. On 23 March 1962 the plaintiff accepted the
offer. In April 1962 the regional representative of the defendant informed the plaintiff that the State
I Volkskas Bpk v Geyser, supra, 417E-H.
219641 SA 49 (N).
) [1926] AC 161.
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had, under the agreement of 1953, the right to resume occupation against compensation calculated pro
rata on the price as fixed in 1953. Accordingly he stated that the offer made in March had been made
in error, clearly due to an oversight by a clerk. Plaintiff was informed that the defendant intended to
repossess the portion against the payment of R 148,73 and a further sum of R 480 for improvements.
Plaintiff refused to accept the repudiation and maintained that the defendant was bound by its written
offer of the 14th and plaintiffs acceptance of the 23 March respectively. Miller J held:
"The issue, therefore, is not whether there was a mistake concerning ownership of the
land but whether there was a mistake in the sense that the provisions of the resumption
clause were overlooked, and if there was such a mistake, whether it was of such a nature
that it justified the defendant's refusal to be bound by the contract. Although the plea
suggests that this mistake was common to the parties, Mr Allaway, rightly in my opinion,
conceded that in fact the mistake was unilateral."!
"[W]hereas defendant was motivated in what he did by his mistaken belief that the
resumption clause. was not available to him, plaintiffs ignorance of its existence played
no part in his decision to accept the defendant's offer. ... The only party who really
laboured under a mistaken belief in concluding the contract was the defendant who says
that but for his mistake he would not have made the offer to plaintiff at all. In this sense,
the mistake upon which defendant relies was unilateral.,,2
"The situation which arises in this case is in many respects similar to that which arose in
Be/lv. Lever Bros. Ltd. 1932 A.C. 161.,,3
"The words of Lord Atkin, which I have quoted above, seem to me to epitomise the
complaint of the defendant in this case: as a result of his own error, the defendant
concluded a bad bargain instead of the good one he could have concluded had he not
made the error. His position, in principle, is no different from that of a party who agrees
to certain terms of a contract because he miscalculated his potential profit or forgot to
take into account a factor which he should have included in his reckoning. The error
which the defendant made did not relate to the identity or nature, or even to the quality of
I Diedericks v Minister of Lands, supra, 53E-F.
2 At 54C-F.
JAt 55F.
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the subject matter of the contract, for on that score the parties were ad idem, each
receiving and giving exactly what he bargained for.'"
PMA Hunt criticises the decision for giving too narrow a meaning to "common mistakev' While it
may often be the case - like here - that one party consciously assumes a fact that turns out to be
different while the other does not even think about it, it would be nevertheless true to say that both
were mistaken. Hunt argues that the case should have been decided as concerning an operative
common mistake in substantia or alternatively common assumption.' In his opinion, the fact that
Diedericks' rights to the property was defeasible because of the resumption clause, was an element of
the identity of those rights which were the subject matter of the contract."
While Hunt is correct in that the term "common mistake" need not be given too narrow a meaning, it
is clear from the judgement that Miller J employed the term in a normative way by linking it to the
really decisive criterion whether the error was for both of the parties vital to the transaction, touching
on the identity of the subject matter of the obligation, or whether it was vital only for one of them and
in that sense unilateral. The crucial issue is, as always, whether one regards the error in the particular
case as fundamental, that is, concerning a vital aspect of the contract. Of course, this is not always
apparent. Diedericks' case and Bell v. Lever Bros. appear to be particularly illustrative borderline
cases. In such cases the solution will always be far from obvious - as the narrow majority of judges in
Bell v. Lever Bros. demonstrates.
In Bell's case Lord Atkin and Lord Thankerton had employed the frustration test to determine whether
the mistake was fundamental or not. Lord Atkin said that the mistake
"will noi affect assent unless it is the mistake of both parties and is as to the existence of
some quality which makes the thing without the quality essentially different from the
thing as it was believed to be.'"
Lord Thankerton further emphasized that a mistake as to the subject matter must relate to
"something which both must necessarily have accepted in their minds [consciously or
unconsciously] as an essential and integral element of the subject matter. ,,2
I At 56D-F.
2 Hunt, "Mistake in the Formation of Contract: The Case of the Careless Clerk" 1964 SALJ 153 157.
J Hunt, 1964 SALJ 156. Hunt rejects the implied-term approach because of its fictious character, 160.
4 Hunt, 1964 SALJ 159.
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In the view of the majority of the judges there was nothing to show that Bell and Snelling regarded the
validity of the service contracts as vital, only Lever Bros. did so.
I am of opinion that the decisions in Bell v Lever Bros as well as Diedericks' case, were correct. It has
been argued here that generally, the causa finalis of a contract is to be found in equality in exchange,
and that the individual contract must be scrutinized to assess the elements vital to both parties which
form the individual balance of exchange on which the parties are ad idem, and the realization of
which is the common purpose of their contract. The absence or unattainability of one or more of these
elements must result in a situation so different from originally envisaged that the obligation changes
its whole character and the realization of the balance of exchange becomes impossible, that is to say,
frustrated.
The purpose of the contract was the release of sub-division 1 from the terms of the 1953 agreement.'
This purpose was achieved, though for the defendant it was a bad bargain due to his own imprudence
and oversight of the resumption clause. Hunt's opinion that the defeasibility of Diedericks' rights due
to the resumption clause formed part of the essence of those rights is questionable. Rather, Diedericks'
rights to the property and the resumption clause are two different things. The resumption clause does
not describe the identity of Diedericks' rights but on the contrary, gives a certain right to the State. A
failure of the State to make use of this right - albeit erroneously - concerns its own sphere of risk, and
does not concern Diedericks. The resumption right therefore played no role in the balance of
exchange, since it related neither to the essence nor the value of the subject matter of the contract. The
decisive reasoning of Miller J, guided by the decision in Bell v. Lever Bros., appears to be correct:
The common mistake related to a fact which played no part in the plaintiff's decision to accept
defendant's offer. It was only vital for defendant's motivation.
As Lord Atkin and Miller J pointed out in their respective judgements, both parties got exactly what
they bargained for, there being no essential difference in the contract before and after the discovery of
the error. The plaintiff, for whose motivation the misapprehended fact played no part, cannot be
compelled to share in the risk of such an error. The error in this case could easily have been avoided
by the defendant, and it fall's within his sphere of responsibility.
1 At 218.
2 At 235.
J Miller Jat 53D.
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2.4. Cases illustrative of the general limitations
As set out in the earlier parts of this thesis,' there are certain accepted Iimitations of a doctrine of
frustration of purpose. These limitations are also reflected in South African case law. The invocation
of frustration of purpose can be excluded because of an express provision of the contract, because the
frustrated purpose was not common to the parties but merely unilateral, or there could have been a
self-induced frustration, foreseeability of a risk or an assumption of risk of some other nature.
2.4.1. Self-induced frustration
Here again, the close relationship of impossibility and frustration comes into play. As in the case of
impossibility through a prevention of performance, cases of frustration brought about by any act or
forbearance of one of the parties to the contract, cannot result in a release of the party concerned.
Dicta to that effect can be found e.g. in M Leviseur & Co v Friedman per McGregor J.:2
"Reference has already been made to the matter of negligence or fraud. In Taylor v.
Caldwell the rule was expressed as being applicable under circumstances arising 'without
default of the contractor.' It may be that where the one party can establish that it was
owing to the negligence or default of the other party that the requisite or material thing or
event was not present, the principle would no longer apply. And a like result would even
more probably follow iffraud were proved."
Then there is the statement by Colman J in Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall:3
"It is unnecessary, however, for me to decide whether our law goes as far in that regard
as the English law is said to do, or whether, even if it does, the doctrine can ever be
applied to the frustration of a term like the one in issue here. I say that because what is
abundantly clear, even in the law of England (it was stressed by the House of Lords in
the Joseph Constantine case which r have mentioned), is that the doctrine does not
operate in favour of the party who has himself brought about the frustration; and that is
what the present plaintiff did when it contracted for its release from the obligations to
pay royalties. It makes no difference, to my mind, that the defendant was an assenting
party to that release."
1 Part II §2.4.1-3; Part III §2.4.
2 M Leviseur v Friedman, 1922 OPO 182 195.
J Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall, 1968 3 238 (W) 239AB.
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It has been argued that the doctrine of frustration of purpose may include cases of relative
impossibility.' That this is not the case when the relative or subjective impossibility has been caused
by an act or forbearance of one of the parties, is also laid down in Benjamin v. Myers and Grobbelaar
v. Bosch.2
2.4.2. Assumption of risk
Self-induced frustration must be distinguished from the case where the risk of a change of
circumstances brought about by external factors is assumed by one or both of the parties. Apart from
speculative transactions, cases where a change of circumstances is foreseeable require consideration
in this regard.
2.4.2.1. Foreseeability
In Mountstephens & Collins v Ohlssohn's Cape Breweries/ Salomon J held:
"But the point is this, that the act of the licensing court is one which might have been
contemplated at the time of the lease. The parties must have known that the court might
refuse to renew it at any time, but there is no clause in the lease providing against this
contingency. "
In HofJend v. Elgeti.: Centlivres JA held:
"The test is what was the cause of the loss and not what was the amount of the loss. If I
agree to bear a loss the cause of which was within my contemplation when I entered into
a contract, I am bound by such an agreement, and it would be no defence on my part to
say that the extent of the loss exceeded my expectations or was greater than what would
normally have been expected."
I Part III, §§ 3.2 and 4.
2 1946 CPO 655 and 1964 3 SA 687 (E).
) 1907 TH 56 59.
419493 SA 91 (A) 103.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
196
2.4.2.2. Speculative transactions
Agreements which by their very nature have a speculative character, like the bulk of business
transactions, cannot be treated as frustrated if the commercial endeavour results in failure, the
transaction turns out to be a bad bargain, and the purpose of making a profit is not attained or even
transformed into the opposite. In these cases, the parties have consciously assumed and accepted the
risk that their speculations as to profit may fail. Such cases are related to those relating to
foreseeability in that the parties usually act on the basis of a prognosis which by its nature is uncertain
and includes the risk of failure. Because these transactions are by nature speculative, the common
purpose cannot be frustrated by an economic failure.
Thus, in MacDuff & Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd
Solomon JA in principle approved of the doctrine of frustration as exposed by Lord Loreburn 111
Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-American Petroleum Co: I
''It was contended, however, in argument, that in law a contract becomes impossible of
performance where the parties make a bargain on the footing that a particular state of
things will continue to exist, and where there has been a discontinuance of that state of
things such as to upset altogether the purpose of the contract. And it is said that in the
present case the footing on which the parties contracted was that there should still exist
an undertaking capable of expansion on the lines indicated in MacDuffs letter of the 28th
July, 1920, and that there was no such undertaking at the time when the new company
should have been formed. The principle of law here invoked is taken from the judgement
of the Lord Chancellor in the case of Tamplin SS Co. v. Anglo-American [Mexican]
Petroleum Co. (1916,2 A.C. 403) ...
It will be observed that Lord Loreburn extends the rule of the civil law that a person is
discharged from his obligation under the contract, if the thing the subject matter of the
contract has ceased to exist, to the case where a particular state of things has ceased to
exist, if the parties have bargained on the footing that that state of things would continue
to exist. I am not aware that there is any express authority in our law to that effect, but
the principle was accepted in the case of Schlengemann v. Meyer Bridgens & Co. (1920,
C.P.D.420), and for the purposes of my judgement I shall assume it to be good law."
But on the facts of the case the judge denied frustration because of the speculative character of the
transaction: I
1 1924 AD 573603.
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"The defendant company deliberately undertook, with full knowledge of the fact that the
position was not so rosy as it had been painted by MacDuff and Lawn, to float a
company to take over the MacDuff company. It was well aware that the undertaking
might fluctuate from time to time, and it might in the contract have made provision to
meet such a case as this. Not having done so, I do not think that it is entitled now to
repudiate its obligation because the MacDuff company had fallen upon bad times."
In Hersman v Shapiro & Co it was held per Stratford J:2
"Looking at the nature of this contract - that it was of a speculative character and both
parties ran whatever commercial risk resulted from a rise or fall of the market against
them - I cannot think the condition of things that has happened is not a condition of
things that might well have been in the contemplation of the parties. Therefore, on the
particular facts of this case, I am prepared to go the length of saying that, looking at all
the circumstances surrounding the making and performing of this contract, the
implication of the contract is that the defendant should not be relieved because of a
failure of crops in the Union."
In Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd and another it was held per Preiss J:3
"On the one hand, to decree specific performance would be to allow the applicant to
purchase a valuable mineral right for a ridiculously low price. On the other hand, there
are a number of features which cannot be ignored. They are the following:
1. The respondents, through the engineer, Mr. Albertyn, valued the mineral rights as best
they could, and with the information then at his disposal, the latter fixed the value at no
more than 10 cents per hectare. Though nominal, it was not shown to be an artificially
low value; .....
2. The respondents concluded the cession and sale agreements with full knowledge of the
fact that the applicant was the holder of the grant, and they were aware of its terms.
3. The applicant is in no way responsible for the dilemma in which the respondents now
find themselves .
IMacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd, supra, 607.
21926 TPD 367 374.
) 19854 SA 615 (T) 628.
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5. The respondents, as authors of their present distress, should be held to the terms of the
agreements. "
In Snyman v. Fow!dsl it was held that a purchaser is not entitled to resile from a contract where after
the sale a burden is imposed upon the land purchased by operation of law or by the exercise of
statutory powers. This was taken to be a risk which every purchaser of a farm has to accept.
2.5. Conclusion
Frustration cases turn up under several different legal categories in the South African case law.
Claire Palley has observed this situation when she said:
"It seems that there are so few cases of common mistake giving rise to restitutio because
in most cases the identical claim will lie on grounds of innocent misrepresentation, or
alternatively the common assumption will have been incorporated into the contract as
either as an express or implied term. ,,2
What most of these different legal rubrics have in common and what links them together is that they
all aim at ensuring contractual justice. That applies also to supervening impossibility, if - as in the
case of the South African law of contract - it is understood in an extended way under the influence of
the English doctrine of frustration.
The reason why in South Africa frustration cases are often dealt with by means of the notion of
impossibility is simple: The English law of frustration does not differentiate between cases of
impossibility and frustration. It comprises indiscriminately cases of absolute, relative and quasi-
impossibility. South African Courts are aware of the difference between the civilian doctrine of
impossibility and the English doctrine of frustration, but, as usual, in applying the doctrine of
impossibility, they looked for orientation to English cases. In doing so, they did not always succeed in
differentiating cases of absolute, relative and quasi-impossibility. Thus they have also applied typical
English frustration cases when speaking of supervening impossibility.' That was a logical
development since, as pointed out earlier, frustration and impossibility rest on the same underlying
I 19503 SA 74 (T).
2 Claire Palley, "Comparative study of mistake", Rhodesia and Nyasaland U, 1961, 206.
J English frustration cases were referred to in Bischofberger v. Van Eyk, 1981 2 SA 607 (W); Rossouw v. Haumann 1949 4
SA 796 (C); Benjamin v. Myers, 1946 CPD 655; Schlengemann v. Meyer, Bridgens Co. Ltd, 1920 CPD 494; Peters,
Flamman Co. v. Kokstad Municipality, 1919 AD 427; Witwatersrand Township Estate and Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Rand Water
Board, 1907 TS 23 I.
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principle and the borderline is always difficult to draw. This development was probably reinforced by
statements like that of Viscount Maugham in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial
Smelting Corporation Ltd: I
"The doctrine of frustration is only a special case of the discharge of contract by an
impossibility of performance arising after the contract was made."
Closely related to instances of supervening impossibility are cases decided on the basis of the
supposition and implied terms. The concept of the common supposition is most obviously related to
the concept of frustration. The South African understanding of this closely resembles Windscheid's
doctrine of contractual assumption (Vorraussetzungslehre) in the late 19th century in Germany.' The
implied term is already by its nature related to the common supposition.' Both concepts have
increasingly come under assault, a development which parallels that in Germany and England. The
arguments are the same everywhere: suppositions can only with difficulty be distinguished from
conditions and legally irrelevant motives, and implied terms are often purely fictitious and only serve
as a last-resort-tool to remedy a certain injustice."
Also closely related to the supposition, are cases of common error.' These two concepts will to a large
extent be interchangeable.f The relation between cases of common error and frustration has already
been described earlier in the part dealing with the English law.'
South African law does not accommodate a specific doctrine of change of circumstances or frustration
of purpose. The relevant cases are remedied by several different legal concepts. Yet it is obvious that
the relevant cases relating to fundamental change of circumstances are somehow connected, they have
something in common. The jurisprudence should take note of that. These cases bear witness of an
important principle which cannot be ignored. It is submitted on the basis of what has been worked out
in this thesis that the principle of causa finalis provides a good ex~lanation of these cases and the
legal tools employed to resolve them, and leads towards more clarity and dogmatic coherence in these
11942 AC 168.
2 See above Part II § I. I. at the end.
J Van der Merwe et al Contract - General Principles 202.
4 Eg. Ramsden, Supervening impossibility of performance in the South African law of contract 1985, 69sqq; Scholtz, "Pacta
sunt servanda en verandering van omstandighede na kontraktsluiting", 1976 Responsa Meridiana 153sqq; Hunt, "Mistake in
the formaton of contract: the case of the' careless clerk" 1964 SALJ 160.
S Lubbe & Murray 446, note 2.
6 Hunt, "Mistake in the formation of contract: the case of the careless clerk", 1964 SALJ 156, note I.
7 See above Part III § 1.2.1.
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areas of the law. The distinct charm of the principle is that it has its place in both common and civil
law which could make it especially suitable for the South African law with its continuing blend of the
two major legal traditions.
The example of Professor Kerr shows that the role of the principle of causa finalis in contract law and
its relevance for the problem of fundamental change of circumstances has not remained unnoticed in
the South African jurisprudence. Kerr observes:
"Every contract is made with one or more purposes in view and is intended to operate in
certain circumstances.":
And therefore:
"Every contract has a sphere of operation beyond wh ich it is of no effect. ,,2
He refers to initial impossibility as entailing the
"absence at the time agreement IS reached of the circumstances necessary for the
operation of the contract'"
and to supervening impossibility as the
"absence during the currency of the contract of the circumstances necessary for its
operation. ,,4
Kerr observes that the rules as to impossibility are not only concerned with absolute impossibility but
also encompass cases of what has been termed relative and quasi-impossibility.' The contractual
purpose has to be common to both parties, and may not only concern the unilateral motive of one of
them." Although most of the relevant cases deal with changes brought about by vis maior or casus
fortuitus, these are not the only possible causes.' Kerr emphasizes that an intervention into the
I Kerr, The Principles a/the Law a/Contract, 223.
2 Kerr, supra, 157.
) Kerr, supra, 223.
4 Kerr, supra, 486.
5 Kerr, supra, 224.
6 Kerr, supra, 224, 225.
7 Kerr, supra, 226.
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contract depends only on the extent of the departure from the contractual norm, and he adopts the
Radcliffe-test to draw the line.!
Kerr summarizes his opinion on the matter as follows.'
"The basic rule is that if during the currency of a contract the conditions necessary for its
operation cease to exist, the change not being due to the fault of either party or to a factor
for which either party bears the risk, the contract ceases to exist. As is mentioned above,
there is no objection to the traditional phrase 'supervening impossibility of performance'
if performance becomes impossible in fact. However, as in the case of initial
impossibility of performance, there is difficulty with the word 'impossible'. Performance
precisely as contemplated at the time the contract was entered into may no longer be
possible but the result intended may be able to be achieved in some other way. The party
bound to perform remains bound if the departure from the norm for the particular
contract in question is minor, he is not bound if it is major, i.e. if the kind of performance
which is possible in fact is 'vitally different from what should reasonably have been
within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract' .... The fact
that the impossibility, as in Bayley's case, above, may relate to the purpose of a lease and
not to the occupation of the premises as such shows that the class of case generally
referred to under the title 'failure of the basis of the contract' is not foreign to our law."
Kerr mentions the same limitations as are employed both in Germany and in England: the change may
not be covered by contractual provisions or other rules of law, self-induced frustration and assumption
of risk.3
He relies especially on the cases Bayley v. Harwood and African Realty Trust Ltd v Holmes for his
position and criticises the courts for obscuring the matter through a superficial distinction between
English and South African law without a detailed investigation into the differences and similarities of
the law regarding this subject.'
Kerr's treatment of causa (redelijke oorzaak) in the South African law of contract also goes into the
same direction as expounded in this thesis. He observes that the authoritative decisions on the topic
I Kerr, supra, 225. Kerr does not refer expressly to the case Davis Contractors, but to the American author Williston, § 1931,
vol. 18, p. 8.
2 Kerr, supra, 487, 49 I .
3 Kerr, supra, 493 sqq.
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only describe what causa is not, while remaining obscure about what the term actually denotes. It is
only settled that causa is not to be equated with valuable consideration as understood by the English
law.' Apart from that, the judges employ vague and ambiguous terms to describe causa, e.g. as "the
origin of the agreement",' "the ground or reason for the undertaking"," or "a reason for a contract, a
rational motive for it, whether the motive is benevolence, friendship, or other proper feeling, or, on
the other hand, is of a commercial or business nature. ,,5 Kerr identifies the distinction of the ground or
reason of the contract from an irrelevant motive as the crucial question." He examines the old
authorities Grotius, Domat, Pothier, Van der Keessel, Van der Linden, Van Leeuwen and Huber and
states: 7
"It is clear, however, that in our law use of the word causa is not confined to counter-
performance, the word being found in other contexts as well, in particular, when purpose
is envisaged."
From the differing choice of words in the sources concerning causa he concludes:8
"This indicates that a causa in the sense of the ground or reason or purpose is considered
to be present in contracts within the normal classes. It is there because, as Voet says,"
such contracts are 'underlain by their very nature by a ground of obligation' .... Modern
law no longer places the emphasis Roman law did on membership of a particular class of
contracts so it seems that nowadays a plaintiff who sues on what he claims to be a
contract need show no more to begin with than that the parties entered into the
transaction, or appear to have entered into the transaction 'seriously and deliberately and
'.
with the intention that a lawful obligation should be established'. It is then open to the
defendant to show that there was no causa" or that there was a causa but that it was
iniusta (or another of the equivalent expressions, eg illicita, inhonesta, turpis, oneerlijke
I Kerr, supra, 490 - 493.
2 Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279.
J Rood v Wallach 1904 TSC 187 199 per Innes CJ.
4 Ibid and 211, per Solomon J.
sConradie v Rossouw supra 286 per Salomon ACJ.
6 Kerr, supra, 164,
7 Kerr, supra, 167.
8Kerr,supra, 166, 167,
9 Voet 12.1.1
10 Kerr refers to Froman v Robertson 1971 I SA lIS (A) 122A and Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3
SA 978 (A) 990F -992F for support of his view.
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etc). In this connection it should be noted that in De Jager v Grunder, I Botha JA adopted
this approach and put the onus of proving a similar exemption on the defendant."
Kerr's exposition of the law regarding this topic clearly is in line with the treatment of causa
advocated in Part IV above. The crucial element of causa is its finalistic nature denoting the purpose
of the contract. In cases of change of circumstances, be it objective or subjective, lack or frustration of
causa can be established as a defence by the affected party. Kerr also links the concept of causa with
the concept of public policy when. he points out that the causa of a contract may naturally not be in
conflict with law, morality or public policy.'
3. Causa finalis in South African law
To resurrect the issue of causa once more will probably touch a sensitive nerve in the soul of some
South African lawyers. Causa is probably the most nebulous and obscure concept inherited from the
Roman-Dutch law. It was in the centre of the most famous judicial debate among the highest South
African judges at the beginning of the century when Chief Justice Lord De Villiers equated it with the
English concept of valuable consideration. This was not surprising since the concept of causa, in the
sense of commutative justice, relates to the notion of reciprocity.'
The decision in Conradie v. Rossouw authoritatively laid down that causa was not the same as
valuable consideration in the English sense, and more specifically, that it had a much wider meaning
than the latter." But the judgement only finally settled what causa was not - its positive significance
continued to be a matter of confusion. The dominant opinion, formulated by Kotzé, Innes and
Solomon JAA, held that causa simply denoted the reason or ground for a promise and that iusta causa
meant that the reason or ground should be "a good and legitimate one and not one contrary to law or
morality or public policy".' This definition, however, does not offer much insight as to the practical
relevance of the concept of causa. From this definition the conclusion seemed inescapable that iusta
causa had finally been swallowed up by other requirements for contractual validity, in particular the
requirements of serious and deliberate intention to contract and legality. This situation has led to
I 1964 1 SA 446 (A) 463 B-C.
2 Kerr, supra, 167, 171 sqq.
3 For a modern view that causa denotes reciprocity in the broadest sense see: Jan Smits, Het vertrouwensbeginsel en de
contractuele gebondenheid, Leiden 1995.
41919 AD 279.
5 At pp. 279,288.
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widespread calls for the total abolishment of the concept of causa from the realms of South African
law. The weight of opinion formulates its criticism thus:
"However even there [in the case of accessory agreements] it seems that the concept has
no independent role to play, because if it is required that the parties should expressly or
implicitly have agreed to make the validity of the accessory agreement dependent on the
existence of a valid principal agreement or obligation, then the so-called iusta causa is no
more than a term of the accessory agreement: more particularly a condition or common
supposition. Indeed, any reason for contracting which the parties elevate to the status of a
fundamental supposition should then qualify as a iusta causa. This is borne out by the
subsequent case of Tauber v. Von Abo ...".1
On the basis of the theme developed in this thesis, it is submitted that the conclusion to be drawn from
Tauber v. Von Abo2 is the exact opposite: it reveals the basic principle behind the concept of
supposition and related concepts, which is in itself open to criticism.'
The plaintiff had granted a written option for the sale of his farm to S. S subsequently ceded its rights
in and to the option to the defendant. When the defendant wished to exercise his right, the plaintiff
informed him that he no longer wished to sell his farm. After discussion between the parties, both of
them considering the option to be valid and binding, an agreement was entered into between them
whereby the defendant agreed to release the plaintiff from his obligations under the option on
condition that the plaintiff pay the defendant a certain sum of money. As a result of the agreement, the
plaintiff signed an acknowledgment of debt which became the source of the dispute in this case. The
plaintiff claiming an order declaring the acknowledgment of debt to be of no legal force and effect
and not binding on him because it had subsequently been discovered that the option was a nullity all
along.
The court held that the fact that the option was void and unenforceable meant that the basis for the
conclusion of the subsequent agreement had fallen away, and that consequently the subsequent
agreement was invalid and unenforceable." Van Rensburg J formulated the principle as follows:'
I Hutchison "Contract Formation" in: Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross, 172; to the same effect: Stassen, "Causa
in die Kontraktereg", 1979 THRHR 357 374; Reinecke and Van der Merwe, 1979 THRHR 435; Van der Merwe et al,
Contract 142.
219844 SA 483 (E).
J§ 2.1.
4Tauber v Von Abo, supra, 489B.
sTauber v Von Abo, supra, 490A-D, my italics.
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"This brings me to Mr. Van Riet's argument that the acknowledgment of debt is invalid
on grounds of a lack of justa causa. This argument can be dealt with briefly. In the
present matter the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant R 150 000 and signed an
acknowledgment of debt for this amount on the common assumption that the option was
valid and enforceable. In other words the existence of a valid option was the underlying
causa for the subsequent agreement. The option having been declared void, it follows
that the acknowledgment of debt must also fail for lack of justa causa. Froman v.
Robertson 1971 (1) SA 115 (A) at 120-122; Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v.
Friedman 1979 (3) SA 978 (A) at 99lF. It is correct, as was submitted by Mr. Viljoen,
that the requirement of justa causa may be sufficiently satisfied if the promise is made
seriously and deliberately, and with the intention that a lawful obligation should be
established, but where, as I have found in the present case, there was a specific
underlying causa for the parties contracting, namely the existence of a valid option, and
the option fails, the conclusion is inescapable, that the subsequent agreement must also
fail."
The common purpose of the parties regarding the acknowledgment of debt was to pay for the release
of the plaintiff from the option. This purpose was frustrated when the option turned out to be invalid.
To nevertheless hold the plaintiff to the acknowledgment of debt would be against the common
purpose of the parties and would militate against commutative justice.'
To require an agreement between the parties on the iusta causa means nothing more than that the
causa must be common to both parties.i Causafinalis is not a new distinct kind of contractual term
(that would require that the parties had foreseen the possible change of circumstances at the time of
the formation of the contract) - it is as much a term of a contract as good faith is: it is an objective,
necessary principle of contract law, and it certainly does not only relate to accessory agreements
although its importance is particularly obvious in these cases. It would be naï ve and futile to ignore
or disregard the role of purpose (telos) in the law, because its role is crucial to the essence of the law.
I The case is also distinguishable from cases like Diederick's v. Minister of Lands (supra) and Bell v. Lever Bros. (supra) in
that in this case the release from the option was the sole object of the acknowledgment of debt and thus the voidness of the
option related directly - and not only indirectly or by implication - to the common purpose.
2 This is borne out in Froman v. Robertson 1971 I SA liS (A) at 127F, and Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v. Friedman
1979 3 SA 978 (A) at 992H, see below.
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South African writers are correct 111 so far as they stress that causa cannot be an additional
requirement for the validity of contract formation. Whenever there is a deliberate, serious and legal
intention to be bound, a causa is present. The doctrine of causafinalis does not regulate the formation
of contract, but its execution - not its validity, but its enforceability. It may afford a defence if the
contract is not executed according to the causa finalis - the common purpose of the parties. The
doctrine is perfectly reconcilable with the traditional approach to contracts which takes the will-
theory as its point of departure, it merely reminds us that will cannot be treated divorced from its aim
or purpose. The law is not, and never was, blind to the aim of the parties' will. How the contract is
treated by the law will in fact often depend more on the aim of the parties than the pure empirical fact
that something has been willed with an intention to be bound. I
The 'missing link' in the South African context is the crucial relation of causa to purpose in the sense
of causa finalis. The discussion of causa in South Africa is obscured by the fact that causa has always
only been equated with 'ground' and 'reason' and its crucial relation to purpose, its relational, finalistic
nature, has never been adequately emphasized, let alone worked out in a coherent and precise manner.
It has been described how in Europe the concept of causa faded into the background for exactly the
same reason: the significance of causa as relating to purpose and its implications were misunderstood,
because its roots in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy were not appreciated anymore. Will and
purpose had become divorced - with serious and disturbing consequences for the law of contract/ The
merit of restating the significance of causafinalis belongs to James Gordley.' Because there is no will
without an aim towards which it is directed, the purpose or causa finalis of the contract must be
understood as part of the agreement which has come into being through the will of the parties and it
ought therefore not be disregarded. The very reason why the parties decide to be bound is that they
want to achieve a common purpose with the contract. If that purpose is frustrated, their will is
invalidated, and the ground for the intention to be bound has lapsed.
The relevance of purpose or common intention and its invocation as a defence, can also be extracted
from judicial statements in other cases dealing with the concept of causa.
In Rood v. Wallach4 the relation of causa to purpose becomes clear from the authorities cited with
approval by Innes CJ and Mason J:
I See Part IV.
2 Part I § 2.
] The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, 199 I.
41904 TS 187.
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"With the edition of Grotius published in 1667 is printed a list of the Dutch meanings of
Latin words used throughout the book. The definition of causa in that list is een waerom
- the ground or reason, the why and wherefor of any matter. Strangely enough, Toullier, a
French writer on the Code, gives almost the same definition (Le Droit Civil Fran Cais,
3,4,sec. 166). 'By the cause of an obligation or of a contract,' he says, 'the Code means the
motive for making the promise which it contains, the reason why (le pourquoi) it was
made.""
"The intention is the essential element in contract as in delivery; it is a state of mind due
to a desire to attain some object, and if the object be lawful, then the desire or motive
forms a lawful causa."
"Many of the writers divide contracts into those in which a mutual advantage is
sought, or in which one party only is to get the advantage; the latter are called
'benevolent contracts', and any intention of liberality is considered a sufficient causa to
support them. It is difficult to see what agreements intended to have a binding character
are not included in one of these two c1asses.,,3
The basic traits of the doctrine of causa finalis are stated here: that causa relates to purpose and that
purpose relates to either commutative justice or liberality.
That the concept of causa must be linked to the purpose of the contract is also borne out by the
judgement in Kennedy v. Steenkamp.' where it was held by Watermeyer AlP:
"Unless causa includes the purpose of a contract it would seem however that even the
maxim 'ex turpi causa non oritur actio' is not wide enough to afford a comprehensive test
of the enforceability of contracts. Grothis (3.1.42 & 43) seems to me to deal clearly with
the matter and bring out the distinction between illegality in the causa, in the contract
itself, and the aim or purpose. ,,5
I Rood v Wallach, supra, 200, per Innes CJ, my italics ..
2 Rood v Wallach, supra, 224, per Mason J, my italics.
1 Rood v Wallach, supra, 225, per Mason J, my italics.
41936 CPO 113.
S Kennedy v Steenkamp, supra, 117, my italics.
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In Froman v. Robertson' it was held per Corbett AJA:
"As between the payee and the drawer these promises are enforceable only if supported
by justa causa in the above-described sense; or, to put it in another way, as between
himself and the payee, the drawer, when sued on the cheque, is always entitled to raise
the defence that he drew and issued the same without there having been the necessary
justa causa (see Cowen, The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa, 4th ed., p.
97).,,2
The decision makes clear that to apply the requirement of iusta causa to the contract of cheque means
to have regard to the purpose of a cheque. The cheque is a medium - a means to an end - for the
payment of a monetary obligation. The purpose of the cheque is therefore to discharge that obligation.
If that obligation is, e.g., void, the purpose of the cheque fails or may be said to be absent. It would
not be permissible to contend that the cheque is supported by iusta causa simply because it was drawn
and issued seriously and deliberately and with the intention to establish a lawful obligation (which is
the case). It is clear from the judgement that this rule is a general principle and not confined to
cheques or negotiable instruments or accessory agreements. That iusta causa does not necessarily
consist of a separate obligation is further emphasised when Corbett AJA says:
"Where, as is often the case, the cheque has been drawn and issued in order to discharge
a pre-existing obligation, this obligation must naturally be looked to when determining
whether there isjusta causa; but I do not accept that such an obligation is an essential
requirement of sec. 25 (1) [of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1964]. I reach this conclusion
upon an interpretation of, primarily, para. (a) of sec. 25 (1) ['any cause sufficient to
support an action founded on contract or agreement'], read against the background of the
common law.":'
In Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v. Friedman4 it was held by Jansen JA that animus contrahendi
and iusta causa were different concepts which had to be distinguished for the sake of clarity.
Furthermore, the decisive role of common intention (purpose) was emphasised:
11971 I SA 115 (A).
2Froman v Robertson, supra, 121G, my italics.
) At 127F, my italics.
4 1979 3 SA 978 (A).
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"In hierdie Hof het die vereiste van redelike oorsaak in ons reg in Froman v. Robertson
tap weer na vore gekom - altans wat die kontrak tussen nemer en trekker van 'n tjek betref
(wat as voorbeeld van 'n suiwer eensydige kontrak beskou kan word). Alhoewel die Hof
redelike oorsaak nog in terme van animus contrahendi omskryf(te 121D en 127D-F), is
dit heel duidelik dat 'oorsaak' ook aan die onderliggende verhouding gekoppel word (te
121 E en 127E-F). Dit sal tot meer helderheid lei as in die toekoms die twee begrippe
uitmekaar gehou sou word sodat animus contrahendi nie meer die 'redelike oorsaak', wat
in die onderliggende verhouding gesoek word, oorvleuel nie.,,1
"Nemer en trekker sal dit eens moet wees oor dit waaraan die opbrengs van die tjek
bestee moet word alvorens daar sprake van redelike oorsaak kan wees. Deur hierdie
ooreenkoms word die band tussen wisselkontrak en die onderliggende verhouding gelê.,,2
This passage makes it clear that 'agreement' in the above sense denotes nothing else than common
purpose and that without that common purpose there is no causa.
In his essay on contract formation in Southern Cross, Dale Hutchison, dealing with iusta causa,
concludes:
"The only conclusion that may safely be drawn from these cases is that the last word has
yet to be spoken on the meaning and role of iusta causa in the modern South African law
of contract. This is an unfortunate state of affairs, and it is ardently hoped that, when next
it has an opportunity to pronounce on the matter, the Appellate Division will
unequivocally declare that the iusta causa requirement, having served its historically
important purpose, has now beccrne redundant. Such a pronouncement would not only
reflect the preponderant weight of academic opinion in the country today, it would also
finally conclude a chapter of our legal history that has already dragged on for far too
long.":'
It is submitted that there are good reasons not to follow Hutchison's appeal. The matter is far more
complex than a purely South African perspective would suggest. No legal concept with a long and
fruitful tradition should be abolished only because its significance and relevance has not been
properly understood and therefore is difficult to assess. It will be a vain attempt. One must only look
I At 991E-G.
2 At 992H, my italics.
JAt 173.
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at the development in Germany regarding clausuIa rebus sic stantibus and remind oneself of
Windscheid's prophecy: thrown out of the door, it will always re-enter through the window. I
4. Legal development
The problem of fundamental change of circumstances, though it has not received attention of a very
fundamental nature, has certainly not gone unnoticed, and several writers have urged that it be dealt
with on the basis of the principle of good faith (the implications of which have also not yet found
exhaustive treatment in the South African case lawj.' Although this would not be an inappropriate line
of enquiry, it is submitted that the notion of causa affords a more pertinent perspective. Understood in
the sense of causafinalis, it contributes to dogmatic and methodological clarity and persuasiveness in
dealing with cases of fundamental change of circumstances.
The South African Law Commission has recommended to integrate Article 2.117 of the Principles of
European Contract Law/ dealing with change of circumstances, into the proposed Bill on the Control
of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms." While it is a
good thing that the problem of fundamental change of circumstances is addressed directly with
statutory means and with regard to legal developments on an international level, it is submitted that
the Lando-Principles' distinction between "more onerous" and "excessively onerous" does not
adequately capture the decisive point for practical purposes. It is submitted that although the principle
of frustration of the contractual purpose is also unable to ultimately preconceive the decision in every
case in question in a cogent manner, it at least provides a clear dogmatic basis for the justification of
the decision and binds the court to a certain intelligible standard which has to be established from
every individual contract by way of concretisation. In this process of concretisation, due regard is to
be paid to the actual intention of the parties as well as to the normative understanding of the concept
of contract. The change of circumstances has to be measured against the thus established contractual
purpose. The final decision always inevitably depends on the facts of the individual case and the
court's understanding of the contract, but - it is submitted - at least the court is forced to establish an
intelligible standard from the case and on that basis decide whether the threshold of frustration has
been crossed or not. This will at least methodologically discipline the judicial reasoning and make it
I Windscheid "Die Voraussetzung" in AcP 78 197.
2 Coenraad Visser, 1984 SALl 641 655; Lubbe & Murray, supra, 773; Christie, supra, 19; Van der Merwe et al, supra, 233;
Scholtz "Pacta sunt servanda en verandering van omstandighede na kontraksluiting" 1976 Responsa Meridiana 153 168.
3 Lando and Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (1995); see Part II §1.2. at the end.
4 South African Law Commission Report, Project 47, Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and Rectification of Contracts
(1998), clause 4.(1) - (3),194,220.
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more comprehensible and convincing. The possibility of recurring to purely equitable arguments will
be reduced considerably. The decision will seem less arbitrary as opposed to when the court only
determines whether the situation has become "more onerous" or "excessively onerous". It cannot be
conceived without qualification why this distinction, why the threshold between the two notions is so
decisive - unless the reasoning is linked to the role (which means: the purpose) of the concept of
contract in the legal system in general and the role of the contractual purpose in particular.
The most detailed contribution to this particular subject is that of LF van Huysteen's and Schalk van
der Merwe, I in which all the issues of importance raised by the subject - e.g. whether change of
circumstances is in itself a ground for intervention, the implied-terms approach, legal certainty vs.
equity (substantive justice), adjudication of interests (value-judgements), the value-orientation of the
law, concretisation - are identified. This thesis seeks to respond to this article by attempting to
evaluate these issues in greater depth. The developments described in this thesis should be seen within
the broader context of a return to the ethical foundations of the earlier ius commune and the
renaissance of Aristotelian-thomistic ideas in legal thought? The crucial role of legal philosophy and
legal methodology in determining the content of detailed rules of the law, and especially the
philosophical and methodological premises of the function and purpose of contract, have been
emphasized. This perception has also been gaining ground in South Africa.'
I "Good faith in contract: proper behaviour amidst changing circumstances" in 1990 Stellenbosch Law Review 244-251.
2 This process is described by Zimmermann in his Law of Obligations, supra, pp. 259sqq., 268sq., Southern Cross, supra, p.
256, and James Gordley in his Philosophical Origins, supra.
J Eg Harker, "The role of contract and the object of remedies for breach of contract in contemporary western society", 1984
SALJ 121; Alfred Cockrell, "Substance and form in the South African law of contract", 1992 SALJ 40; Van der Merwe et al,
supra, 10; Van Reenen, "Philosophical underpinnings of modern comparative legal methodology", 1996 Stell LR 37.
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Summary
On the basis of a comparative analysis of the case law in Germany, Englarid and South Africa dealing
with fundamental change of circumstances, it is submitted that the underlying principle of this
prob lem area is the idea of frustration of the contractual purpose (causa finalis).
The problem of fundamental change of circumstances is directly connected with basic issues of legal
theory such as the dichotomy between legal certainty and substantive justice, the role and limits of
interpretation, the concretisation of principles, the adjudication of interests and the problem of value-
judgements in the law which are of immediate influence on the understanding of the problem by
judges and legal commentators. A broad perspective on the topic is necessarily indicated hereby.
The thesis therefore starts off with an account of the role of purpose (causa finalis) in the history of
legal philosophy, with a focus on developments in Germany. The continuing relevance of
Aristotelian-Thomistic legal thinking is emphasized. The German and English case law dealing with
fundamental change of circumstances is analyzed in an analogous manner. An account of the history
and development of the doctrines dealing specifically with fundamental change of circumstances is
given: the clausuIa rebus sic stantibus of the ius commune, the doctrine of WegJall der
Geschaftsgrundlage in Germany and the doctrine of frustration of contract and common mistake in
England. The crucial elements of the approach of the courts are restated. The positions of the two
most influential German legal authors involved on opposite sides of the debate concerning the
doctrine of WegJall der Geschaftsgrundlage are discussed. At the end of the discussion of English
case law, the approach of the English courts is compared with that of their German counterparts.
On the basis of the analysis of the cases, the historical and philosophical developments as well as the
position of legal commentators the principle of causafinalis is restated in the following terms:
The causa finalis (end or purpose) of a contract is a balanced, and therefore just, equivalence of
interests of the parties. In contracts of exchange the causa finalis of a contract entails equality in
exchange (commutative justice) in view of the obligation as a whole. Equality in exchange may relate
to either the value or the fitness of the subject matter of the performance for a special purpose. In the
case of unilateral contracts, the causa finalis of the contract may alternatively be - like in the case of
donation - liberality.
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To apply the principle, one has, in the first instance, to assess the balance of exchange (interests) of
the individual contract, as agreed by the parties - which determines the allocation of risk - and
secondly, to evaluate whether a change of circumstances has totally defeated that balance of
exchange. This is the task performed by the doctrines of clausuia rebus sic stantibus, Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage and frustration of contract. They constitute emanations and concretisations of the
underlying informing principle of causafinalis.
The principle of causa finalis does not regulate the formation of a contract, but rather its execution -
not its validity, but its enforceability. It may afford a defence if the contract is not executed according
to the causa finalis of the contract - the common purpose of the parties. The doctrine is perfectly
reconcilable with the traditional approach to contracts which takes the will-theory as its point of
departure, it merely confirms that the will of the parties cannot be dealt with divorced from its aim or
purpose. The law is not and never was blind towards the aim of the will of the parties. How the
contract is dealt with by the law, often depends more on the aim of the will of the parties rather than
the pure empirical fact that something has been willed with the intention to be bound.
Notwithstanding the fact that South African law does not recognize a doctrine dealing specifically
with fundamental change of circumstances, and in spite of dicta to the effect that the English doctrine
of frustration of contract is not part of South African law, it is submitted that the doctrine of
frustration of contract has nevertheless strongly influenced the South African law of supervening
impossibility and supposition, and has arguably become part and parcel of it. Likewise, cases of
frustration of the contractual purpose due to a fundamental change of circumstances have been dealt
with by means of other doctrinal devices such as common mistake.
It is submitted, finally, that the famous and controversial issue of the role of causa in South African
law should be reconsidered, since it may contribute to the understanding of the notion of contract, and
assist in overcoming the current doctrinal crisis of the theory of contract.
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